

The Soviet Union, the UN and the Cold War in East Asia

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Role of the UN in International Politics

-A Historical Re-examination from the Member State's Perspective-

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(Revised Draft)

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Preface

The aim of this essay is to investigate the role of the United Nations in Asia in the formative years of the Cold War, with special emphasis on the Korean War period (1950—53) and its aftermaths.

The Cold War in Asia has never been 'cold'; it turned into a 'hot' spot in the global confrontation especially between 1950 and 1953. American specialists, S. Goncharov, J. Lewis and X. Litai have called this conflict as 'marginal'.ⁱ However, Korea became an acute theatre of the armed struggles between the two 'camps'.

One of the main victims of this conflict was the United Nations (hereafter UN), which had been born with difficulty, and had to face with dramatically changing circumstances of the Cold War. The UN had to cope with incompatible expectations; namely to be a fair arbitrator in a situation of bipolarizing among the leading forces, namely the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Or one can argue that fragility of the UN might have triggered the conflicts of Korea, which still haunt global community with uncertainty even today.

Among others, the UN authorized to use the UN flag for the US and her allies in the Korean War, urged by the sudden invasion on the part of the Kim Il Song's North Korean army. This was made possible by the boycott tactics on the part of the USSR. The Soviet delegation had been absent from the Security Council activity, claiming to permit the newly born Communist China to be given a seat in the Security Council, replacing Chiang Kai Shek's defeated Kuomintang government. Soviet diplomat A.

Gromyko recalls that he had advised Stalin not to take boycott tactics, but in vain.ⁱⁱ

This paper claims that this was not a coincidental mistake on the part of Stalin, but a deliberate evolution of his strategic thinking. Stalin apparently downgraded the role of the UN, stimulated by the emergence of Soviet–Chinese strategic alliance of February 1950s to counter the US-NATO alliance and began to underestimate the role of the UN. He thought the alliance was more important than the UN as a form of ‘class struggles’.

This miscalculation on the part of Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, coupled with the ambition of Kim Il Song, made the US military and his allies to combat under the banner of the UN. The US government could easily condemn the attacks of the DPRK as ‘aggression and intervention’, pushing aside the Russian claims as a ‘civil war’ and could rally the UN army under the US command.ⁱⁱⁱ This experience of the UN employment of forces was unique. Thus, the United Nations chose one-sided role in the Korean War (1950-53), whilst China and North Korea had fought with the UN forces, and China was declared to be ‘the enemy of the UN’ in 1951.

This naturally alienated East Asian members from taking important roles, especially in the initial stages of the UN. China had to wait until 1972 before she could join the UN and become a full Security Council member. Japan was able to participate the UN system after the Japan-Soviet normalization of 1956. The two Korean governments, namely the Republic of Korea (hereafter ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter DPRK) could participate legally only in 1992.

Inevitably, legitimacy on the role of the UN in this region was contradictory; in one sense the activity of the UN became idealized, whilst it was also regarded as an ‘unrealistic’ factor in a realistic world. This was mainly due to its historical context,

above all the unfinished Korean War. Because the peace treaty was not concluded, the Korean War is not yet over in legalistic terms.

Illustration of this issue from a historical point of view is a hard task, partly because materials concerned are scarce and still difficult to obtain, from China, the Soviet Union, and the US, to say nothing of the two Koreans, above all the DPRK. Still the Cold War in Asia is becoming new topics of historical research. Above all, the former Soviet sources are being opened in this respect.^{iv} The Russian archival and other sources are showing somewhat surprising and 'unexpected history' of the issue.

1 Stalin's Korean Policy (1945-1949)

To understand these new findings and their significances, one should understand motives of Joseph Stalin on Korean after 1945 briefly. Joseph Stalin was basically interested in the geopolitical gains, especially the North East Asia, after the end of the World War Two. Stalin's view on Asia after the defeat of the Japanese militarism was best illustrated in V. Molotov's unauthorized memoir, "Sto sorok vesh s Molotobym".^v Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov recalled Stalin's reaction on the post war situation, when he saw the maps of the world as follows;

"It is about a map with new borders of the USSR that was brought after the war to the Stalin's dacha. "Let's see what we have here. Every thing is all right to the North "And he turned to the eastern borders; "What we have there? The Kuril Islands now belong to us. Sakhalin is completely ours, you see, it is good. And the Port Author is ours, and Dairen is ours...and Chinese Eastern Railways is ours. China, Mongolia every thing is in order... In short, it was good that the Russian Czars took so much land for us in war'. ^{vi}

This recollection shows how Stalin saw the East Asian region through prism of geopolitics, formulated in the Yalta agreements between F. Roosevelt, W. Churchill and J. Stalin. This geopolitical thinking was not solely Stalin's original but also shared with the Soviet Foreign Ministry. In fact, Soviet deputy Foreign Minister I. Maiskii in January 1944 send a memorandum to Stalin, showing that the Soviet tasks in Asia were to prepare 'the defeat of Japanese militarism without the participation of the Soviet Union and establishment of the 'democratic, progressive, nationalistic and friendly China'.^{vii} In other words, Stalin was to abide by the principles of Yalta. Actually Stalin's partner in China was not a Communist Mao Zedong, but a nationalist leader Chiang Kai Shek.

On the other hand, Soviet leaders were negative on the near possibilities of the socialism in Asia, especially for Korea. A Russian expert on Korea, Vladimir Tkachenko may be right when he argues that socialism in North Korea was the least thing to be imagined by J. Stalin. Indeed, the first Soviet directive in September 1945 was to establish "bourgeois democratic republic" in North Korea.^{viii} Stalin was never interested in neither revolution nor forced unification. According to Soviet official view at that time, Korea was basically an agrarian society, 'was not yet ripe for socialism' and the working classes were only minority; less than three per cent of her population.^{ix}

Thus, Soviet position towards Korea was within the frame work of the 1945 December agreements the three Foreign Ministers (the US, UK and the Soviet Union), which was embodied in the joint control system over Korea between the Soviet and the US. Although Kim Il Song met Stalin, first secretly in 1946, and in 1949 March officially, their relation was cool and restrained.

