# Can Japan Create a Basis for its Internationality?

Article 9 of the constitution has been the most important norm in Japanese security policy for sixty years. The "no war, no weapon" clause has created the image of a "peace state" in both domestic and international society. However, since the end of the cold war, the Japanese constitution has been one of the country's most salient political issues. Both of the two major parties, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party, have proposed amending the constitution in the near future. This chapter seeks to explain how constitutional politics have evolved since World War II and contemplates the fate of the constitution. It seems likely that a new framework for Japanese security strategy will appear from debate on the constitution. Since most of Japanese people were born after the second world war, they no longer share the idea of "peace state"(*heiwa kokka*) unanimously, and there has been active debate on amendment of the constitution for several years. Focus of this debate is of course article 9. I am not arguing that Japan will return to a militarist state by amending article 9, nor that people will stick to pacifist ideal in article 9. Various opinion polls show that people still want to keep the "spirit" of the "peace constitution" while they hope Japan plays more active role in international society. In this chapter, I would like to clarify issues about article 9 and try to explore what consensus can be formed in the constitutional politics.

## 1. Historical Background

The Japanese constitution, which guarantees democratic political institutions and the protection of human rights, is typical for a modern democratic country. The first two chapters of the constitution, however, are exceptional, and each is closely related to Japan's wartime defeat. Chapter 1, which deals with the status of the emperor, established partial continuity between the prewar and postwar state. In the post-war settlement, US leaders accepted the plea of the old guard that the emperor was indispensable for national integration even if deprived of political power, and sought to use the throne to keep Japan under US influence. Other countries in the allied forces, however, wanted to hold Hirohito responsible for the war and many Asian countries resented him as a symbol of invasion and colonial rule. As long as the United States wanted Japan to maintain the emperor system, it had to create a mechanism in the constitution to effectively prevent Japan from becoming a military threat again. In order to completely sever postwar Japan from its prewar militarism, the American-written document renounced war and proscribed the maintenance of armed forces in Chapter 2, Article 9.

Thus, the first two chapters of the constitution are mutually dependent.[1] Chapter 2 was written to make chapter 1 acceptable overseas—particularly to those countries that had been invaded by Japan. If Japan had abolished the emperor system and truly become a democratic republic, it would not have needed Article 9 to regain the confidence of international society. Without Article 9, the emperor's postwar status would have been unacceptable to Asian-Pacific countries. In this sense, Article 9 originated from a desire to preserve the emperor system in the postwar period.

Of course, not everyone welcomed the postwar constitution. Political views on the constitution can be divided into three distinct groups. First, pacifists formed a pro-constitution group. They interpreted Article 9 literally and strongly opposed rearmament. To use John Dower's phrase, they "embraced defeat[2]" and attempted to safeguard the newly established peace and democratic reforms enacted by the American occupation. Paradoxically, they were largely socialists who took an anti-American posture during the cold war. The second group was made up of pragmatic conservative elites, who accepted the postwar Constitution for the time being. They deployed Article 9 to resist American demands for rapid rearmament in order to avoid economically exhausting the country. They, too, "embraced defeat" to some extent, because they thought the Pacific War a reckless venture by stupid military leaders. Prime minister Ikeda Hayato(1960-64) and politicians of his faction were example of this type. Many of them were high-ranking civil servants of Ministry of Finance or other economic policy during the war. They negated militarism in the 1930s and 40s, and hoped to rebuild Japan by economic development after collapse caused by the war. They were ambivalent about the postwar Constitution. On the one hand, they were nationalistic enough to feel uncomfortable about the "imposed" constitution. On the other hand, they found article 9 quite convenient to restrain military expansion and concentrate national resources on domestic economic development. The third group was the right wing traditionalists, who felt humiliated by the postwar Constitution. They attempted to amend the constitution, especially Article 9, as soon as possible.

