# Japan and the UN in International Politics: Historical Perspectives

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The Academia Juris Booklet series records the symposiums, lectures and conferences organized by the Advanced Institute for Law and Politics, Graduate School of Law, Hokkaido University. The present volume is a collection of papers produced for the international conference on Japan and the United Nations/the League of Nations held in Tokyo on 10 December 2006.
Introduction

Asahiko Hanzawa


The conference’s aim was to re-examine Japan’s relations with the United Nations (and the League of Nations) from the perspectives of international politics and history. Japan was an active member of the LN and has now participated in the UN for half a century. Officially it has repeatedly advocated “UN-centred principle”. Many observers, however, would point out that the policy is either without substance or a domestically directed fig-leaf for its overriding US-centred foreign policy. Moreover, Japan’s historical great power aspirations have often set it at odds with its Asian neighbours, especially China and Korea. At the same time, Japan’s unique peace constitution has in effect seemed to bar Japan from fully participating in UN PKO, which have now become one of that organisation’s major functions.
Despite the state-centred inclination still apparently prevalent in Northeast Asia and the United States, one of the paradoxes and fascinations of the history of the “universal organisations” is that while they have confirmed and embodied the sovereign states model, they have been impressively instrumental in undermining and transforming the very principle of sovereignty. Not the least of these transformations has been in the fields of peace-building, human rights, humanitarian interventions and economic development. By examining Japan’s policy, perceptions and attitudes toward the LN/UN in the context of the complex multi-lateral dynamics that the UN has helped generate, the following chapters may help us better consider how Japan (and other related international actors) can/should cope with the overarching transformation of the broad paradigm of international relations.

The conference was organised in a form that would hopefully stimulate interaction between historians and international political scientists with current/future policy concerns. Admittedly, mainstream historians have tended to dismiss the UN as irrelevant or of marginal significance to realpolitik, despite its obvious status as a major non-state actor. On the other hand, both theorists of the UN and UN
officials may not always have had a sufficiently long-term historical sense of direction. The recent crises in Iraq, Iran and North Korea, as well the incessant discussion over UN reform and peace-building, in particular, appear to urge us to redress such intellectual aporias.

I would like to express utmost gratitude for the generous contribution of Sir Marrack Goulding, former Under-Secretary-General of the UN in charge of Peace Keeping Operations (1986-1993). Also, we would like to thank the panellists and the participants of the conference as well as the secretariat and the efficient simultaneous interpreters from Simul International Co.

The panellists and the official discussants of the conference were as follows:

Prof. Akami, Tomoko (Australian National University, Australia)
Prof. Aoi, Chiyuki (Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan)
Ms. Asounuma, Haruna (Kyoto University, Japan)
Dr. Best, Antony (London School of Economics, U.K.)
Sir Marrack Goulding (former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations)
Prof. Guthrie-Shimizu, Sayuri (Michigan State University, U.S.A.)
Prof. Hanzawa, Asahiko (Meiji Gakuin University, Japan)
Dr. Jin, Linbo (China Institute of International Relations, China)
Prof. Kawashima, Shin (University of Tokyo, Japan)
Prof. Kitaoka, Shinichi (University of Tokyo, Japan, former Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan at the UN)
Prof. Ma, Xiaohua (Osaka Kyoiku University, Japan)
Prof. Matsumoto, Saho (Nagoya City University, Japan)
Mr. Murakami, Tomoaki (Osaka University, Japan)
Prof. Pan, Liang (Tsukuba University, Japan)
Prof. Takahara, Takao (Meiji Gakuin University, Japan)
Prof. Tohmatsu, Haruo (Tamagawa University, Japan)
Mr. Wang, Wenlung (National Chengchi University, Taiwan)
Prof. Yamada, Tetsuya (Sugiyama Jogakuen University, Japan)
Symposium Program

Sunday 10 December

8:40    Registration

9:00    Opening remarks by Prof. Asahiko Hanzawa, Meiji Gakuin University

9:15–11:00 Session 1: Japan and the League of Nations

Chair: Prof. Haruo Tohmatsu, Tamagawa University

Speakers: Dr. Antony Best, London School of Economics

“The League of Nations and the Death of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance”
Prof. Tomoko Akami, Australian National University

“Empires and Nation-state: the League’s International Order and Japan re-considered”

Commentator: Ms. Haruna Asonuma, Kyoto University

11:10–12:55 Session 2: Japan and China at the LN/UN

Chair: Prof. Shin Kawashima, University of Tokyo

Speakers: Prof. Shin Kawashima, University of
Tokyo
“Sino-Japanese Relations at the League of Nations”
Dr. Linbo Jin, China Institute of International Studies
“Sino-Japanese Relations at the United Nations”
Commentator: Mr. Wang Wenlung, National Cheng-chi University

13:00–14:10 Lunch Break

14:15–16:00 Session 3: Japan and UN Activities
Chair: Prof. Liang Pan, Tsukuba University
Speakers: Prof. Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, Michigan State University
“The United States, Japan, and the UN during the Cold War”
Mr. Tomoaki Murakami, Osaka University
“Japan’s Participation in UN Peace-Keeping: 1950s–1990s”
Commentator: Prof. Liang Pan, Tsukuba University
16:15-18:30  **Concluding Session: Japan and the UN: past, present and future**

**Chair:** Prof. Asahiko Hanzawa, Meiji Gakuin University

**Speakers:** Sir Marrack Goulding, former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations

"The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping and Japan"

Prof. Chiyuki Aoi, Aoyama Gakuin University

"Japan and Peace Support Operations: A Doctrinal Perspective"

**Commentator:** Prof. Shinichi Kitaoka, University of Tokyo

Former Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan at the UN
§ 1 The Birth of the League and the Death of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1918-1922*

Antony Best

Introduction

In the years between the end of the First World War in 1918 and the conclusion of the Washington Conference in 1922 the international politics of East Asia underwent a great transformation. At the opening of this brief period of time Japan appeared bent on a largely unilateral policy of expansion in continental North-East Asia, seeking increased influence in north China, Manchuria and Siberia, while Britain and the United States struggled to uphold the ‘open door’. However, by its conclusion Japan had been forced to retreat from its imperialist line; in 1922 it announced its intention to withdraw from Siberia and explicitly accepted the need to co-operate with the Anglo-Saxon powers in implementing a multilateral and non-interventionist approach towards China. The region had thus changed from being one defined by imperialist expansionism to an area where co-operation and consultation would be used to underpin a new era of stability.
The question that obviously arises when looking at this transformation is why did it take place. Was it solely the logical result of the changing balance of power in the region following the end of the First World War, or was it also a consequence of the normative revolution that was at the time reconfiguring the tenets of international politics? This question needs to be asked for this brief period of time witnessed two events that were emblematic of the changing nature of international relations and which were to have a marked effect on East Asia in the coming years. These were the foundation of the League of Nations in 1919, the crowning glory of the new spirit of internationalism, and the decision at Washington in late 1921 to end one of the last remaining exemplars of 'old diplomacy', the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Does the fact that these two events took place in this period suggest that internationalism had a marked effect on decision-makers? Moreover, can it be said that there was any direct connection between the birth of the League and the death of the alliance?

**The Difficult Birth of the League**

It is well known that in 1918 Japanese politicians and intellectuals were profoundly sceptical about the idea of an organization being constructed to police and regulate the
workings of international politics. As the writings of Naoko Shimazu, Frederick Dickinson, and Noriko Kawamura, to name but a few, have made clear, Japan’s suspicions rested primarily on the fear that the new organization would, despite its claims to universalism, be dominated by an Anglo-American cabal.¹ To a state such as Japan, which had struggled and often been disappointed over the preceding decades in its effort to claim equality of status with the Great Powers, the prospect of this new organization being dominated by the West was disquieting. This was, of course, a view most memorably expressed at the time by the young Konoe Fumimaro.² The *Gaimushō* and the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations (*gaiko-chosakai*), which brought together a range of important decision-makers, realized that Japan in reality had no choice but to enter such a body if it were established. However, to make it more acceptable to Japanese sensibilities they sought to ensure that it acted on a basis of equality between states by sponsoring the inclusion of a racial equality clause into what became its covenant.