From this geopolitical point of view, the North Korea may be characterized as

‘Stalin’s Manchugo’, to say straightforwardly. This provocative characteristic was admitted by the Russian official history of the Foreign Ministry “the Two Hundred Years’ History of the Foreign Ministry”, when authors wrote that ‘The Soviet Union has pursued her geopolitical object to prevent to use this peninsula as a strategic corridor for Manchuria and Soviet Far East’.^x

This may also explain Stalin’s modest request in demarcating the line along the 38 parallel, when the US government (including the future secretary of the State Department, Dean Rusk) rather hastily drew a line there and asked the consent of the USSR government in the middle of August 1945.^{xi} Though the Soviet military had abundant chances to incorporate the whole Korea at that time, they were modestly satisfied with the US occupation in the southern part of Korea. ^{xii}

This conciliatory spirit, especially with regard to Korean, was apparent when the three Foreign Ministers met in Moscow December 1945. The Koreans simply wanted an independence, whilst Soviet Foreign Minister V. Molotov was satisfied with the slight modification of the US initial proposals to introduce ‘five year’s trusteeship’ under the guarantee of the US and USSR. Thus Koreans were far from accepting this unpopular decision, though formally Korean lefts including the North Koreans were forced to accept this future plan. ^{xiii}

Korean political history between 1945-50, from the occupation of the Northern parts by the Soviet Army in August, and outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, is illustrated by Russian historian A. Lankov in his new book ‘From Stalin and Kim Ilson’, using Soviet declassified materials. ^{xiv} Professor Lankov depicts that the North Korean regime was made solely by J. Stalin and the Soviet troops. He points that it was Stalin and his generals in the Far Eastern Front, who made the state of DPRK, thus

diminishing the role of Kim Il Song as the founder of the North Korean state, as is often portrayed by North Korean propaganda.

At the initial stage of 1945-46, the US and the USSR were still trying hard to maintain conciliatory mood of the post war period. However, coexistence between the US and the USSR gave way swiftly to the emerging confrontational tone of the Cold War by 1946-47. Stalin's Korean policy at the formative years is being rewritten from a revisionist point of view by recent Russian publications. According to them, Russians were much interested in geopolitical situation in this peninsula. Soviet diplomat A. Gromyko emphasized to Foreign Minister V. Molotov that Soviet could not lag behind in constructing the infrastructures than the US in the South. In fact, Russians were much interested in getting strategically important resources, above all, Uranium in the Northern part of Korea. Moscow had few uranium within the USSR until 1947 and had to import sometimes by using force, from Germany and Bulgaria. North Korea was also a new target.^{xv} The Soviet had constructed the railway between North Korean and Soviet Far East, apparently carrying Korean resources, above all uranium.^{xvi}

Thus we can draw conclusions that J. Stalin was not interested in the establishment of the Socialism in Asian arena when the DPRK was set up in September 1948. By them, however, Stalin found it advantageous to move to geopolitical confrontation with the US and allowed to set up the DPRK as an adjutant reserves. The institutional setup of the DPRK was totally controlled by the Soviet government. It was Stalin, Molotov, A. Zhdanov, and the first ambassador T. Shtykov (Zhdanov's son-in-law) who decided to construct this 'Socialism in a half of the Korean country'. No Koreans were invited to discuss their future. The politico-institutional structure of

the DPRK including the Constitution were decided by these four persons when they discussed over it on Stalin's dacha in the end of April 1948.^{xvii}

Still Moscow was not interested in expanding their influences beyond the 38 parallels. Prime minister Kim Il Song's relentless request to unite the Korean peninsula, if necessary by force, was refuted severely by Stalin and the politburo, as was instructed to the Soviet ambassador I. Shtykov in August 1949. ^{xviii}

2 Role of the United Nations

Comrade Joseph Stalin's view on the role of the United Nations evolved as time passed by. At first, Soviet views on the role of the International coordination after the victory of the WW2 was not at all negative. They have accepted a fact that the coalition among the US, UK and USSR should dominate the post war world order at least by mid-1945. Among others, Joseph Stalin and his Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov welcomed the idea of the "Peace keeping mechanism" at the meeting of Foreign Ministers who met in Moscow October 1943.

This official view was in line with the informal policy proposals for the Soviet government by the commission that had been organized under the auspices of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and composed of former Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov and ambassador I. Maiskii. This organization was to propose a plan for the post war world order for Stalin. Especially ambassador I. Maiskii proposed that 'a kind of international organization for keeping the Peace after the war' should be set up in his January 1944 memorandum to Joseph Stalin. I. Maiskii also proposed that 'the Big four of the USSR, US, UK and China' should be responsible for 'keeping the world order' after the World War Two. ^{xix} This report also suggested that a kind of 'compulsory measures' should be

taken to carry out necessary decisions, apparently taking lessons from weakness of the United League. 'Former hostile nations' were to be excluded for the first period, according to Maiskii document.^{xx}

In November 1944, Stalin characterized this newly emerging international institution as an 'specially empowered international organization that has the full necessary capacity to keep the peace, prevent new aggression'^{xxi}. Thus by the beginning of the 1945 when the leaders of the grand coalition met in Yalta, they were certain to set up the United Nation as the new institution to guarantee the 'peace and stability' of the post war period.

It was indeed the Soviet Foreign Minister V. Molotov who visited New York and San Francisco to take part in the first foundation meeting of the United Nations in May 1945.^{xxii} Thus, it was natural that V. Molotov in his 6th November 1945, or the 28th anniversary address of the October revolution stressed the importance of the US-UK and Soviet alliance as the basis of the 'United Nations'. He also cautioned that new organizations should not be the 'weapons for the leading role of the super powers'.^{xxiii}

This Soviet commitment to the UN organization affected to the on going negotiations on the alliance treaty between the Soviet Union and Chiang Kai Shek government in July-August 1945. Whilst Chinese original draft aimed at Japan as the 'common enemy', Molotov declined to accept this view and proposed to 'the enemy's of the United Nations' instead.^{xxiv} The treaty was agreed on 14th August 1945.