These three groups have been most important pillars of post-war political system in Japan. The pacifist was the mainstream of the progressive party. The Japanese Socialist Party was satisfied with the role of defender of the constitution. It was true that JSP was heavily influenced by Marx-Leninist ideology, but ordinary people supported the party because it could block attempt of revision of the constitution. The pragmatists and traditionalists formed the Liberal Democratic Party. Roughly speaking, the LDP was a coalition of modernists and right wing. The former accepted the post-war institutions and pursued economic recovery and the latter

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[1] Tetsuro Kato, Shocho Tennnosei no Kigen (Origin of Emperor as Symbol), Heibonsha, 2005, Chapter 10.

[2] John Dower, Haiboku o Dakishimete, Iwanami, 2001, chapter 7.

dreamed of restoring pre-war regime. They had different ideas about political institutions, but they united together in order to prevent the left party from taking the power in context of the cold war. They shared a great value of anti-communism.

Between 1945 and 1960 political conflict centered on the constitution,[3] with the emergence of the cold war adding to the polarization. On the left, political parties and trade unions mobilized popular opinion against rearmament and revision of Article 9. Employing slogans such as "Boys, don't pick up guns again!" socialist leaders gained widespread public support for pacifism. On the right, conservatives were galvanized by changes in American policy towards Japan. As the cold war intensified, the United States deployed Japan as a fortress on its Far East front. Japan was no longer a harmless democratic country but a junior partner of the United States in the conflict with the Soviet Union. When the Korean War erupted, Japanese leaders complied with US demands to create an armed force, but limited its size and military capability.

Once the occupation ended, conservatives advocated the elimination of Article 9 and the strengthening of the Self Defense Force (SDF). The principle goal of the Socialist Party was to prevent the constitution from being amended. It also advocated progressive social policies and demanded rapprochement with communist countries. Conservative forces united within the Liberal Democratic Party, which proclaimed its intention to craft a new constitution written by Japanese to replace the one drafted by the Americans. The main pillar for the LDP was anti-communism. While the Socialists defended the postwar reforms in the late 1950s, the LDP sought to restore some of the elements of the prewar system.

This early constitutional dispute reached its apex in 1960 when the Kishi cabinet tried to amend the US-Japan Security Treaty and strengthen military cooperation between Japan and United States. The left feared that the treaty would lead Japan into war through its alliance with America. Prime Minister Kishi's aggressive posture enhanced these fears. Although Kishi managed to have the treaty approved by the Diet, he was obliged to resign as prime minister in the face of huge public protests. It was clear that most people were attached to the postwar regime and that constitutional revision was impossible.

The next prime minister, Ikeda Hayato, shifted the constitutional policies of the LDP. He virtually gave up on amending Article 9. Instead of elevating Japan's political status internationally, Ikeda concentrated on Japan's economic development. During the 1960s, the LDP altered its interpretation of Article 9. The party claimed that Article 9 did not prohibit Japan from possessing the right of self-defense but did inhibit it from becoming a military power that could seek hegemony in the world. So

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[3] Masumi Ishikawa, Sengo Seiji-shi(Post-war Political History) new edition, Iwanami Shoten, 2004.

long as the SDF did not go beyond defense, the force was deemed to be constitutional. The limited mission of the SDF was captured by a newly coined term, "exclusively defensive defence" (*senshu bouei*). In this manner, an enduring postwar security framework was established in the 1960s. In order to distinguish the pro-constitutional sentiment in the progressive camp and the more realpolitik attitude among the ruling elites in the 1960s, I call the former pacifists and the latter pragmatists4."In order to distinguish the pro-constitutional sentiment of the early postwar period, which rejected the possession of any military capacity, and the more *realpolitik* attitude of the 1960s, which favoured the possession of defensive military capacity, I call the former pacifists and the latter pragmatists

In the postwar security framework constructed by the pragmatists, Article 9 and the security treaty were no longer contradictory. While Article 9 allowed Japan to maintain limited armed forces to deal with a small-scale invasion, the US-Japan Security Treaty complemented this defense. In this way, Article 9, the SDF, and the Security Treaty became mutually supportive[5].