The racial equality clause became, of course, a doomed Japanese *cause célébre*, for the white settler countries that ringed the Pacific naturally interpreted it as a threat to their right to regulate immigration on racial grounds. It was thus defeated by overt Australian and covert American opposi-
tion.³ This action, of course, merely had the effect of confirming that Japan’s original suspicions of Anglo-American motivations were entirely justified. However, this did not necessarily mean that Japanese intellectuals rejected the principle of internationalism as being inherently flawed. As Harumi Goto-Shibata has observed in a recent essay, in the wake of the peace conference those publicists who wrote in the journal Gaikō Jihō generally argued that the ideal of international justice and equality should continue to be pursued. Their view was that the League should and could be reformed so that it would not become a mere diplomatic tool of the Anglo-Saxon powers.⁴ In other words, the motives that underpinned the original desire for the racial equality clause continued to exist. A similar attitude was reflected in the writings of the leading liberal thinker of the day, Yoshino Sakuzō, who observed in an editorial in July 1919 that ‘The trend of the world ... [i]n foreign policy ... is the establishment of international egalitarianism.’⁵

Moreover, this sense that something positive could be constructed was evident in Japanese governmental policy towards the League. Despite the problems that had arisen at Paris, the Hara Cabinet did agree to membership, appointing the former foreign minister Ishii Kikujirō as its representative to the League Council and nominating a number of talented
individuals, such as Nitobe Inazō, to be members of the League Secretariat. It also acted within Japan to encourage the internationalist cause by supporting the establishment of a League of Nations Association, which although it remained small in size, was closely linked to the business and political elite. Its careful handling of the League was also apparent in the area of policy, for, although states such as Australia feared that Japan would revive the racial equality issue at the first meeting of the Assembly, the Hara government allowed the matter to lie at least for the foreseeable future.

However, while Japan showed no propensity to reject internationalism, it was, of course, by no means satisfied with the outcome of the Paris Peace Conference. In Gaikō Jihō writers lined up to attack what they saw as the double standard followed by the Anglo-Saxon powers. An important aspect of this phenomenon was that it was not just the United States that came in for adverse comment, but that Japan’s ally, Britain, was also targeted. This was not a new phenomenon, for Britain had already been heavily criticized during the First World War, when the media in Japan had expressed resentment towards what they saw as its junior partner status in the Anglo-Japanese alliance and their distaste for British domination of Asia. The peace conference only acted to heighten Japanese suspicion, for after all it was
a member of the British Empire delegation, Australia, that had proved pivotal to the suppression of the racial equality clause. For some intellectuals, the simple answer was that Japan should renounce the alliance and turn towards Asia. Other critics were not willing to go that far, for at the very least the alliance still provided Japan with an element of security and a guarantee against diplomatic isolation. This too was the line adopted by the Gaimushō.

**Internationalism and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance**

The question, however, was how long the alliance could continue to play a useful role, for it was not just under attack from critics in Japan but also from a number of other and potentially more significant angles. The most notable problem was that in the period following the end of the First World War American opinion began to criticize the alliance as an umbrella under which Japan had been able to expand its influence in East Asia. It therefore followed that if the alliance were to end Japan would become a less predatory and more amenable power. This American assault was not though predicated entirely on balance-of-power considerations, for, in addition, criticism was also expressed in internationalist terms. The fact that the United States had not joined the League had not by any means blunted the interest of
American intellectuals in internationalist thinking and in their desire to create a better world the alliance came in for a good deal of hostile comment. Much of the critique rested on the assertion that alliances were simply anachronistic in a world defined by ‘new diplomacy’.

Furthermore an extra twist to this argument was added by the contention that culturally Britain and Japan had nothing in common; this contrasted with the Anglo-American relationship, which was based on a friendship that derived from a common language and values. Such views were expressed in newspapers and journals, but were also evident in the correspondence that American thinkers on foreign affairs held with their counterparts in the British Empire. For example, in June 1921 the prominent American jurist, Felix Frankfurter of Harvard University, asked the Canadian civil servant, Loring Christie, ‘Why should Great Britain have alliances anyhow—or certainly any that is not conditioned on a friendship between U.S. and Gt. Britain that is deeper than alliances.’

Both the realpolitik and internationalist arguments espoused by American writers found a receptive audience in Britain and the Dominions. As had been the case in Japan, the First World War had seen some strident criticisms of the alliance. British critics, who included many of the Foreign Office diplomats serving in East Asia, had expressed dismay
about Japan’s reluctance to provide sufficient assistance and its tendency to expand its sphere of influence while the other Great Powers were distracted.\textsuperscript{13} The suspicion levelled at Japan during the war had died off to a degree once the conflict was over, but still a number of diplomats and military figures who had served in the region had profound doubts about whether the alliance should continue beyond its ten-year lease of life. Much of this objection rested on the assumption that British and Japanese interests were diverging, particularly in regard to China, but, in addition, the moral element was important. Sir Beilby Alston, who had acted as chargé d’affaires in both Peking and Tokyo, noted pointedly, while on home leave in July 1920, that:

As long as we are Allies we must in the eyes of the world share the moral responsibility of Japan’s actions. Can we continue to do so without drugging our consciences and conniving at violations of principle, the maintenance of which is vital to the civilization of the world?\textsuperscript{214}

Of particular embarrassment in this context was that a common label that critics on both sides of the Atlantic attached to Japan during this troubled period was that of the ‘Prussia of the East’, an expression that was, of course, heavily loaded
with negative connotations.\textsuperscript{15}

Outside of Whitehall, criticism of the alliance was particularly apparent among the liberal/progressive elite that now dominated public discourse on international relations. This group fully accepted the idea that the alliance was an anachronism that had no place in the modern world. What, however, particularly sparked this group into action was the perception that as long as the alliance existed it would remain as an obstacle to any deeper Anglo-American friendship based on a shared interpretation of internationalism. For example, the liberal editor of the \textit{English Review}, Austin Harrison, noted in August 1921 of the forthcoming Washington conference that it would:

\begin{quote}
... give us the opportunity to declare our policy, above all to prove whether we have learnt any lesson from the war, whether we are to remain the "flaming second" of Japan, or to move constructively and culturally at the side of America as the example of world-peace.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

Thus for progressives in both Britain and the United States friendship between their two countries had become synonymous with the internationalist cause, and Japan had no place in this vision but as an obstacle.
Another angle to this problem, which reinforced the view that the alliance was an anachronism, was that a nascent regional internationalism had been evolving in East Asia since the end of the nineteenth century based on the concept of the ‘open door’. This was an internationalism designed to regulate and rationalize Great Power intercourse with China with the object of maintaining open access to the Chinese market and preventing a drift towards spheres of influence. Initially the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in sympathy with this phenomenon and indeed explicitly stood for the maintenance of the ‘open door’. However, after Japan’s victory over Russia in 1904–5 and its inheriting of the latter’s strategic and commercial dominance over south Manchuria the relationship between the alliance and the ‘open door’ became more problematical. Hampered by its own strategic imperatives, Britain was reluctantly forced to acquiesce to Japanese infringements of the ‘open door’. But by the end of the First World War these infringements had become so blatant as to make a mockery of the alliance, and there was considerable agitation in intellectual circles for a revival of regional cooperation to uphold the ‘open door’. The alliance was thus not just seen as incompatible with universal internationalism, but was also seen as failing to uphold the regional values that it had originally purported to support.\textsuperscript{17}
The advent of internationalism did not, however, merely raise a problem in regard to the outlook of elite public opinion, for it also had a more concrete impact on the future of the alliance. This first became apparent in 1920 when questions were raised about whether the alliance, as then constituted, was not merely out of step with the principles that underpinned the League but also with the legal obligations of membership. This was especially the case in regard to the alliance’s military clauses. As a result of deliberations in London and Tokyo in July 1920 the two countries addressed a communication to the League announcing their intention, should the alliance be continued beyond July 1921, of bringing its terms and spirit into harmony with the Covenant. What this might entail in substance was left studiously vague, but the very fact that such a declaration had to be made bears witness to the fact that the alliance was now subject to markedly changed circumstances.

**The Changing Balance of Power in East Asia**

The fact that the alliance was criticized from an internationalist perspective in both theory and practice might suggest that its eventual termination arose out of this sense that it was an arrangement out-of-time. In other words, the death of the alliance might be construed as a victory for internationalism.
There are some elements of truth in such a conclusion, but it is far from being the whole story, for, in addition, the alliance’s demise can also be seen as arising from the changing balance of power in East Asia.