However, Stalin's priority towards the UN had been significantly diminished eventually and he did not hesitate to discredit the UN openly. This was true of 1948 when he requested the North Korean leadership to pass a resolution to criticize 'the UN general assembly and commissions which had taken without the commitment of the

Korean people' in the April 1948 conference. This politically meaningless conference was successful from the Stalin's propaganda point of view, because Koreans were mobilized to welcome the Soviet military withdrawal and 'all-Korean elections after the withdrawal of foreign military'. ^{xxv}

Still both Korean governments wanted status of the UN membership by 1949 and each patron began to rally for supports so that the respective client country to be invited as a membership, while denouncing the others request for membership. Example is given by ambassador the statement of J. Malik on 15th February 1949, when he said that 'the ROK is a marionette country, while the DPRK is the central government of the all Koreans, and should be therefore invited as an full member'.^{xxvi} Of course both maneuvers were in vain.

3 Changing Asian Political Configurations 1949-1950

Though the Cold War has deepened by 1949, Asian political configurations seemed far from bipolar dichotomy. Stalin was stick to the old ally in Asia- Chiang Kai Shek's Guomintang-China. He even sent a special envoy (A. Mikoyan) to Mao Zedong of the Chinese Communist Party in January 1949 to the effect that Chinese communists should refrain from attacking Soviets' old ally totally.

However, Mikoyan's mission failed and it was inevitable that Chinese communists would win. New tides of Chinese revolutionary campaign began to prevail by 1949, which gave a serious impact on the global and regional structure of the East-West confrontation. Among others, Chinese revolution made a fundamental change in the Asian political context including North Korea. To the surprise for Stalin who had been

pessimistic towards Asian liberation movement, Chinese revolution became inevitable by 1949. Thus Stalin had to react to this reality.

Thus, the year of 1949 proved to be fatal for Stalin; the Cold War confrontation came to its peak. By then, Stalin's policy to cooperate with the United Nations was also disappointing. Above all, the emergence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a serious blow to Stalin's policy towards 'Peace' in Europe. This was serious implication on the work of the United Nations. On one side, this alliance was set up in accordance with article 51 of the UN charter, which allowed on the self and collective defense as an instrument of sovereignty.^{xxvii} While on the other, this was a clear defeat of the security system formed after the World War Two. The NATO was set up, along with other western alliance systems, without consent or consultation of the UN. Soviet foreign ministry declaration on the formation of the NATO characterized this as 'Intrigue under the UN organization'.^{xxviii}

A failure of the spirit of the grand coalition symbolized in the UN charter, was apparent, although the NATO had cited the article 51 of the UN as legitimizing ground.^{xxix} Stalin criticized the NATO organization as a 'weapon of aggression, not for peace'. The success of the unclear test by the USSR in August 1949 only heightened the international tension and the control of the atom energy became a severe issue. Both criticized the other's aggressive intentions, ambition of world dominance etc.

Between July and October 1949, Stalin's strategic thinking, especially in this region had dynamically modified. Stalin again and again criticized the UK and US policy as politics of aggression and politics of new war. This was motivated by the 'succession of defeats suffered in the spring and summer of 1949 (M. Shulman)'.^{xxx} In fact, Soviet foreign policy had to face series of failures. Germany was divided. Schisms among the

East camp, caused by the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, damaged the image of the USSR. The political purges in the East European capitals only worsened the situation. The Soviet foreign posture had to cope with the deteriorating conditions.

J. Stalin, appreciating the change of the tide, did not hesitate to dismiss V. Molotov from the Foreign Minister. He was more or less associated to the alliance with the US and UK, from the foreign ministry and was replaced by more royal dogmatist A. Ya. Vishinskii by February 1949. A. Vishinskii had been the prosecutor at the great purge trial of 1930s. Although, V. Molotov remained as deputy premier, but was removed from the decision making body, the bureau of the presidium (politburo) by the 19th party congress of 1952. Mikoyan also lost confidence by 1952. Both came very near to be executed by the beginning of 1953, when Stalin and his entourage began a new wave of purge.

Meanwhile, Vyshinskii's first statement at the UN session in September 1949 has marked the turn of the atmosphere. He categorically criticized the US and UK which has neglected the UN charter and had set up the NATO.^{xxx} Yugoslavia was accepted as a Security Council member of the UN, despite protests of the Soviet block. Another tough-minded ideologue M. Suslov came to propagate militant 'Anti-War movement'.^{xxxii}

One of the striking reveals after the Cold War was the fact that the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had allowed a kind of autonomy for the Chinese communist party to control over the Asian and Eastern international matters after 1949. Thus, J. Stalin really intended to give a more autonomous status for Mao Zedong as the leader of the eastern communist 'camp'. In other words, the Soviet Union made a kind of power sharing mechanism with the Chinese Communists Party, especially with regards to the Asian security and communist matters.

Russians documents are still vague on this matter. North Korean specialist, A. Tkachenko wrote in his work on 'Russian interest on the Korean Peninsula' 2001, that Moscow allowed Chinese communists to lead other Asian communists over the Asian matters, especially for Vietnamese and Korean matters, provided the global matters should be consulted with Moscow.^{xxxiii} He has never cited sources, but there is some reason to believe this thesis.

This means that by the fall of 1949 when the People's Republic of China was established, Moscow allowed that Beijing should be more responsible over Asian security and leadership over Asian communists' affairs. Even cautions V. Molotov also endorsed the 'socialist camps headed by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China'.^{xxxiv} By then, bitter experience in the formation of the Soviet block including the Cominform and expel of the Yugoslav from the East "camp" gave lessons to Stalin. He had to be more realistic to the newly born alliance forces that had been more or less autonomous from the 1920s. The turning point, in retrospective, was less known visit of Chinese delegation led by Liu Shaoqi and Gao Gang (who was in charge of North East Government) to Moscow in June-August 1949, where they met with Stalin and made an arrangement on Chinese political upheavals. Soviet Ambassador A. M. Ledovskii's documents on this visit show this clearly, though this was done by somewhat enigmatically.