Conservative elites found Article 9 useful for pursuing an economy-oriented statecraft. Article 9 served as an excuse to limit military spending and concentrate on economic growth. It also freed Japan from troublesome tasks such as contributing militarily to international conflicts. Nineteen-sixties pragmatists created the postwar security framework in the wake of the bitter confrontation between the pacifists and the traditionalists. In this sense, the postwar security framework was a truce between these two groups. Traditionalists who pushed for full-scale rearmament, though, remained a minority throughout the cold war period. The public came to accept the postwar security framework and strongly supported both Article 9 and the security treaty. Thus, the postwar security framework created a comfortable situation for Japanese policy makers. The United States, of course, was frustrated with the passive approach of the Japanese government to military issues. However, the postwar security framework was so stable that all America could do was to urge the Japanese government to increase its financial support for US bases in Japan.

## 2. The Post-Cold War and the Erosion of Support for the Postwar Security Framework

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[4] Jiro Yamaguchi, Sengo Seiji no Hokai (Collapse of Post-war Politics), Iwanami Shoten, 2004, pp.3-9.

[5] Yamaguchi, "Nihon Seiji no Saihensei to Higashi Ajia Kihan Chitujo no Sozo (Transformation of Japanese Politics and Creation of Norm of Order in East Asia)", in Yasuaki Onuma ed., Toa no Koso (Vision of East Asia), Chikuma Shobo, 2000, pp.169-170.

Japan, which had benefited more than any country from the cold war, was abruptly pushed out of its comfort zone when the long standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union ended. Japanese leaders were unclear about what security policy was best in the new environment. With the end of the cold war, regional conflicts erupted one after another. Some of these conflicts were regarded as clearcut confrontations between vicious aggressors and blameless victims, such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Issues such as Peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention came to receive a great deal of attention internationally and Japan faced an entirely unfamiliar dilemma[6]. During the cold war, Japan was generally able to take a relativistic position vis-à-vis military conflicts, because the United States and Soviet Union faced off with each other (or fought proxy wars) in pursuit of their own national interest. Most Japanese people were convinced that non-involvement, based on Article 9, was a legitimate response to cold war conflict. After the end of the cold war, however, the Japanese government found it difficult to maintain such detachment. Article 9, which denied the use of Japanese military force to help settle international conflicts, seemed empty and meaningless when tyrants waged war and massacred civilians throughout the world. If Japan did not do something to contribute to international peace and justice, could it not be rightly accused of being selfish?[7]

Pacifist defenders of Article 9 faced a serious problem in the early 1990s. If they clung to their strict interpretation of Article 9, Japan could not contribute militarily to cooperative international missions even if these missions furthered international justice. Further complicating matters, the Socialist Party had its first opportunity in forty years to push the LDP from power after a series of major scandals made the LDP unpopular. The LDP's decline presented the socialists with an opportunity but further sharpened their dilemma. So long as they stubbornly defended Article 9, they would be unable to participate in a coalition government. To resolve this dual dilemma, reformers within the Socialist Party proposed that the party recognize the legitimacy of the SDF and the Security Treaty, and promote the creation of a collective security system in East Asia. There was new generation in the socialist party. They were baby-boomers and had such professional jobs as lawyers and doctors before entering the political world in the early 1990s. They wanted to change the socialist party from permanent minority with purely pacifist ideology into a party capable of handling the government. They thought it indispensable to take pragmatists' approach to security issue for this purpose. These proposals, however, did

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[6] Yamaguchi, " The Gulf War and the Transformation of Japanese Constitutional Politics", The Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol.18, No.1, Winter 1992.