Any defensive alliance is built on the fact that its signatories share the belief that they are under threat from a common foe. In the case of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it had originally been constructed in 1902 to ward off Russian expansion in North-East Asia, and over time had also, by implication, sought to restrain German ambitions in the Pacific. By 1921 both of these strategic threats seemed to have disappeared, for Russia was in chaos and Germany’s overseas empire had been dissolved. The alliance had thus lost any clear and definite rationale for its existence. This is not to say, of course, that no threat existed to either signatory’s interests in Asia, rather the problem was that the foes were no longer common ones.

For Japan, the United States now clearly loomed as the greatest menace to its freedom of manoeuvre. This involved not merely a clash of interests over the ‘open door’ in China, Manchuria and Siberia and ill-feeling over immigration issues, for it also contained an even more disquieting aspect, namely the fact that an increasingly tense naval race had opened up between the two countries.\(^{19}\) Some alarmist commentators
looking on at this unhealthy situation were moved to predict that an open clash was inevitable. Japan therefore needed the alliance still, but largely as a means of containing the United States. Britain, however, had absolutely no desire to enter into a war with the world’s second largest naval power or with a country that seemed to share its values more wholeheartedly than its ally did. Indeed, in 1911, in anticipation of growing American-Japanese rivalry, Britain had already written into the third alliance a clause debarring itself from any such commitment.20

To complicate the situation even further, Britain too had a new potential foe to contend with in Asia; unfortunately this just happened to be Japan itself. This did not necessarily entirely negate the alliance’s raison d’être, for a number of senior political figures believed that the best way to meet this danger was for Britain to continue its understanding with Japan in order to achieve a measure of control over future Japanese policy. In May 1921 this argument was put forward in Cabinet by both the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, and was enough to persuade their ministerial colleagues to agree in principle to renewal.21 The British government was therefore prepared to continue with the alliance, but only in order to contain its ally.
Clearly then in 1921 the alliance was in danger of being pulled apart by the very different strategic imperatives that the allies sought to impose on it. Britain in essence wanted an alliance that would put Japan on a leash, which was exactly the criticism that Japanese publicists had made during the Great War. Japan, for its part, wanted an arrangement that Britain could never agree to, namely one that would contain the United States. Both sides thus wanted the impossible, but were unwilling to move away from the safety blanket that the alliance seemed to offer. Old diplomacy was clearly a hard habit to kick.

There was, however, one solution that might satisfy all parties, including the American government, which was that the two allies might invite the United States to join the alliance. This proposal, which the Foreign Office and Gaimushō appear to have come to independently of each other, seemed to have the potential to square the circle, for, if it came to fruition, it would at a stroke reduce Japanese-American tensions and act as a permanent cap on Japan’s imperial ambitions. In addition, it also had another benefit, for the Imperial Conference that Britain held in London in the summer of 1921 had revealed that the Dominions were dangerously divided over whether the alliance should be renewed in its original form. The argument had pivoted on the Canadian
fear that the United States would react adversely to renewal and the Australian contention that the alliance was too strategically important to be subject to an American veto. The suggestion that the United States should be invited to adhere to the alliance thus appeared to answer both of these concerns.\textsuperscript{23}

**Naval Limitation and the Death of the Alliance**

When in July 1921 the United States declared its interest in holding an international conference in Washington on Pacific and Asian issues, the British interpreted this as providing a green light to its tripartite alliance proposal. At this point the realpolitik and the internationalist agendas began to mesh, for clearly any expansion of the membership of the alliance would require re-negotiation of the existing arrangements. Britain and Japan had already committed themselves to the principle that any renewal of the alliance should bring it into line with their respective obligations under the League Covenant. While the United States was not, of course, a member of the League, the proposal that it should join only reinforced the idea that the terms should be adjusted and the responsibilities incurred made less demanding. What this meant primarily was that the security commitment made under the alliance would be greatly reduced. Thus, in draft-
ing his notes on the future of the alliance, the head of the British delegation to the Washington Conference, Arthur Balfour, stressed that one of the objects of the scheme was to ‘enable the Americans to be parties to a tripartite arrangement without committing themselves to military operations’. The emphasis therefore was to be on co-operation and consultation rather than on rigidly adhering to taking joint military action in specific circumstances, although he did envisage security talks taking place under circumstances of crisis. The alliance was thus to be broadly brought into line with the League and the spirit of internationalism.

This prescription also appealed to the Japanese government. With the original alliance clearly of little strategic benefit if it did not extend to defending Japan against the United States, the Japanese government felt that it too could only gain if the membership was extended. Important in this respect was the role that was played by the ambassador to Washington, Shidehara Kijurō, who recognized that the maintenance of the original alliance might only worsen Japanese-American relations. Shidehara’s influence, however, did not end there, for he was one of the most forward of Japanese diplomats in understanding the normative changes that had taken place since 1919 and the need for Japan to engage with and seek to benefit from internationalism.
This effort to perpetuate the alliance by changing its character was not, however, to succeed, for it predictably fell at the first fence, namely American disapproval. Even in the watered down form favoured by Balfour the mere word ‘alliance’ caught in the throat of American policy-makers.²⁸ Supposedly in this situation, with the United States having rejected this initiative, British policy was to turn back towards the original alliance. This though proved impossible, for by the time of the Washington Conference, the issue of the alliance’s future had become inextricably linked to another popular manifestation of internationalism — the surge of support for an international naval limitation treaty. With membership of the League having become impossible, in 1920-21 internationalists in the United States had coalesced around preaching the cause of disarmament. This idea gained support in Congress and also appealed to the Harding administration as a means of gaining parity with the Royal Navy on the cheap, while simultaneously ending the American-Japanese naval race and pleasing public opinion.²⁹ At the same time, however, disarmament also had its attractions for the British and Japanese governments because the alternative they faced, if naval limitation was not adopted, was that the United States would build its navy up to its full capacity. This would involve the two former powers in a
naval race that they could ill-afford and were likely to lose.\textsuperscript{30} In these circumstances, any attempt to sustain the alliance was assumed to be dangerous, for this would pose a threat to American strategic interests and thus undermine the case for disarmament. Thus, in order to avoid further naval competition, the alliance had to be sacrificed.

In the end it was Shidehara who came up with an answer to the dilemma. On his own initiative he produced a draft of a still further watered down understanding between Japan, Britain and the United States, which eventually paved the way to the conclusion of the Four-Power Pact. The pact was an agreement in tune with its times, for it did not contain any military clauses; it merely called on its signatories to uphold the status quo in the Pacific and to consult in times of crisis. As such, the pact did not on the surface conflict with the League Covenant, but this did not mean that it was entirely congruent, for it prefigured a drift towards regionalism that did not sit easily with the universal internationalist values espoused at Geneva. This phenomenon was reinforced by the fact that the conference also gave birth to the Nine-Power Treaty, which saw the full flowering of the nascent regional internationalism that had always been present in the idea of the ‘open door’ in China. This in essence was the whole problem with the Washington experiment. The Washington
Conference was a triumph for internationalism, but because it was the United States that largely dictated its terms it was an attempt to instil order that was almost entirely divorced from the League’s ambit. Moreover, it built on a regional variant of internationalism that was not entirely in sympathy with the League’s principles. Thus internationalism in East Asia came to have two poles, with the Washington order as the most dominant at least until the turbulent events of 1931–33.31

**Conclusion**

There is good reason to believe that the rise of internationalism did have a profound effect on the history of East Asia in the period immediately following the conclusion of the Great War. The creation of the League, although it was not in the form that Japan desired, did stimulate hope that an era of greater equality might be at hand, but perhaps more importantly it raised significant questions about the future of the structures that had defined regional order up to that point. Clearly, the dominant understanding in the area of security, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, was in decline for reasons of realpolitik, but it was further weakened by the perception that it was an arrangement that could not but stand awkwardly in an era of collective security. It is, of course, difficult to divorce its demise from American pressure, but it is important
to remember that, even without Washington’s lobbying, it would have had to be revised in a way that would have made it compliant with the Covenant. That being the case, what sort of alliance would have emerged? Would there have been any point in its continuation? Would Britain and Japan have been able to agree mutually satisfactory terms? These are questions that those historians who have argued that the Pacific War might have been avoided had the alliance continued have not considered. They have assumed that the alliance could simply be renewed without taking into account the fact that revision would have been necessary. Yet the new dynamic created by internationalism cannot and should not be ignored.