At first, Chinese made a draft admitting a total subjugation of the Chinese to CPSU and comrade J. Stalin.^{xxxv} Stalin was critical of this Chinese 'loyalty', and marked negative on these statements. Several Chinese documents also suggest Stalin's critical attitudes. A Chinese translator Shi Zhe recalled later that Stalin spoke on his banquet speech for Liu delegation to the effect that Chinese communists should hold greater role

over Asian matters.^{xxxvi}

This thesis of Chinese autonomy was officially stated at the Asian trade union congress held in Shanghai by Liu Shaoqi in November 1949. In his speech he clearly stated the hegemonic role of the Chinese party over the Asian socialists matters.^{xxxvii} Thus, Chinese autonomy was hailed; even the former Comintern network within China was also subjugated to the Chinese party.

Thus, Chinese communists succeeded to establish its own identity and hegemony over the Asian Communist world. This thesis was also endorsed in August 1952 when Zhou visited Moscow and held a second summit between Moscow and Chinese leadership.^{xxxviii} It was inevitable that an autonomous position of China would lead to the special relations between Moscow and Beijing. Moscow had been at first reluctant revise the Moscow-Beijing alliance system that had been concluded in 14 August 1945 between Moscow and the Kuomintang government led by Chiang Kai Shek. This legal framework had to be changed even after the victory of the Chinese Communists by 1949. Although Mao was afraid of US commitment to Chinese affairs, Stalin was more optimistic about the future of Asia and he even joked to Mao that “I wonder Kim IL sung may come to Beijing (to fight)”.

Thus radicalism came to the foreground and Soviet–Chinese alliance pact of 1950 was concluded under these surroundings. Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai came to Moscow in January 1950 to talk with A. Vishinskii on the alliance between the Soviet Union and China. More anti-Americanism emerged. Russian materials tell that Zhou Enlai was harder on this respect. He was backed by more radical group of ‘Manchurian School’ communists (Gao Gan, Li Fuchun and others).^{xxxix} Thus, both Beijing and Moscow began to defy the Yalta agreement and coalition with

the US.

Main researchers agree that Stalin was negative of Korean unification at first. This was due to his commitment to the agreement on the Korean Peninsula with the US. Although Kim met Stalin first in 1946 secretly and in 1949 March officially, the relation was rather cool. Thus, the Soviet politburo categorically opposed the Kim's idea of the unification Moscow even in September 1949. This sober message was communicated to Kim through Soviet ambassador by the beginning of October.

However, the Soviet- Chinese alliance of 1950 gave new impetus for both global and regional politics. Thus, all Asian communists were given impetus to more radical confrontation with the US and UN. Stalin wanted to reverse the failure of 1949.

It was inevitable that Japan became a renewed target of eastern alliance. Soviet paper 'Izvestiya' printed a long and detailed report on the Soviet military tribune on the Kwantung army for the preparation of the biological warfare on 29 December 1949. This was a part of the total reassessment of the Far Eastern strategic situation.^{xi}

Japanese communists were no exception to be mobilized. The Cominform organ 'For the eternal Peace' on 2nd January printed a letter ' On the situation of the Japanese Communist party' and began to criticize its leader S. Nosaka who had been criticized to be 'soft' to the US occupation. It was unusual in a sense that the Japanese communist party never been associated to the Cominform. But Chinese communist newspaper also endorsed this.^{xli} Reportedly, this letter was written by Stalin himself.^{xlii} The Soviet wanted to mobilize the JCP as an instrument to carry out anti-US, anti-military campaign^{xliii} This criticism gave serious impetus for struggles within the JCP and split and factional struggles followed. ^{xliv}

Stalin's coalition with Mao made another impact; the downgrading the role of the

UN for the Soviet policy. In 13th January 1950, Soviet delegation J. Malik in his speech at the UN declared that Soviet would boycott the work of the Security Council and other bodies, unless Chiang Kai Shek government ousted.^{xlv} Historians have discussed Stalin's pro-Chinese shift differently. Above mentioned book by H. Goncharov, Lewis and Litai have argued that this tactic was cunningly utilized by Stalin to hamper the conciliation of communist China towards the UK-US. In fact, the UK government was willing to oust Chiang's nationalist China from the UN Security council and thus was prepared to reconcile, thus Stalin had to made harsher counter measures to boycott the UN solution to separate China from the west, according to this version. ^{xlvi} However, this interpretation seems to be a hindsight.

4 Korean War (1950-1953)

Preparation

Thus, new political alignment emerged in the East Asian 'front'. The establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, and new alliance between the two socialist countries became a fact accomplishment. Also the establishment of the Eastern Cominform was discussed, but did not came to the conclusion by 1949. Apparently the Chinese Communist Party led the hegemonic roles.

Among others, North Korean Premier Kim Il Song seemed to be stimulated by these new events. He stressed the feasibility of the armed intervention to Ambassador T. Shtykov, who was rather skeptical of Kim's proposals by the beginning of 1950. Historians are divided on the date of the visit of Kim Il Song to Moscow. Usually Kim seems to have visited to Moscow, namely in from 30 March through 25th April. Comrade Kim met with Stalin three times in Moscow including the important meeting at the end

of April. However, A. Torkunov's little known article suggests that Kim might have visited twice to Moscow in 1950.^{xlvi} According to him, Stalin oscillated and once rejected at the first meeting, asking Kim to present the detailed war plan. Kim brought the new plan of armed unification at the meeting in late April. Stalin again was not decided, but some politicians and the military thought that Kim's plan could be achieved, according to A. Torkunov. Stalin told Kim that he should consult with the Chinese communists, Mao above all.