[7] Ozawa Ichiro, former secretary general of the LDP, criticized post-war pro-constitution movement as selfish pacifism. See Ozawa, Nihon Kaizo Keikaku (Blue Print for Reform of Japan, Kodansha, 1993.

not meet with party-wide consensus because many members continued to insist on a strict interpretation of Article 9. In particular, hard core leftists found their new identity in pacifist ideology after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Grass roots organizations were still heavily influenced by such dogmatic approach. The party was not able to determine the policy change and would soon be overrun by the rapid evolution of politics[8].

In the early 1990s, before the LDP momentarily lost power, the government began to expand the role of the SDF after recognizing the limitations of Japan's contribution to the Gulf War. As Michael Seigel will argue in the next chapter, this constitutes the beginning of the current wave of efforts to change the constitution. In 1992, the Diet passed a law allowing the SDF to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and Japan dispatched troops to several countries in the 1990s. They engaged in humanitarian aid activities, such as construction works, water supply, medical care etc.

In the government's view, a more important matter was to enlarge Japan's cooperation with the United States. America sought to redefine the US-Japan Security Treaty in the 1990s, after the principle target of the alliance, the Soviet Union, collapsed. But as coalition cabinets rose and fell one after another during the mid-1990s, Japan was unable to deal with the matter. There was debate about what security model was most appropriate. Some insisted that Japan should become a "normal" state with full-fledged military forces and take a more active political role in international affairs[9]. One party proposed using only civilian soft power to contribute to international society[10]. This debate, however, was merely a political sideshow in the midst of political turmoil. The LDP recovered from devastating experience during the time of non-LDP coalition government. Especially, after the 1996 general election, the LDP has regained power. When it formed a coalition with the JSP, it refrained from presenting hawkish view about security and history issues. The LDP appeared to share the value of the peace constitution as long as it needed the socialist party to regain the power. In January 1996, Hashimoto Ryutaro became prime minister, and he solidified his power by winning the election in October. Then redefinition of the security treaty started between Japan and United States. The Clinton administration should have felt relief to find reliable counterpart in Japan[11]. It wanted Japan to provide enough support for global deployment of the American armed forces. ここの段落の途中で「But as coalition cabinets rose and fell one after another during the

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[8] Yamaguchi, "Tou Kaikaku no Seijigaku (Politics of Party Reform)", Yamaguchi and Ishikawa ed., Nihon Shakaito (Japanese Socialist Party), Nihon Keizai Hyoron Sha, 2003, pp. 130-139.

[9] Ichiro Ozawa, op.cit..

[10] Masayoshi Takemura, Chiisakutemo Kirari to Hikaru Kuni (Japan as Shining State Even if it is Small), Kobunsha, 1993.

[11] Funabashi Yoichi, Domei Hyoryu (Drift of Alliance), Iwanami, 1998.

In the late 1990s, the government responded compliantly became far more responsive to American proposals to redefine the alliance. The security treaty no longer simply guaranteed Japan's security but required Japan to support the worldwide military strategy of the United States. Japan is now expected to provide support and logistics whenever the United States demands. This has changed the raison d'etre of the SDF. Its mission is no longer simply defense. It can now operate globally even if it does not take direct part in conflict. In addition, the government has established domestic legal mechanisms to legitimatize expansion of the SDF, including the so-called emergency laws[12]. After 911, the United States attacked Afganistan and Japan sent the SDF to Indian Ocean to provide fuel and logistics. Also, the SDF has been stationing in Iraq under occupation by the United States. In both cases, sending the SDF was not allowed under the current legal framework about the SDF and Defense Agency. Therefore, the government and the LDP made provisional law to enable the SDF to go far beyond Japanese territory.

These policy changes show that most mainstream conservative leaders have abandoned the postwar security framework and have chosen to deepen Japan's commitment to American military strategy. A significant change took place in the LDP in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Pragmatists got old and retired from politics. In addition, able politicians of the pragmatist camp left the LDP during the process of party realignment in the 1990s. At the same time, sons and grandsons of the traditionalist, such as Abe Shinzo, came to play more important role in the party. They were frustrated with the restrained posture that Japan had been taking concerning the military issues. They wanted to make Japan a normal state with full fledged military power. Pressure from the United States was effective tool to break the legal frame work that confined the SDF to self defense. Abduction by North Korea provided favorable circumstance for policy change toward military activism.