The irony, however, is that, while the League may have disrupted the international order in the region, it did not come to define its future. If internationalism was important in East Asia in the 1920s it was largely in a regionalist guise in the form of the order created at the Washington Conference. This was not an ideal solution, for the ideological underpinnings of this order were even looser than those that existed at Geneva and the appeal to consultation and co-operation that were initially invoked were soon to be honoured in the breach. Internationalism had thus undermined the old order, but in the end the fact that in East Asia it had become bifurcated,
existing in the competing forms of the League and the Washington order, meant that little of substance was put in its place.

*I wish to thank the British Academy for its help in financing some of the research used in this paper.


5 Quoted in Dickinson, op.cit., p.235.


8 National Archives of Australia (NAA), CP360/13/5 ‘Japan and Racial Equality at the Assembly of the League of Nations’ Piesse memorandum 27 October 1920.


10 Nish, op.cit., pp.271–90.


14 The National Archives (TNA), FO371/5360 F1783/199/23 Alston memorandum July 1920.


21 TNA, CAB23/25 43(21) Cabinet meeting 30 May 1921.
25 Nish, op.cit., pp.369–70.
26 Ibid. p.360.
27 Akami, op.cit. pp.60–1.
31 It is notable that Iriye’s *After Imperialism*, the best single text on the 1920s, has only two references in its index to the League of Nations.
§ 2 ‘The Nexus of the Nation-State and the Empire’: Reconsidering the League’s Order and Japan in the inter-war period

Tomoko Akami

Introduction

In this chapter, I will start where Dr Antony Best finishes, and re-examine the nature of the international order in the Asia-Pacific region, the role of the League of Nations in it, and Japan’s ‘challenge’ to the order. By doing so, the chapter hopes to address the main theme of the book, the governance of the League (and the UN) in the region and the role of Japan in this context.

I argue that for this re-examination, a slightly different framework, based on the concept ‘nation-state/empire’, will be useful. International politics of the region in this period had been largely understood by a framework that assumes the opposition of the two concepts, the nation-state and the empire. As a result, Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931 had been understood as the Japanese ‘imperial’ challenge to the League’s order that was based on the new norm of
self-determination and the nation-state. In contrast, I stress the need to pay a greater attention to the nexus between the nation-state and the empire, and by using the concept of nation-state/empire, I question this binary assumption. I argue that the inter-war years can be understood as a transitional period not from the norm of the empire to that of the nation-state, but from one kind of nation-state/empire to another kind of nation-state/empire, and in the latter an element of ‘informal empire’ became increasingly significant. In the following, first I briefly summarize the previously dominant understanding of the international order in the Asia-Pacific in the 1920s and of the Japanese aggression in China in the 1930s. Second, I elaborate the concept of nation-state/empire and informal empire, and try to explain why a new framework based on the notion of nation-state/empire is important and more useful than the assumed binary concepts of the nation-state and the empire. Third, I suggest what this framework means for the understanding of the dominant order in the region, the role of the League in it and Japanese foreign policies in the 1920s and 1930s. Finally, I ponder the usefulness of this concept as well as its problems, if we would like to apply it to the period after 1945.

A few points, however, need to be made before entering the main argument. First, the concepts such as the ‘govern-
ance' and the 'order' of the world or a region tend to confine the perspective of this chapter largely to that of those who intended to govern (those who envisaged their global or regional governance). The concept of nation-state/empire reflects this limited perspective. In other words, it focuses on units of international politics, which had a greater power than 'others', and as a result, it largely leaves the less powerful, such as 'colonies', out of the discussion.

At the same time, however, I use the term, 'empire', with a particular attention to its relational meaning as much as its ontological meaning. The term of empire in this chapter, therefore, refers not only to a specific historical empire, which 'existed out there', but also to a greater power of a unit of international politics, which was to be exerted over other less powerful units. In this sense, the term, empire, presupposes the other units that were to be influenced or governed. It means that an empire’s power existed only in relation to the less powerful, or to put it more strongly, an empire did not exist without the less powerful. The use of the term, empire, therefore, does not negate the existence of the less powerful. In fact, it only makes sense by referring to the latter. Furthermore, this power relation is not totally one-way domination of the structural power, because the less powerful is not exactly those with no power. I stress the significance of an
interactive aspect of power relations, while acknowledging the asymmetrical nature of this relationship. In particular, I emphasize how the nature of imperial/colonial relations (and the nature of an empire) had to change and adjust, because of the logic, need and pressure of not only those who intended to dominate, but also those who were to be dominated.

Second, in the process of turning the presentation I made in Tokyo on 10 December 2006 into a chapter, I have made some revisions. In particular, I incorporated valuable comments made by Ms Asonuma Haruna, especially her point on how my proposed framework based on the notion of nation-state/empire could be located in the existing debate on ‘informal empire’—the debate that began with the argument by John Gallangher and Ronald Robinson in 1953, and that was developed by various scholars, especially historians of British imperial relations. It also became clear that the proposed concept needs to be clarified in relation to the argument by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, especially on their point that the historical notion of ‘imperialism’ needs to be distinguished from their concept of ‘Empire’. By incorporating the idea of ‘informal empire’, I embrace a broader interpretation of ‘imperialism’ than Negri and Hardt do, and define imperialism as an ideology of an empire. Unlike them, I see that there is a power centre which is defined by the underlying structure.
At the same time, however, I also understand that this power centre may be multiple. Furthermore, I acknowledge that if we discuss the influence of non-military might, such as the power of information, it is hard to clearly demarcate the boundary of the spheres of this influence. I will elaborate further these points in the following.

Third, as Dr Tohmatsu Haruo indicated in the beginning of the session in Tokyo, this piece intends to be more thought provoking than empirical. It aims to present a new perspective, and it takes more the form of a survey. The proposed concept needs to be further clarified, and substantiated with more detailed evidence. Nevertheless, I have been working on primary and secondary sources of international politics of the region in the inter-war period for almost a decade, and I have used the notion of nation-state/empire in my previous works, although in a less articulated manner.\textsuperscript{5} I feel convinced that this nexus between the nation-state and the empire needs to be more articulated and strongly presented as a framework in order to fully and more meaningfully understand the nature of international politics of the inter-war period, and possibly the period after 1945. The chapter is, therefore, a further articulation of my thought and research of the past years. It may clarify the past puzzles better, while posing a new set of questions. Its objective is not to provide
a full answer, but to contribute to or even initiate further
critical discussions on some key issues of international politics
in the region in a slightly different way from before.

Furthermore, in these past years, I have became aware of
some significant gaps among various epistemic paradigms of
concerned disciplines or their sub-fields, namely International
Relations, Diplomatic History, British Imperial History,
Modern Japanese History, or Postcolonial Studies, as well as
between works in Japanese and English languages. In this
chapter, I hope to contribute to a further synthesis of the
above-mentioned fields. Although it is not exactly a newly
explored path,6 it is still not a well-trodden path.