Thus, the DPRK began offensive maneuver on 25th June. Pravda printed two statements by Radio Pyongyang, telling that it was the KOR that began offensive attack firstly. However it was no secret in the North that Kim Il Song began the War, as famous the DPRK leader Kan San Ho said; It is crazy or idiot if we don't understand that Kim Il Sung began the War" who was in the 38th parallel at that time. Thus, the fact that Korean War was initiated by Kim Il Song was no longer challenged by historians, after the publication of the Russian sources.^{xlvi} Stalin finally endorse Kim's plan on their April 25th meeting and was further blessed by Mao Zedong in May. In its turn, Mao was also well informed with the Kim's secret mission to Moscow and had already informed that Mao would meet with Kim after the meeting with Stalin, according to Moscow Archives.^{xli} Joseph Stalin, in his turn, had informed Mao on the results of the meeting with Stalin (pseudonym, Filipov) with Kim. Thus, Kim fled to Beijing informally on the 13th of May to see Chairman Mao who was positive on this and gave a green light to Kim's forced unification plan. On 15th dinner with Mao, Kim thanked to Stalin that Mao endorsed the war plan which had been agreed with Stalin. Stalin, in its turn, supplied with the 90 per cent of the demand on the part of the DPRK.

Process

The process of the war is rather known. ⁱ Perhaps we need not to go into details of the major turning points of this War.

It would be divided into four stages;

First stage 25 June until 14 September;

the offensive of the North, or the Korean people's Army

Stage two 15 September 1950-24 Oct. 1950;

Counter offensive of the US-UN and the South

Stage three 24 Oct-7 July 1951;

Participation of the Chinese Voluntary army

Stage four 10 July 1951-27 July 1953;

Stalemate and Peace talks

Anyway, it was general Mac Arthur, who was alarmed by the imminent danger on the South Korea and send a telegram of the danger of 'total collapse' of the South. Thus the UN was naturally involved in this conflict.^{li} On the same day of the invasion, the extreme meeting of the Security Council took place in the UN and US government prepared a resolution, charactering the action of the DPRK as 'aggression' and asked to withdraw immediately the North Korean troops to the 38 parallel. On 27th another resolution was adopted. The emergency meeting of the Security Council of the NU, under the request of the US government adopted a resolution, condemning the aggression. The US government appointed General Douglas MacArthur - commander of the Far Eastern Army - as the commander of the UN Army. On 28th UK, Australia and New Zealand governments permitted to send troops to the United Nation's army.

On 7th July the US government gave a new resolution that gave all the UN member's troops and other resources to be controlled by the General MacArthur as the commander of the UN army thus allowing to use the United Nation's flag against the North Korean campaign. Fifty three states supported this resolution, though two thirds of the UN army was Americans. On 8th July US President Truman appointed General MacArthur as the UN commander. In all, the US, UK, Australia, Belgium, Holland, Greece, Canada, Columbia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Thailand, Turkey, Filipino, French, South Africa, and Ethiopia fought under the banner of the United Nation army.^{lii} On the same day President Truman agreed to give a military aide to the ROK government.

From a Soviet point of view, on 4th July, Deputy Minister A. Gromyko officially recognized the invasion and even legitimized the action, saying that 'Korean people have a right by their own discretion to remove their own national works by uniting the South and North into her national state'.^{liii}

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has been boycotting the work of the United Nations. This was related to the status of Chinese Security Council membership after the formation of the People's Republic of China in October 1949. The USSR was in line with their request to expel Chiang Kai Shek's China from the UN as a legitimate Security Council member. Ambassador Ya. Malik on 13th January 1950 declared to boycott the work of the Security Council and other works as a means of protest. Russian diplomatic historians of the Korean War characterizes this was a 'diplomatic mistake' of Stalin, because this gave the US to monopolize the legitimacy of the UN on the Korean issue.^{liv} Only in 10th August, Soviet Ambassador came back to the work of the UN, in vain. Stalin's boycott tactics gave a gain for the US involvement in the Korean War

under the blue flag of the UN in the Korean War.

After the initial victory of the North, the UN forces entered Inchon and tides reversed. The DPRK came very near to be defeated by the end of September. On 13th October, Stalin cabled Kim that “Resistance has no chance of success. Chinese are resisting from the help”. Realist Stalin was prepared to retreat from the hopeless adventure, according to Russian researcher A. Y. Mansourov, who had checked Soviet archives.^{lv} In Stalin’s own words, recalled by N. Khrushchev, he was willing to abandon North Korea and allow the United States to become the USSR’s neighbor. Stalin almost accepted the defeat of the North and even Chinese delegation Zhou Enlai came to this conclusion. According to Soviet diplomat M. A. Menshikov, who was close to Stalin at that time, he got old, unhealthy; and his stamina lost by the middle of 1950.^{lvi}

But suddenly Chinese ‘voluntary army’ led by Marshall Pen Dekhai came to foreground on October. Again situation drastically changed in favor for the North by the beginning of 1951. General MacArthur was moved by this and wanted to counter by using Chiang Kai Shek’s army in the South of China. This caused a serious disputes with the officials of the Truman government (D. Acheson and D. Marshall). Thus General MacArthur was dismissed from the commander of the UN army on 11 April 1951.^{lvii}

Although Soviet returned to the UN Security Council by August, the Russians still neglected this organization even after this. It is also noteworthy that Stalin suggested to Zhou Enlai who visited on August 1952 that both should establish an alternative organization to the UN in Asia, although he added carefully that “the UN is an US organization and this UN should be destroyed, though we should keep the face of we are not against the UN.”^{lviii}

Since the termination of the Korean War in 1953, Moscow and Beijing have been disputed over who was responsible for the war. In 1960, for example, the first secretary of the CPSU N. Khrushchev argued that the war was endorsed by both Stalin and Mao. This was apparently moved by his own agendas of criticizing both. In its turn, Chinese delegation Pen Chzhanya to the International congress in Moscow claimed that this decision was made by Stalin and Kim, but, Mao was informed only in the summer of 1950, but he at first was also against the war". Pen's statement may be overstated, but Mao's position was motivated by the priority to unite his own country first by defeating the Kuomintang in Taiwan.