However, there is still no consensus on this shift in policy, though, as indicated by the public's response to the deployment of the SDF to Iraq. The public is about evenly divided on the sending of troops. Few politicians in the LDP, however, oppose their deployment.

## 3. The Current Constitutional Debate

The Koizumi government claims Japan can send troops to Iraq under Article 9. The Self Defense Force may go to safe regions to provide humanitarian aid. They cannot be sent to an active war zone because Article 9 prohibits the use of military force and denies the right of belligerency. The government insists that the war in Iraq is over and an incidental terrorist attack and is not an act of war.

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[12] Cf. Kenpo Saisei Foramu, Yuji Hosei Hihan (Critique of the Emergency Law), Iwanami Shoten, 2003.

Prime Minister Koizumi openly declares that he would like to amend the constitution in the near future. Both houses of the Diet have established special committees for research on the constitution, and these committees submitted reports on amendment in 2005[13]. Kan Naoto, then the chairman of the Democratic Party—the biggest opposition group—has indicated his party will submit a draft of a new constitution by 2006. Once the most widely heard slogan was "Defend the constitution." More frequently heard now are: "Creating a new constitution," "Supplementing the constitution," and "Discussing the constitution." There appears to a growing consensus that Japan should have a new constitution[14].

The positions in the current constitutional debate form the same three groups that we have already discussed--pacifists, pragmatists, and traditionalists—but now pacifists have almost disappeared from the political arena. As mentioned earlier, the Socialist Party drifted in the 1990s and was never able to find a new identity. When a neo-conservative party led by Ozawa Ichiro challenged the postwar security framework during the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, the Socialist Party created a coalition government with the LDP to block Ozawa. But by doing so, the Socialist Party abandoned its strict interpretation of Article 9 and accepted the postwar security framework. As part of the pact with the LDP, the Chairman of the Socialist Party, Murayama Tomiichi became prime minister, and the party officially recognized the legitimacy of the Self Defense Force, exclusively for defense, and the US-Japan Security Treaty. This change, however, was far from strategic. Murayama declared that the SDF was constitutional and that his party would firmly support US Japan security treaty. This abrupt conversion left many disillusioned. At the same time it was not persuasive enough to attract independent voters. His conversion just appeared like opportunistic excuse to justify the coalition with the LDP. The party split into diehard pacifists and pragmatists in 1996. The former remained in the party (which changed its name to the Social Democratic Party) and remained committed to their strict interpretation of the constitution. The latter joined the Democratic Party. The strength of the Social Democratic Party has diminished with each election, and in the 2003 general election, it became a negligible minor party holding only 6 seats in the Lower House. It was barely able to maintain its seats in the lower house election in 2005. The once popular socialist politician, Doi Takako, who embodied the pacifist position, resigned as the party's chairperson to take responsibility for the defeat in 2003. The abduction incidents by North Korea decisively undermined credibility of the

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[13] Horitsu Jiho, September 2005, special issue on the research committees on the Constitution of the Diet, provides the most convenient resources about these reports.
[14] The latest opinion polls by Mainichi Newspaper show that nearly 60% of the people agree that the Constitution needs to be amended while 34% disagree. Concerning Article 9, 62% oppose amendment while 30% agree to it. Mainichi Shinbun, October 5, 2005.

social democratic party because it had close tie with North Korea. The SDP appeared irresponsible about security of Japanese people, and pacifist come to mean unrealistic to ordinary people.