The orthodox understanding of the international order in
the Asia-Pacific region, and the role of the League of
Nations and Japan in the inter-war period

Japanese diplomatic historians of the inter-war period do
not exactly use the term, the League’s order, in the context of
the Asia-Pacific region in the inter-war period. Rather, lead-
ing historians, such as Hosoya Chihiro, have used the term, the
Versailles-Washington system.7 This reflected the dominant
perception in the inter-war period. Contemporary foreign
policy experts in the 1920s, for example, repeatedly noted the
weakness of the League’s effectiveness in the region: the
League was Euro-centred and inadequate in the region; the major regional powers, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., were absent from the League; while China joined the League eventually, it remained skeptical of it at least in the late 1920s.\textsuperscript{8} They thought that although the Washington Treaties of 1922 may have been understood as vague and limited as an alternative to the regular diplomatic machinery for the settlement of disputes, they nevertheless provided a significant multilateral framework of economic cooperation, arms control and diplomatic arbitration in the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{9} As Akira Iriye makes it clear, the new code of diplomatic conduct, New Diplomacy, which Woodrow Wilson proposed for the post-World War I order, was embodied in the Asia-Pacific in the Washington Treaties, not the Versailles Treaty of 1919.\textsuperscript{10} Accordingly, major debates on Japanese diplomacy and inter-war international politics in the region were not so much about the League and Japanese relations with the League. Rather, they were about the American initiative for a new order, which they saw was embodied in the Washington Treaties, and how Japan, along with other key players, reacted to it.\textsuperscript{11}

Nonetheless, American foreign policy experts of the late 1920s stressed that this regional treaty framework should be ‘in harmony and constructive relationship’ with the League.\textsuperscript{12}
Their Japanese counterparts also understood the international order as a set comprising both the League and the Washington Treaties. Accordingly, later scholars, especially Japanese, had largely accepted that the Washington Treaties was complementary to the League’s order, hence the terminology, the Versailles-Washington system. Although the League was marginal in the region in the 1920s, it was complemented by the Washington Treaties. As a result, the Versailles-Washington system was understood as the dominant international order in the region, and it was also virtually the League’s order in the region. Dr Best’s chapter in this volume, however, questions this assumed ‘coherency’ of the system, and suggests a more ambiguous and complex picture. It was this complexity of ‘the system’ that presented major dilemma for Japanese foreign policy elite in the following years, and it is why the proposed concept of nation-state/empire is more useful to understand this complexity and the Japanese dilemma.

Japanese military aggression in Manchuria that began in September 1931 resulted in the establishment of Japan’s puppet regime, Manchukuo, in March 1932. The orthodox understanding that this aggression was the starting point of the following Japanese aggressive war [shinryaku sensō] with China and then with the Allied stands firm in modern
Japanese historiography. This is reflected in the well-accepted term, the 15-years war [Jūgōnen sensō, 1931–1945]. Here, I want to draw attention to how this military aggression of 1931 was understood in the debates of international politics.

Most significantly, it was this Japanese military aggression that brought Northeast Asia into the scope of the League’s order, which had had only a very marginal presence in the 1920s. This meant that China appealed its own case against the Japanese military aggression to the League at the time when the Washington Treaty framework of 1922 had already proven to be ineffective and was failing, according to Iriye. As a result of this Chinese action, however, an incident far away from Geneva became a problem of the League: it was now understood as a ‘crisis’ of the legitimacy of its collective security in Northeast Asia, and a crisis of the governance of the ‘West’. In a paradoxical sense, the Manchurian ‘crisis’ for the League also ‘revived’ the Versailles-Washington system on two significant accounts; the League invited the U.S., still a non-member, to deal with the crisis in the special committee, and the U.S. cooperation with the League became close on this point; the U.S. also unilaterally condemned Japanese actions in Manchuria on the basis that it violated the Nine Power Treaty on China (a part of the Washington Treaty framework) as well as other inter-
national treaties.

The League sent the Lytton Commission to the ‘Far East’ in early 1932 to examine the crisis, and submitted the report to the League in October. In contrast to the uncompromising American Stimson Doctrine, as Ian Nish’s work elaborates, the Lytton report was not unsympathetic to Japanese imperial interests in Manchuria. Nevertheless, it rejected the Japanese argument for the legitimacy of Japanese military actions after September 1931 and that of the Manchukuo. The Japanese government decided that this was unacceptable. Accordingly, Matsuoka Yōsuke, the Japanese special envoy, made a famous withdrawal speech at the League’s General Assembly in February 1933, leading the Japanese delegates to a dramatic exit from the League. This Japanese departure from the League is also understood as the first step to the following Japanese diplomatic isolation, paving a path for Japan to the war with China in 1937 and with the Allied forces in 1941.

The moral condemnation of Japan’s action was rightly based on its military brutality on the Chinese continent and the violation of relevant international treaties. Yet, an argument that the action violated the new norm defined by the League (and the Washington Treaties) also contributed to the questioning of the legitimacy of Japanese actions. The foun-
ding document of the League, Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points of 1918, contained the point of self-determination as a key principle for the post-war order. Although the principle’s application was largely confined to the European continent in 1919, the idea reflected and inspired independence movements in Asia, the Middle East and other parts of the world. Accordingly, a respect for the sovereignty of the nation-state entered as a new vocabulary in international politics, although the acceptance of this new norm differed substantially from one country to another.19

The U.S. was leading the new initiative. Iriye argues that at the Washington Conference of 1921–1922, the U.S. intended to ‘demolish the existing system of imperialist diplomacy’, which it associated with European empires.20 For Anthony Giddens, a similar attempt was also evident in the Versailles Treaty and the League, which he understands were largely driven by the American initiative, supported by Britain. In his view, the League promoted the norm of the nation-state in an unprecedented manner on a global scale.21 These arguments indicate a shift from the norm that was based on the empire to that based on the nation-state as a key unit of international politics. Accordingly, the Japanese military aggression in Manchuria was Japan’s ‘return’ to the ‘old imperialistic code’ from its cooperative diplomacy of the
1920s that was led by Foreign Minister, Shidehara Kijûrõ, and that tried to comply to the new code defined by the League and the Washington Treaties. The aggression was, therefore, a challenge to the ‘new’ norm that was based on the nation-state. Hence, for those who associated the new norm with the League, an internal conflict for foreign policy options in Japan in the 1930s was understood as ‘a struggle of internationalists against old imperialists’.

Empires, however, were ever more present in the League system. This is obvious in the most common terminology of international politics in this period, the powers (in Japanese, rekkyô). The ‘powers’ meant powerful nation-states, both the nation-state and the empire. It is worth pointing out that debates on the nature of the inter-war international order in the Asia-Pacific region have largely focused on new factors after 1919, such as the norm of self-determination. They also mainly focused on powers’ policies towards China after 1919. This is understandable, and reasonable, because we are examining the nature of the post-1919 order, and because China was the focal point in diplomatic relations in the region of this period. Nonetheless, these focuses inevitably under-rate the pre-existing factors. Here, I am problematizing specifically the existence of the formal colonies of the former Allied empires, which were acquired before 1919. Most
British, French, Dutch, American or Japanese formal colonies remained largely intact in 1919. This meant that in the period in which Giddens argued the norm of the nation-state gained a universal acceptance in an unprecedented scale, most powerful nation-states, except for the former Axis powers, remained empires. It is important here to go back to Iriye’s insight of 1965.

‘Until after World War II the Far East had been a land of empires [and its colonies], not of nation-states. This is perhaps the most important fact in the diplomatic history of the Far East’.23 (words in brackets added)

Although Iriye discusses an American initiative to demolish imperialistic diplomacy, he does not deny that main actors in this period, including the U.S., were the empires. Furthermore, he also sees this American initiative for the new order was already failing by the mid-late 1920s. The ‘new’ order intended after imperialism was, therefore, far less clear-cut in the inter-war period than Giddens suggests.

Yet, despite this problem, an artificial separation of the concept between the nation-state and the empire is prevalent not only in Japanese diplomatic history, but also in modern social sciences in general. Hanna Arendt, for example, in her
classic study of totalitarianism of 1951 located the nation-state and the empire in a binary and oppositional relationship. In her view, the governing logic of the nation-state and that of the empire were mutually exclusive.\(^{24}\) This understanding is reflected in the terminologies in international politics of the time. ‘Imperialism’ based on the logic of the empire is largely understood in opposition to ‘internationalism’ that is based on the logic of the nation-state (and in this sense the latter is clearly distinguished from cosmopolitanism). Imperialism is also judged as ‘old’ and ‘morally wrong’, and internationalism, ‘new’ and ‘morally right’. Accordingly, the cooperative diplomacy in Japan in the 1920s is understood as an expression of this internationalism. In contrast, the Japanese actions in the 1930s were regarded as imperial Japan’s challenge to the international order, and Japanese ‘internationalists’ struggled to resist this imperialism.

Interestingly, however, orthodox histories of modern Japan also locate this ‘internationalism’ against not only imperialism, but also ‘nationalism’ in the 1930s: internationalism ‘declined’ against the rise of ‘nationalism’. E. H. Normal made a connection between two ‘enemies’ of internationalism: he used the term, ‘extreme-nationalism’ [kageki kokkashugi], and argued that it was the backbone of Japanese imperialism and the cause of the Sino-Japanese War in 1938. The theme
was further taken up by Maruyama Masao in the postwar period. Yet, the notion of ‘extreme-nationalism’ or ‘ultra-nationalism’ flatly contradicts the argument of Ardnt, who extreme nationalism as an internally integrating ideology, and as incompatible with an outward and expansionist ideology of imperialism. Nevertheless, the term, extreme-nationalism, and its role in Japanese imperialism are accepted in Japanese historiography without fully problematizing the nexus between the empire and the nation-state.