6 Delayed Peace Talks(1951-53)

Thus, the role of the military came to stalemates and negotiation began. However, the negotiation positions among Stalin, Mao and Kim were surely not identical from the onset. Each party was moved by its own interest. The Chinese were in eager to get resources from their elder brother. Communications between Mao and Stalin shows that Stalin was annoyed by the excessive requests on the part of chairman Mao, especially on the latter half of 1951. Facing with the stalemate and difficult position, Mao wanted to lower the conditions of termination and to stop the War, which is abundantly clear on his letter to Stalin on 20th July 1951.^{lix}

Especially, Stalin's policy to this war became known; he was categorically against the termination of the War, though his Asian associates were inclined to stop the War. This was known by his message to Mao on 5th June 1951 on which Stalin, while agreeing to negotiate with the US, he also ordered to Mao that he should not make haste on negotiations.^{lx} He said that Chinese military can master modern warfare techniques

and damage the US prestige.

Kim Il song's position was unique; Chinese wanted to subjugate Koreans, Kim wanted to enhance his position by communicate with Stalin directly. While Mao wanted to monopolize the communication with Stalin, Kim in his turn wanted to communicate with Stalin directly. However, apparently Kim lost favor by the decisive defeat and had to appeal to the chairman Mao and Marshall Pen Dekha to change courses.^{lxi}

Thus, communication pattern between the three parties was neither direct 'boss-subordinates' relations, nor 'equal partner among them'. This asymmetrical relation was further damaged by miscommunication among others. This was further exacerbated by the indirect communication channel of North-Eastern Chinese buro, which connected between Kim and Mao. Soviet-Chinese relation between 1950-53 was complicated and not necessary well informed each other.

In due course, Mao and Kim came to the same conclusion that Peace was necessary and negotiation with the US should be accelerated. However, Soviet positions were different; the politburo decision on 28 August 1951 was categorical that the US was weaker and Mao should not hastily conclude the agreement.^{lxii} At that time Ambassador Shtykov was removed, apparently voicing the North's requests. After this, Stalin never replied for Mao's letters for several months. On 19th November, the Politburo again sent a message to the effect that Mao should not accelerate the peace talk. Newly appointed ambassador to the DPRK, V. Razbaev was twice reprimanded because he sent messages from North Korea that showed Kim's their desire to stop the War.^{lxiii}

Still, Foreign Minister Park and the DPRK could not hesitate to appeal to Mao via

Chinese top military Pen Dekhai to stop the War in the beginning of January 1952 in his private conversation with Pen. This political atmosphere was shared with even Ambassador Razubaev who again wanted to publish from TASS Kim's 'peace oriented' interview in March 1952. Deputy Minister Gromyko again had to reprimand him.

This did not prevent Mao and Kim again to agree on a process of peace and would appeal to Moscow on this matter on July 1952. This led to the dispatch of Zhou Enlai to visit to Stalin in August. This was the third high level meetings among the Alliance leaders after February 1950. The dialogue between Stalin and Zhou that took place on 20th August 1952 was partly printed in Russian materials. Stalin again maintained that the US position was weak and they would not fight the Third World War, thus the Korean War can contribute to prevent of the third World War. "Americans soldiers are speculators, they can not handle this tiny war", he claimed.^{lxiv} It is noteworthy that he stressed that PRC should play dominant role in the Asian arena. He added that because there were panic mood among the DPRK leaders, thus he avoided to meet with Kim. Thus, Stalin was categorical to continue the Korean War, which could serve to avoid or prolong the start of the Third World War.

In November 2nd, Stalin's polituburo (renamed as Presidium buro) again emphasized that it is necessary to continue the struggle. Despite Eisenhower's election as a new President inevitable, Stalin was pessimistic and continued the course of the War, though Mao and Kim was in favor for the peace settlements. Meanwhile Molotov and Mikoyan came very near to be physically purged.

Only the death of Stalin on 5th March could change the course and stop the War.

Molotov came back to as the Foreign Minister. New leaders like Beriya and Malenkov could drastically change the foreign course, to the effect that peace came to

the foreground. V. Molotov recalls that the Korean War was initiated by Kim Il Song and his entourage. "The situation was developing in a way not in our interests. It was pressed on us by the Koreans themselves." ^{lxv} Stalin said it was impossible to avoid the question of a united Korea. We prepared a draft proposal on the German question, besides that I raised the Korean question".

After the death of Stalin (5th March 1953), politics, both international and domestic, began to change. The first violin was played by L. Beria. V. Molotov returned to Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was always as conservative, but he seemed even radical when he criticized Beria, as O. Troyanovskii recalls.^{lxvi} Thus, changes of the courses were inevitable including the position to the Korean War. In all, the Soviet lost 335 airplanes and 120 pilots in this conflict. 399 Soviet military men were lost including 138 officers.

This gave serious political results. Firstly, from an asymmetrical interdependence among the socialist brotherhood turned independent search for their own identity. Contradictory enough, this search for independence in respective countries took serious domestic political victims. In China, the establishment of the Maoist way was followed by following purges like Gao Gan (1954), Pen Dekha (1959), Lyu Shaoqi (1966) and Lin Piao (1972). In Korea, Kim Il Song's one man rule was heralded by the victims like Park he Nyon (1954), pro Chinese factions and pro Moscow factions.

Secondly, independence for the Asian communist regimes and movements often meant serious struggles among regimes and movements for both within and beyond. The DPRK's search for 'Independence or, Chu zhe', turned into a kind of isolation from the surrounding world and their search for 'Unification', often by forces, took an violent forms.

The lack of collective security framework (such as WTO) in Asia was a result of 'independence' and mutual interdependence and, thus peculiar multi-polarism resulted. However, this multipolar world often accompanied with the schism and conflicts among the socialist countries. Ten years after the agreement on the alliance with Moscow, China departed towards more independent position and schism among socialist's giants became inevitable, resulting in the armed struggle on the national border in 1969 and it took for thirty years before their relation normalized. Normalization with US and Japan (1972) for China was followed severe struggles within the socialist regimes.