The rapprochement of pacifists and pragmatists in 1994 did not significantly strengthen the pragmatist position. The majority of LDP politicians pretended to respect the spirit of the constitution only in order to tame the Socialist Party. Some traditionalists like Hiranuma Takeo, former Minister for International Trade and Industry, called themselves "liberal" in negotiation with the socialist party when two parties agreed to form a government. However, after the socialist party disappeared from the government, they returned to hawkish traditionalist and promoted transformation of the security treaty. Since the late 1990s, having regained power, the LDP has tilted toward nationalism and statism. Moderate conservative politicians, such as Miyazawa Kiichi who established the postwar security framework, are old and retired. Another guardian of the post-war constitution, Gotoda Masaharu died in 2005. They have been unable to bring up successors. There are still some pragmatists, such as Kato Koichi, but they are ousted from the mainstream by Koizumi. Facing overwhelming power of the United States, candidates for next prime minister try not to make US-Japan relation big issue. It is astonishing how few pragmatists are present in the LDP now.

The traditionalists who want to amend the constitution now dominate the debate. The right wing of the LDP succeeded in raising a new generation of politicians in the 1980s and 1990s. Many of these LDP traditionalists are sons or grandsons of 1940s and 1950s rightists. They want to make Japan a prominent military actor and deny some of the democratic principles of the postwar Constitution[15]. They insist that their new constitution will define the emperor as head of state instead of as a symbol and want to require people to observe Japanese traditions and be patriotic (although this is not reflected in the new LDP draft proposal for a new constitution). The traditionalists are also pro-American. They take it for granted that Japan should follow the United States at anytime. They use pressure from the United States, such as Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage's "requests" that Japan "Show the flag" and put its "boots on the ground," to encourage public support for constitutional revision. He even demanded that Japan should revise Article 9 in order to deepen military cooperation between the United States and Japan in a meeting with Nakagawa Hidenao, now chairman of Policy Research Council, on July21, 2004[16]. Conservative politicians and senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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[15] Some progressive citizens' groups open web sites about debate on the constitution amendment in the Diet. They are useful to understand what the LDP Diet members are arguing in the committee. See http://members.jcom.home.ne.jp/web-kenpou/, and http://www.annie.ne.jp/~kenpou/index.html

[16] Asahi Shimbun (Evening), July 22, 2004.

often visit Washington DC and meet Armitage and other high ranking officials in the Department of State and Defense[17]. Some of the Democrat also join revisionist. Maehara Seiji, chairman of the Democratic Party, proclaimed in Washington in December 2005 that Japan should amend article 9 so that it can participate in collective defense. This was what Armitage demanded to Japan in 2004. In this sense, the current movement for revision is based on a coalition between traditionalists and the United States[18].

## 4. Prospects for the Constitution and Principles for Japanese National Strategy

To understand the current predominance of the trend for constitutional amendment, it is necessary to consider the entire recent reform process since the early 1990s, from Hosokawa's political reforms to Hashimoto's administrative reforms and Koizumi's structural reforms. The Japanese political system in its entirety was suffering from what one might term "system fatigue," which revealed itself in various ills of increasing severity. Japanese economy has been in stagnation for more than a decade since early 1990s, and the government has not been able to implement effective policy for economic recovery. During this stagnation, stability and equality is lost, and Japanese society becomes polarized. Unfortunately, the series of rapid reforms implemented during this period were not designed to address the pervasive structural problems underlying those ills. As a result, meaningful reform of the political system remains an unresolved and daunting task. By channeling the nation's political energies into superficial "quick fixes," advocates of reform ensured that the underlying problems would be with Japan for years to come.

The fact is that "reform" during this period was first and foremost the currency with which politicians and parties sought to buy the public's support, each trying to outbid the other: first through reform of the electoral system, then the administrative apparatus, and now the constitution itself has become the object of reformist zeal.. Since the middle of the 1990s, the ruling coalition has held onto power not by carefully implementing reform but by waving the banner of reform as vigorously as possible and appearing to be busily occupied with systemic change. Large-scale reforms, such as those altering the electoral system or state ministries, are big issues for the politicians and bureaucrats affected and make for good political drama. They attract public notice and persuade people to believe that systemic reforms are a silver bullet that will solve all the nation's ills. The politicians who direct these efforts become a magnet for the public's hopes for positive change. Many Japanese were convinced that the economic malaise and social disorder would be

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[17] Yamada Atsushi, "Revision of the Constitution directed by US?---Is Armitage a commander of Japan?", AERA, August 2, 2004.