**Why the nation-state/empire, not the nation-state and the empire?**

I used the terminology, the nation-state/empire, in my work of 2002 initially in an attempt to clarify the idea of the powers or *rekkyō*. The powers in the inter-war period meant powerful nation-states, most of which possessed formal colonies. In other words, they were both the nation-states and the empires in an ontological sense. This understanding made it possible to examine the problems of ‘Wilsonian internationalism’ or ‘liberal internationalism’ of the 1920s, as not something created by external factors, but as something inherent in its own logic and assumptions: Wilsonian internationalism assumed that their international order was based not only on the nation-states, but also the empires: they were also not
free from racism or what we now call Orientalist prejudice, which was strongly evident in the League's mandate system. Japanese internationalists, like internationalists in Britain, the U.S., or even in Australia, assumed their need to protect their national/imperial interests, although they generally condemned the use of force. Nitobe Inazō was, therefore, internationalist, imperialist and nationalist at the same time in this sense, as many of his American and British counterparts also were. What was important in my inquiry was not to examine the 'contradiction' of Japanese internationalism, but to understand its inherent problems, and how they manifested both in Japan and in the Allied countries in the 1930s and the 1940s. The concept, the nation-state/empire, which stresses the nexus of the nation-state and the empire, was essential for this examination.

There are two main reasons why I feel this concept, nation-state/empire, is useful for broader examination of international politics of the inter-war period, and possibly for the period after 1945. First, while Iriye's point about the absence of the nation-states in the Northeast Asia was probably intended to stress the peculiarity of international politics of the region, this also reveals a fundamental flaw of the orthodox theories of International Relations. What I suggest as a flaw here is not so much the much-discussed Euro-
centricity of IR theories as the centrality of the nation-state in this discipline. It is an unshaken understanding that the nation-state was the basic unit of modern international relations: the modern inter-state system begins with the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, the Westphalia System. Torbjorn L. Knutsen writes:

Upon its foundation was erected a new system of international interaction and a new system of concepts and theories by which this interaction could be understood. The Treaty’s recognition of the principle of external sovereignty represents the formal recognition and the legal consolidation of the modern interstate system: i.e., a system of political interaction between legally equal territorial states, whose monarchs exercise their authority (their ‘internal sovereignty’) within well-defined, geographical frontiers, their inhabitants subject to no higher authority.27 (emphasis added)

In 1648, the states were absolutist, not the nation-state, which developed much later. Yet the major four assumptions that defined the Westphalia System have penetrated following IR theories: the norm of international politics originated in Western Europe (and was gradually to spread to the rest of
the world because of this legitimacy and rationality); the system assumed the equality among basic units of international politics, the state (and then the nation-state); it gave the states the highest status with no super-state authority; and it also assumed a relative homogeneity of the ‘nation’ within the territorial boundary. These four assumptions seriously underrate the element of power in international politics, and make it difficult to fully incorporate the notion of empire. One may argue that balance of power is one of the most important ideas in international relations, and that could be explained by the idea of the nation-state as the basic unit. As Fujiwara Kiichi notes, the ‘balance of power’ was indeed the mechanism for preventing the emergence of empires.\textsuperscript{28} In what way, then, are these assumptions associated with the centrality of the nation-state problematic, and why do we need to incorporate the empire into the discourse?

First, the power of one state was never equal to that of the other in terms of military, economic and other resources. Second, while a relative equality among states may have been achieved in Western Europe, this was not the case beyond the region. As powerful European states expanded their powers beyond their region, the inequality of the relationship between the ‘nation-state’ in Western Europe and the ‘rest of the world’ (including Eastern Europe) became manifest. The states in
Western Europe developed their own nation-states, and scholars saw that these nation-states constructed their ‘international society’. At the same time, many of these states also became maritime empires beyond the region. Edward Keene points out that a main problem of the notion of this ‘international society’, argued by Hedley Bull and the English School, is a neglect of ‘the dualistic nature of order in world’: in the European order, the states held onto the principle that they ‘should respect each other’s territorial sovereignty, and hence their equality and independence’: the ‘extra-European order’, on the other hand, was based on another principle that ‘sovereignty should be divided across national and territorial boundaries’, which legitimized Western European states’ imperial institutions and their domination. Bull understands the nineteenth century onwards as the period in which ‘international society’, the civilized code of diplomatic practice of the European nation-states, was expanded to various parts in the world. The underlining theme in this framework is that this spread occurred not only because of the dominant military and economic power of these nation-states, but also because this code of practice was rational. In this framework, the aspect of power and coercive actions of the empires is not dismissed totally, but underrated substantially.

Third, like the assumed equality among the states, the
assumed homogeneity of the nation-state itself was an ideal model or an illusion, as diverse religions, ethnicities, genders, classes, or regions, existed within the territories of the most modern nation-states both in Western Europe and beyond the region. Making a modern nation-state often meant the process of making a dominant nation the nation. It inevitably needed the state and its apparatus to homogenize and standardize the ‘national’ codes, while marginalizing other minor nations within the territory. This can be understood as an ‘internal colonization’. The assumption of the pre-existing or given homogeneity negates the existence of coercive power within the nation-state. As a result, modern International Relations theories, which assume the centrality of the nation-state as the principle unit of international politics, do not adequately incorporate empire.

The second reason why the concept of nation-state/empire is needed now more than before lies in the recent development of post-colonial studies. Many of these recent works stress the inter-connected and interactive nature between metropole and colonial peripheries. Catherine Hall describes this new trend as follows in 2002:

‘The idea that colonies and their peoples were made by the colonizers was of course nothing new: what was new
was the argument that this relationship went both ways, even if in unequal relations of power.\textsuperscript{32}

Accordingly, these post-colonial scholars ask the questions ‘how events in both locations [metropole and colony] affected each other, shaped what happened and defined what was possible’.\textsuperscript{33} Hall’s works, among other post-colonial studies, suggest that imperial/colonial histories are a crucial part of national histories, and they argue the need to place ‘colony and metropole in one analytic frame’.\textsuperscript{34} The influence of this perspective is becoming stronger, and is also evident in the works of modern Japanese history.\textsuperscript{35} Recent works, such as Louise Young’s \textit{Japan’s Total Empire}, also demonstrates the need to understand the nation-state and the empire in an integral manner.\textsuperscript{36}

How, then, does a framework, based on the concept of nation-state/empire, alter our understanding of international politics of the inter-war period? Now I suggest that the period could be understood as a transitional period, not from the order of the empires to that of the nation-state, but from one kind of nation-state/empire to another kind of nation-state/empire. This framework explains what seems to be the ‘contradictory’ nature of the League’s (and Washington Treaties’) order in the inter-war period: the seeming confusion
was largely due to the concurrent existence of the norm of the empire (the existence of pre-1919 formal colonies and post-1919 mandates of the empires of the former Allied powers) and the norm of the nation-state (self-determination and the rhetoric and idea of the nation-state as the basic unit of international politics).

The questions we need to ask now is, therefore, not whether the new norm of nation-state took over that of empire, or if it did, when, how and why. Rather, our questions will be: what changes were occurring in imperial/colonial relations, and how were they affecting the nature of the nation-state/empire in the inter-war period? How had these changes affected the League and its order in the 1920s? Was there a substantial difference in the nature of the nation-state/empire of Japanese, European (or various European), American, or the U.S.S.R.’s models, and how was the League’s order located among these models in the 1920s? Was the difference between these models substantial enough to claim that the Japanese nation-state/empire was incompatible with the others, and that this warranted its systemic challenge to the League’s order in 1931? Or would there be a better explanation for the Japanese action of 1931 in this framework?
The changing nature of the nation-state/empire in the inter-war period

A few factors were significant in causing changes in the nature of nation-state/empire around the inter-war period. These were occurring both in metropole as well as at colonial peripheries, affecting political developments at each end as well as changing imperial-colonial relations.