The DPRK also searched for alliance with the Soviet Union, which resulted in the alliance treaty with the Soviet Union in 1961, apparently being freed from the Chinese tutelage. However, when N. Khrushchev suggested this treaty would be short-lived once the US government would agree a détente with the USSR, Kim in its turn, rushed to Beijing in five days, without noticing the Soviet side to conclude the alliance treaty. Khrushchev and his successor Leonid Brezhnev never strongly felt the DPRK as an ally. For both China and USSR, the DPRK was an ally without trust.

Among others, the United Nations as security institution was the victim of this War. The US-USSR schism has resulted in the debacle of the peace settlement mechanism especially in Asia, where institutionalization was still weak and chaos prevailed. Still worse, the UN took on the US side, thus alienating from China, which had every reason to be invited to the Security Council by 1949. Kim Il Song's adventurous initiative, coupled with Stalin's miscalculation led to the collapse of the security framework symbolized in the UN.

Meanwhile, the Soviet searched for normalization with ROK for a long time. But it was only in 1988 when they have agreed to normalize. Chinese also followed two

years later and ROK-Chinese relation was normalized after forty years intervals, though the DPRK complained severely. In its turn, the DPRK has failed to normalize, or even contact with the former enemy, the USA. Its contact with the Japanese Prime minister Ichiro Koizumi has half succeeded in September 2002, but half failed to make a final break through. Thus, the Cold War still haunts the responsibility still in larger part falls in the miscalculation of the DPRK leader as was true some half a century ago.

The process of the six party talks on Korean nuclear issue exemplifies weak role of the UN in this region on regional security. This is rooted in historical legacy of the Korean War which is not yet over in legal terms. How to cope with these negative lessons from the past totally depend on all parties involved.

ⁱ S. Goncharov, J. Lewis and X. Litai, *Uncertain Partners, Stalin, Mao and the Korean War*, Stanford, 1993, p.5.

ⁱⁱ A.Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, M., 1988, p. ; Martin Walker, *The Cold War*, London, 1994, p.74.

ⁱⁱⁱ Marshall D Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised*, 1963, p.152.

^{iv} See my translation 'Chosen sensou no nazo to Shinjitu, Sosisya, 2001 This is an translation of A.Torkunov's book, "Zagadochnaya voyna –Korean konflikty 1950-53' M., 2000. This is based on the declassified Soviet politburo documents of the Korean War.

^v Nobuo Shimotomai, "Sorenn-tougasyoyuusita kokka", Kodansya, 2002. This is a book on Vyacheslav Molotov and his role in the political history the Soviet Union. See also Molotov Remembers, Chicago, 1993.

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^{vii} Istochnik, No. , 1995, p. .

^{viii} Mainiti Sinbun, 26 Feb., 1993, citewd in Haruki Wada, Kitachosen, Yuugekitaikokka no genzai, 1998, p.63. Paradoxically, Prof. Wada's book is weak on Russian sources and is sometimes misleading. He exaggerates the role of Kim Il Song in the formative process of the DPRK which is a political myth.

^{ix} V.Tkachenko, *Koreiskii poluostrov I interesy Rossii*, M., 2000, p.18.

^x Ocherki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del Rossii, t.2 1917-2002, M., 2002, p.369.

^{xi} Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan, The origin of the Cold War in Asia*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1985,

^{xii} Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan, The origin of the Cold War in Asia*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1985, p.75.

^{xiii} Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soiuza 1945 god, M., 1949, p.86-89.

^{xiv} Andrei Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim il Song*, Rutgers Publisher, 2002. This is a revised version of his earlier work, Severnaya Koreya, M., 1995

^{xv} Ocherki Istorii Ministerrstva inostrannikh del Rossii, t.vtoroi, M., 2002, p.369.

^{xvi} See, Yosuke Kosaka, Senkou, beiso jyohousen to Dosanko nougakusya, Dousinnsensyo, 1997, p.chap.three; Nihonjingari, Shincyo, 2000, p.118. The Soviet was anxious to get information of the North Korean Uranium, and the chief

commander Otoza Yamada was interrogated seriously. The Russian new document suggests they found in the DPRK area and used it.

xvii A. Lankov, *ibid.*

xviii *Ocherki Istorii*, tom2, p.369.

xix *Vestnik*, No.4, 1995, p.135, p139. The work of this commission itself had been proposed to be set up by deputy foreign minister S. Lozovskii in December 1941, when the British Foreign minister A. Eden visited and negotiated with J. Stalin and V. Molotov on the strategic alliance between the US, UK and the Soviet Union, three weeks after the attacks on Pearl Harbor by Japanese navy. J. Stalin in the name of the politburo allowed to set up this commission to prepare in a preliminary way 'On the Future Peace Commission' within the Soviet foreign ministry.

xx *Vestnik*, No.4, 1995, p.135, p139.

xxi *Vneshnyaya Politika Sovetskogo souiuza/1946 god/*. 1952, p.222.

xxii Nobuo Shimotomai "Sorenn-Tou ga syoyuusita Kokka" *koudannsy* 2002, See also Molotov remembers, 1993,

xxiii *Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soiuza 1945 god*, 1949, p.128. It should be noted that Stalin at that time was heart problem and was absent from the leadership for two months. Molotov was assigned to lead the country. However, his rivals, Malenkov, Beriya and Mikoyan were apparently unhappy with the role of Molotov. In this situation, Molotov announced to ease censorship for the foreign press. The US press Daily Herald printed an article where V. Molotov may become a next leader instead of Stalin. This might have been manipulated by Beriya. But Stalin was angry and was punished. His satted among the leadership fell and his role became secondary even with regard to foreign policy. Instead such prominent Stalinist like Vyshinskii came to foreground (A.A. Danilov and A.V.Pyzhkov, *Rozhdenie Sverkh derzhavy*, M.,2001,p.202.).