[18] Concerning proposals by conservative elites, see Asuteion, 2005 no. 62, special issue on "Amendment of the Constitution from a forward-looking perspective".

solved once these systems were reformed, and no one ever bothered to audit the results or grapple seriously with the problems that persisted. This was partly because the focus of reform kept shifting constantly[19]. In a boom of reform in the 1990s, institutional reforms became ends, not means to achieve substantial goals. Politicians ardently discussed institutional changes, such as electoral reform and reorganization of the central ministries. However, they did not pay attention to the outcome of these institutional changes. Few politicians or media investigate content of policy formulated in the new political and administrative institutions.

To be sure, the electoral system and the administrative apparatus are important elements of the political system, but they have no direct bearing on the fundamental issues, namely, the clash of interests and the distribution of values in substantive economic policy. They are simply the internal rules governing the activities of government "professionals"—namely, politicians and bureaucrats—and the intense focus on these areas reveals the character of Japan's politicians and political parties. Lacking the ability to take on such substantive policy challenges as reducing the fiscal deficit, restructuring the social security system, or promoting a shift in the country's economic structure, politicians have instead fabricated an empty reform agenda divorced from the genuine issues of society. Their failure to address the real reform issues was one reason for the rapid political rise of Koizumi, who emphasized structural reform.

Prime Minister Koizumi has changed some of the most important principles of post war Japanese politics. He sent SDF troops to Iraq to support American military operation. He has visited Yasukuni shrine frequently as if to intentionally provoke China and Korea. Under his leadership, Japan has become more involved in American strategy, and more isolated in Asia. In domestic policy, Koizumi's structural reform has been undermining equality and fairness in Japanese society. The more sensational politics becomes, the more emotional the people become. The current political turmoil is far from a rational discussion of policy. Koizumi pushed through a single issue campaign on privatization of the postal service in the lower-house election in September 2005. A landslide victory of the LDP gave him a blank check about other important policies. Amendment of the constitution could well make a start under Koizumi's overwhelming power.

The traditionalists ascribe all social ills to the constitution. They say the law of the land has brought about the deterioration of morality and ethics and paralyzed the nation. Such criticism toward the post-war political value is closely related to their complaint about history education in post-war Japan. They insist that history textbooks overemphasize Japan's crime during the war time and that such education deprive children of pride and confidence. They further argue that post-war education has been producing selfish people without sense of duty or nation, Therefore, the

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[19] Yamaguchi, Sengo Seiji no Hokai, op.cit., pp.55-59.

movement for amending the constitution is closely related to history textbook revisionism. Excision of Article 9 means justifying Japan's wartime and colonial past, which will upset many Asian countries.

It depends on the opposition whether an alternative is presented to the people. The largest opposition group, the Democratic Party, is also studying constitutional change. There are some moderates in this party, who used to belong to the Socialist Party or the new liberal parties of the 1990s. However, this party is an amalgam of various groups, from social democrats to neo-liberals, from doves to neo-cons. The constitution is the touchiest issue in the party. Its proposal to investigate constitutional revision can be best understood as a preemptive attempt to avoid intra-party strife rather than an effort to contribute to the debate about the constitution in a meaningful way.