The development of democracy in the metropole was one of these significant factors. Socialism and labor union movements were gaining strength. Politicians in the metropole needed to adjust their domestic policies to this new political reality. The rhetoric and methods of governance needed to change in order to be effective, and reforms were made to not only expand the franchise to the working classes, but also initiate and strengthen welfare policies in order to co-opt these newly franchised voters. The change also influenced colonial policies: this was evident especially in the British metropole in the late nineteenth century at the height of formalization of the British Empire. The political platform that later scholars called social-imperialism became dominant in the 1890s–1910s. Distinguished from the U.S.S.R’s international socialism in the following decades, the social-imperialism of Britain in this period combined domestic social
reforms with imperial expansion. Domestic changes were, therefore, defining a new kind of imperial relations.

Greater political participation of broader classes in the metropole also changed what the state regarded as vital resources of its power. This was most evident during World War I. The war was regarded as the first total war, in which the thought war or psychological war was regarded as one decisive factor for the war’s outcome. Politicians in imperial metropoles could not ignore public opinion in their domestic and foreign policy making process, while overseas public opinions also became significant especially in a diplomatic crisis or during war time. As the management of public opinion both at home and overseas became increasingly important for politicians, they needed to recognize the power of non-military force, especially that of information as well as economic might in their foreign (and imperial) policies.

A smaller, yet significant parallel was evident in not all, but in some colonial peripheries: some colonials demanded greater political participation. This also affected imperial/colonial relations and imperial policies. As the British Empire formalized colonial possessions, white settler colonies, such as Australia, were increasingly pressuring the metropolitan government to give them a greater political autonomy and a greater say in the imperial policy making. Independence
movements in colonies such as Ireland and India were also becoming stronger. All these stirred the discussion of new forms of the British Empire, and ideas, including Commonwealth, were debated.\textsuperscript{38}

The Round Table movement was established in Oxford, London, and various colonial locations in order to respond to this crisis, and to strengthen and revitalize the British imperial union. While those who became members of this movement thought military dominance as significant, they felt stronger military forces did not automatically mean a stronger imperial tie. The Commonwealth was a looser, organic, yet hierarchical imperial order, in which the metropolitan government still had a greater power: each unit, especially white settler colonies, however, was increasing its autonomy. In this Commonwealth, symbolic ties, such as those based on a loyal sentiment and attachment to the British Monarchy, or a common heritage of the superior British civilization, were stressed, and mutual economic benefits were also emphasized. Furthermore, John Kendle suggests that in the Round Table movement, the ideas of social reforms and welfare policies were significant,\textsuperscript{39} and this meant social reforms and welfare of colonials, not only metropolitan ‘nationals’.

Sakai Tetsuya suggests that in the 1920s, some Japanese foreign policy experts and colonial officers evaluated more
highly this new form of the British Empire (British Commonwealth) than the League of Nations as an alternative framework for the new international (and imperial) governance. The framework stressed the new ‘empire’ as ‘an organic community’ in which metropole and colony would cooperate and help each others. In their minds, this ‘organic community’ of mutual help was stronger and more effective than the League. It was because although each unit of the Commonwealth was more autonomous than before, now it wanted, not was forced, to belong to the commonwealth both for economic gains as well as for welfare benefits.\textsuperscript{40}

Woodrow Wilson’s proposal for self-determination was another crucial factor to change the nature of imperial/colonial relations in the inter-war period. While Wilson was influenced by American progressivism of the time, it is also significant to remember that this proposal was publicized in 1918, during World War I and soon after the Russian Revolution. Wilson needed to present what the U.S. stood for to the Americans, the Axis powers, and the U.S.S.R. As a result, the two powerful, and newly emerging nation-state/empires, which were gaining economic and military might, were to use ‘anti-imperialism’ as their identity banner. The socialist U.S.S.R., a new nation-state/empire,\textsuperscript{41} emerged in 1917. It was founded on an alternative vision of the political and
economic structure, and propagated fiercely the condemnation of imperialism as the highest form of capitalism. It called for the solidarity of workers in the world against imperialism during World War I. Its ideology appealed to many in the working classes, whose political awareness was growing. The U.S.S.R. not only had an increasingly popular ideology, but it also was becoming a great economic and military power.

Wilson’s fourteen points, which included the principle of self-determination also condemned the ‘imperialism’ of the Axis Powers. By doing so, it was to counteract the threat of the U.S.S.R.’s anti-imperialist campaign, which was affecting the morale of workers and soldiers in the Allied countries. Wilson also needed to respond to independence movements in Europe, as well as in the non-European world, such as in India and China, where the U.S.S.R.’s influence was to spread. The U.S. had a particular advantage in defining itself as an anti-imperialist nation-state/empire, and appealing as a liberating force. It was a colony of the British Empire, which won its independence by fighting, and which enshrined the notions of the liberty and the independence in its national foundation. Although it itself had formal colonies, the U.S. was in a position to condemn the ‘old imperialism’ of not only the Axis Powers, but also all European powers. It claimed its mani-
fest destiny to the world to spread its ideology, ‘democracy’. Sakai Tetsuya refers to the work by an American foreign policy expert, Paul S. Reinsch, who became a minister to China during Wilson’s administration. Reinsch predicted in 1900 that the twentieth century would be the age of ‘national imperialism’, in which territorial expansion that was prevalent in the nineteenth century would be taken over by economic expansionism. Reinsch’s idea for a new approach of the powers to China was very similar to Gallagher and Robinson’s notion of an ‘informal empire of free trade’. Sakai argues that this new view of the empire by Reinsch, which emphasized economic expansion (‘informal empire’), influenced Japanese thinking about their own empire and its colonial policies: this was evident in various notions, such as ethical imperialism, economic expansionism as opposed to military expansion, and the promotion of mutual benefits through the development of resources in under-developed regions. Furthermore, Sakai also notes that these ideas became even more convincing for Japanese scholars and colonial officers in the face of locals’ increasing demands for greater political participation in Taiwan in the 1920s.

These changing imperial/colonial relations and the changing nature of nation-state/empire inevitably influenced the method and rhetoric of the League’s governance. League's
key terms were law and justice, which indicated not only the right, but also the duty of the powerful to the weak. The League, therefore, stressed powers’ benevolence and paternalism towards the weak, and promoted the welfare of the weak, such as workers, women, children, or refugees. Furthermore, this great concern with welfare was evident in the League’s various international cooperative activities: the campaign to improve medical welfare and hygiene in the world, and to prohibit drug trading and prostitution. The rhetoric and policies of welfare became increasingly crucial in the governance of the League as well as in that of the nation-state/empire. The League was also aware of the power of non-military resources in international politics. Giddens notes its special attention for the significance of information management and the promotion of the international postal service. The League was actively engaged in ‘public diplomacy’ (or propaganda) to cultivate and promote world peace. For the masses, it used pamphlets to promote world peace to schools and churches, and for the elite, it established the Internation Institute Internationale de Cooperation (IIIC).

‘Informal Empire’

One of the most significant elements in the changing nation-state/empire in the inter-war period was, therefore, a
greater significance of ‘informal empire’ and a greater recognition by the policy elite of non-military powers. Non-military power meant the power which derived from dominance in not only the economy, but also in information, communication or other intangible resources, including culture, values or ideology. This did not mean, however, that the military dominance was dismissed or neglected in this period. Here, it is important to remind ourselves that the period is characterized by the co-existence of the formal empire (including pre-1919 colonies and post-1919 mandates), the informal empire, and the new norm of self-determination. Rather, it is probably best to understand that military might only no longer was sufficient for an effective system of the governance of the powers as well as the League in the 1920s. Or it could be also understood that as a result of formalization of the empire in the late nineteenth century, the powers needed to supplement over-committed military forces with other non-military means.

‘Informal empire’ holds a key to understanding the nature of the nation-state/empire in the inter-war period. Here, it is useful to clarify how I use this term, informal empire, in comparison to others’ notions of ‘informal empire’ (those by Gallagher and Robinson, more recent scholars of British imperial history, and scholars of Japanese imperial history), or to
that of ‘Empire’ of Negri and Hardt. By doing so, I will try to elaborate a few key points: how does the notion of the nation-state/empire distinguish the difference in imperialism before and after 1919?; how does this notion see the formation of the block economy of the British Commonwealth in 1933?; how does it see ‘imperialism’ in the period of decolonization after 1945?; and how does it also see the concept of ‘Empire’ which is defined as networks of power with no centre?