xxiv A. M. Ledovskii, *SSSR i Stalin v sud'bakh Kitaya*, M.,1999,p.303. Although the negotiations took place on June-July period before the Soviet declaration on war against Japan, both had agreed to lay the Yalta agreement as a basis. Molotov persuaded that the treaty covers for thirty years, thus Japan is not an appropriate target as an enemy.

xxv Lankov, p.45. this is the Politburo decision of 12 April, 1948 which was handed to Kim Il Song. See also Politburo TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b), t.3, 2001, p.509.

xxvi *Vneshnyaya politika SSSR*, 1949. 287-92.

xxvii NATO *spravochnik*, Bryussel, 1995, p223-26.

xxviii *Vneshnyaya politika* 1949, 1953, p.63.

xxix NATO *sprabochnik*, 1995 in Russian. p.20.

xxx Marshall Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised*, West View, 1985, p.123.

xxxi *Vneshnyaya politika*, 1949, p444.

xxxii *Ibid.*, p.121.

xxxiii V.Tkachenko, Russian interests in the Korean penninsula, M., 2001, p.18.

xxxiv A.Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbachova*, M., 1994, p.57.

xxxv According to Chinese communist report to the Soviet politburo, 6th July 1949,

Chinese delegate insisted that " the Soviet Communist Party (B) is the headquarters of the International Communist Movement, and Chinese communist party is only the head of one direction...Chinese party will be subordinated to the will of the Soviet Communist party". If the division of the opinion emerges between the two parties,

Chinese, while, maintaining his opinions, would decisively carry out the decisions of the Soviet Party.

xxxvi “In the communist world matters, both Soviet and Chinese party must owe joint responsibility, therefore they must be a division of labor between the two. I hope that China would aid the liberation movement of the colonial, half colonial and subordinated countries. ...You should make a contribution on the movements of the Eastern, colonial, half-colonial world, meanwhile we would take larger responsibilities in the Western world” Stalin said that “in the eastern revolution Chinese communist party should carry out his revolutionary tasks”.

xxxvii He even mentioned ‘the way of Mao Zedong’ in this context.

xxxviii Stalin endorsed that “although Soviet is only partial Asian, China is all Asian country, so China should play primary role in Asian matters.”

xxxix Ledovskii...,op.cit.

xl Vneshnyaya politika..., p631-672.

xli In fact, Chinese communists were not so informed on the internal struggles among the Japanese communists from Moscow and had to ask it afterwards in 1956 Presidium TsK KPSS 1954-1964,2003,p .

xlii This letter also was never sent to China and Chairman Mao and Lyu Shao Shi in 1956 had to complain on this, because Japanese party experienced serious internal struggle (Presidium TsK KPSS 1954-1964, M., 2003, p179). Presumably, this letter was written by former political officer of the 25th Army which occupied the North, Mr. V. Kovyzenko, who promoted Kim il song to leadership. Kovyzenko worked in 1950 in Tokyo and was close to Kenji Miyamoto of the JCP, who were leftists oppositionists in 1950 split of the JPC. Kovyzenko later became Japan desk of the Soviet Communist party. Incidentally, Kovyzenko later apologized to Professor XX for this left turn, Professor XX was associated to Miyamoto faction at that time. In short, Stalin wanted to use JCP to make a counter measure against the US against Soviet-China new alignment especially in Korea.

xliii This maneuver was repetition of what Stalin did in 1932, when Kolkhoz and domestic crisis deepened after the 1931 Manchurian Incident. He gave the JCP famous programme of 1932 thesis, stressing the struggle with the Japanese army. Then JCP also split into a tiny factions (See Shimotomai. Stalina and city Moscow1931-34, Macmillan,1991,)

xliv This document was prepared by CC international department (presumably Kovyzenko) and was modified by Stalin and Molotov, According to Kovalenko memoir, p.168. The S

xlvi According to Gromyko, he in vein persuaded Stalin to go back to UN to veto, but J.

Gaddis argues that Stalin was cunning enough to do so, because the US declaration of War would evolve Sino-Soviet alliance treaty automatically (J. Gaddis, *We know now, Rethinking Cold War History*, Oxford, 1997, .76). The present author think that Stalin was moved by emotion of old generation. He was far from realistic for other state's fate.

xlvi Goncharov, Lewis and Litai, *Uncertain Partners*, Stanford, 1993.p.111

xlvi Koreiskii poluosrov, ch.2, M., 2001, p.134,

xlvi A. V. Torkunov (Zagadochnaya voina 1950-53, M.2000), translated by Prof. Kim Song Ho and the present from Sosisyua, 2002).

xlvi A. Torkunov, "Chousennsennsou no Nazo to Shinzitu", 2002, p.110-111.

¹ See my paper presented to Korean Asssocation of the ..June 2003.

li Among the American leaders, such a realist like G.Kennan, the State Department, thought it necessary to expulse the North to the status quo of the 38th parallel, but he never had imagined that the UN should be involved in this process. So he was surprised by this involvement (G. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, Pnantheon, 1967, p.490.) Anyway he was to go to academic circles of Princeton University by August 1950.

lii Voina v Koree, 1950-53, M., 2000. p.880-81. This was a reprint of the secret document of the Korean War, prepared in the 1950s for Soviet officials and generals.

lii p.13.

liv Voina v Koree, 1950-53, M., 2000. p.10; Ocherki istorii., t.2, p.370..

lv CHIPS,xxx

lvi M.A.Menshikov, S vintovkoi I vo frake, M., 1996, p.132.

lvii p.16.

lviii Ledovskii, op.cit., p.171.

lix My translation, chapter 11.

lx Ibid., esp. p.248.

lxi Ibid., esp. chap.12.

lxii Ibid., p.339.

lxiii Politburo TsK RKP(b)-VKP(8b)t.3, M., 2001, p843,847 I dr.,

lxiv Ledovskii, pp.153-176.

lxv *Molotov Remembers, Inside Kremlin politics*, Chicago, 1993, p.75: Feliks Chuev, *Molotov poludershavnyi vlastelin*, M.p150.

lxvi O. Troyanovskii, *Cherez gody I rasstoyaniya*, M., 1997, p124-143.