## 4 Conclusion

In conclusion, the era of Koizumi is not good time to implement amendment of the constitution for two reasons. First, as I explained above about Japanese 911, Koizumi's political style is rather demagogical. His politics is characterized by oversimplification and fervor. It is evident that populist politics is preventing the people from joining sober discussion. Secondly, Koizumi intentionally worsen the relation between Japan and East Asian countries by visiting Yasukuni Shrine. Revision of Article 9 will surely give serious impact to East Asian security if the revision is pushed through by nationalists who justify Japan's invasion in the wartime. Article 9 has been the international promise by Japan about its determination to keep peace in Asia. Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine again in October 2005, which has made relations with China and Korea even more difficult. In such circumstances, amendment of Article 9 would appear arrogant and aggressive to neighboring peoples. Therefore, Koizumi is not qualified to lead revision of Article 9. In this context, sane people cannot imagine any positive outcomes to constitutional revision. The problem is that there are few people who present rational arguments about the constitution.

Whether amendment of the constitution is fulfilled or no depend on political development after Koizumi resigns as Prime Minister in September 2006. There are two scenarios. One is continuation of Koizumi line. If next leader continues deep involvement in American military strategy and rough relation with East Asia, debate on the constitution will be political campaign by the nationalists. New constitution could make Japan a normal country that can fully participate in military cooperation with the United States with military forces. Even Chairman Maehara of the Democratic Party could join this project. However, there is an obstacle in the way. National referendum is necessary for amendment of the constitution, and there is no predicting whether the people will agree the amendment. Proposal by conservative politicians could be rejected by the nation.

The other scenario is modification of Koizumi line. If such moderate leader as Fukuda Yasuo or Tanigaki Sadakazu, takes over Koizumi, he would struggle to improve relation with East Asia. If discussion on the constitution proceeds abreast with the rapprochement, there can be constructive investigation about Japanese security strategy in the new circumstance.

As a conclusion, I would like to point out several problems to be solved in building an alternative along the second scenario. The overall goal is to establish a sustainable order in East Asia. To achieve this goal, there are some tasks to be done.

The first task is to create a policymaking system that can develop national strategy on basis of rational discussion. After the political reform, a two-party system based on broad consensus about the political and economic regime appears to be settling.

Further, debate on the constitution should be contained so that constitutional politics will not disturb the international environment in East Asia. The chapter by Akira Kawassaaki demonstrates the importance of this. For that purpose, Japan must emphasize again and again that the very principle of Article 9 will be maintained even if the text of the constitution is revised.

The second task is to resolve the dispute over the history issue. Japan should take the initiative in determining a settlement after World War II, as Germany did in Western Europe. Japanese leaders should define the collapse of the Japanese Empire as the beginning of independence and autonomy in Asia. This point again relates to Yasukuni issue. Aso Taro and Abe Shinzo, who are loyal to Koizumi, promise to visit Yasukuni, and do not understand political significance of history. Fukuda and other non-Koizumi politicians do not share jingoistic interpretation of the wartime history. On this ground, if Koizumi line is modified by next leader, Japan and other Asian countries can share the same understanding of the post-war period.

The third task is to share the experience of post-war Japan with neighboring countries. Japan has had great success since the war in realizing peace and prosperity with social stability. Now latecomers, such as China, are facing socio economic problems caused by rapid economic growth. Japan can, from its own experience, provide environmental policy and policies to handle inequality between classes and regions.

On October 28, 2005, the LDP proposed its draft for a new constitution. Although the draft was originally expected to reflect traditionalist ideology shared in the party, it rather emphasizes continuity with the current constitution. The moderate tone means that LDP is more serious about achieving its amendments. The LDP expects that the more moderate the draft becomes, the broader consensus it will be able to obtain among the parties and the public. As Michael Seigel will discuss in the next chapter, the new Article 9 maintains the renunciation of war in the first clause, but proclaims the possession of armed forces in the second clause. This article is so

vague that there is no substantive rule about the procedure and limits of the armed forces. Thus, new Article 9 is not concrete enough to present a framework for security policy in the new constitution. It is unlikely that the draft of the LDP will provide a helpful platform for serious and rational debate on constitutional amendment. If debate on Article 9 is to be productive, it should be handled together with discussion on Japan's relation with the United States and East Asia. This problem is open to new leaders after Koizumi.

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