British informal empire

The concept of ‘informal empire’ has been developed mainly in the context of British imperial history. Although its original meaning of ‘empire without formal colonies’ has not been altered, it has been interpreted more broadly in recent years than it was first argued by Gallagher and Robinson in 1953. Gallagher and Robinson’s ‘informal empire of free trade’ was mainly concerned with the mid-nineteenth century and British industrial capital: it was the system of free trade, defined by the existence of the unequal treaty between Britain and lesser ‘partners’. Later scholars of British imperial history shifted their main focus to London’s financial capital and its ‘gentlemanly capitalism’, and their period spaned far beyond Gallagher and Robinson’s original scope.

Because of this shift, it is at times difficult for this notion
of ‘informal empire of free trade’ to be sustained: these later scholars include the late nineteenth century when the British Empire fiercely expanded its formal colonies with military forces: they also include the period after 1933, when the ‘free trade’ imperial system officially ended with the formation of the block economy. Rather, Akita Shigeru stresses that even after this ‘official’ end of the free trade system in 1933, Britain continued to sustain and even expanded its influence to China and Japan through its strong financial capital.\textsuperscript{50} Furthermore, the notion of ‘informal empire’ is more loosely and broadly applied, including in the areas where the influence of an empire was exerted only in the domain of foreign policies, not in domestic politics.\textsuperscript{51} What is stressed, therefore, is the continuing strength of ‘informal empire’ which was based on the strong British financial capital: the changes were understood to be not substantial. Nonetheless, Akita makes a point that the British needed to shift their means of influence from military force to financial power in Asia in the mid-1930s, because of the recognition of the relative decline of their military dominance.\textsuperscript{52}

**Japanese informal empire**

Peter Duus applied more closely the notion of ‘informal empire’ of Gallagher and Robinson to the Japanese case than
some scholars of gentlemanly capitalism. It needs to be noted that Duus’ scope was specifically limited to the Japanese presence in China. This means that his case of the Japanese informal empire in China co-existed with its formal empire. Using the framework of Gallagher and Robinson, Duus stresses the unequal treaty system as the fundamental base for this ‘informal empire’. He argues that ‘[u]ntil the Manchurian incident, Japanese imperialism in China was not “formal” so much as “informal”, defined by its participation in the unequal treaty system’.53 He also points out the collaborative structure between Japan and China (although the relationship was unequal), which Robinson defined as another key factor in British informal empire.54

Duus is mindful of a loose usage of the term. Following the point made by Robinson in 1986, he distinguishes ‘informal imperial relations’ from ‘unequal, but non-imperial relations’ by a critical factor of the presence of or a threat of force. As Robinson pointed out, ‘informal imperial relations’ were still ‘imperial’, because they involved an ‘unequal contract signed under duress’.55 Albert Feuerwerker stressed the need to understand the meaning of imperialism (formal or informal) from a receiving end, China, and made the second significant point to distinguish ‘informal imperial relations’ from ‘unequal, but non-imperial informal relations’: What made the
Japanese presence in China imperial, as he argues, was its ‘totality’. Feuerwerker argues: ‘an invasion of China’s sovereignty... derogated not only the autonomy of an abstract polity, but also, more critically, the autonomy of particular and individual Chinese’.56

‘Informal empire’ did not occur without stronger military power in relation to a lesser partner. It assumed the existence of this military power, and relied on a fear that the more powerful party might resort to force ‘if necessary’. Non-military power also did not negate the significance of military power. Rather, it was used to enhance or complement military power. These were the cases both for Japanese ‘informal empire’ as well as for British ‘informal empire’. Furthermore, this criteria (the presence or a threat of force) makes it possible to apply the notion of ‘informal empire’ in the post-1945 period, even in the period after decolonization. At a time when an unequal treaty was concluded, if the presence of the superior military might of one party played a significant part in some way in the process, this could be understood as ‘informal imperial’ relationship. This was not an unlikely scenario even after 1945.

If the growing significance of ‘informal empire’ is a key to understanding the nature of international politics of the interwar period, some may ask, why don’t we just describe the
period as a transitional time from formal empire to informal empire, rather than that from one kind of nation-state/empire to another? The Feuerwerker’s point of the ‘totality’ of imperial relations is useful to answer this question. While the nation-state was very prominent in the discourse of international politics in this period, there has not been a useful framework to integrate this key concept as an integral part of the changing nature of the empire. What distinguished the nature of international politics of this period was the ‘totality’ of the nation-state/empire. By this, I mean the total mobilization of ‘nationals’ (both in metropole and colony) not only in the military, but also in broader, and non-military fields into imperial/colonial affairs; and the way these actions influenced each other. Because of this, I still see the framework based on the nation-state/empire as more useful than that of just formal and informal empire.

The meaning of 1931 and the aftermath

If we understand the inter-war period as a transitional time from one kind of nation-state/empire to another in which informal empire became increasingly significant, then how do we understand the Japanese military aggression of 1931 and its aftermath? Did this happen because of the substantial difference of the Japanese model of nation-state/empire from
other powers’ or that of the League’s? In other words, was it a systemic challenge?

Duus characterizes the Japanese informal empire in China as being part of a ‘collective informal empire’ of the powers, and this system in China was unique among informal empires of all the powers. Furthermore, like other powers, Japan prospered in this system.\(^57\) In his view, however, by the 1920s this collective informal empire in China, which was based on the unequal treaty system, was in a ‘systemic crisis’ because of the attack by ‘indigenous Chinese forces’. In Duus’ view, what distinguished Japan from other powers was the Japanese reaction to this crisis: it reacted more aggressively in order to hang onto its crucial interests, while others were more ready to abandon the system by 1931. In other words, the difference of the reactions was not due to the substantial difference of the mode of Japanese nation-state/empire from the others’. It occurred because Japanese strategic and economic stakes in China were far higher than those of other powers.\(^58\) Yet, as Duus observes, while the Japanese government before 1931 refrained from a massive military reaction, the precise timing of Japanese military aggression cannot be explained without the presence of the active Kwantung Army in Manchuria, and the fact that it had been waiting for the right moment to establish ‘the military fait accompli’ for some time.\(^59\)
As this military aggression made significant impact in China, it also caused a great change in domestic politics in Japan. As Louise Young argued, Japanese aggression and then the establishment of Manchukuo made Japan a ‘total empire’. It meant an even greater integration of the nation-state/emprise, in which process every ‘national’ was mobilized into imperial/colonial affairs on a very broad scale, and actions in the metropole and at the peripheries interacted closely. There is no doubt that the aggression in Manchuria resulted in a greater influence by the military, especially the Army, in political affairs in the Japanese metropole. It is often argued that the incident prompted the emergence of a militarist and fascist regime. Does this suggest that even if the military aggression of 1931 cannot be understood as Japan’s systemic challenge to the dominant order of the time, the Japanese mode of nation-state/emprise changed its nature significantly as a result of the military aggression in Manchuria, and became incompatible with other powers’ modes of nation-state/emprise?

While I have only a limited space to tackle this big question here, I will briefly suggest a few important works, which may leave us some clues. First, recent studies on the political system in Japan in the 1930s and early 1940s, such as those by Furukawa Takahisa and Katô Yôko, stress the
problem of the Meiji constitution system: it lacked the central executive body for policy planning and execution, and resulted in a lack of a grand plan and in ministerial fights. These works elaborate struggles of various policy elite groups to change the system.\textsuperscript{50} The Japanese political regime in the 1930s appears, therefore, hardly as coherent and well coordinated as the term, the military fascist regime, implies. Second, Takaoka Hiroyuki also argues that recent works of Japanese history of the 1930s and 1940s stressed the modernity and rationality of the regime of the time. The political system of the period was characterized as the regime which mobilized the masses into a political system both in a positive and negative sense.\textsuperscript{61} Third, this last point is also central in Yamanouchi Yasushi and others’ argument of the total war system. Here, Yamanouchi argues that the regimes developed in many industrialized countries in the 1930s and 1940s can be categorized as the total war system: Japanese, German, and Italian fascist regimes and the New Deal type regimes in the U.S. or Britain can be understood as sub-categories under this system.\textsuperscript{62} This suggests that there was no fundamental difference in the nature of the nation-state/empire between the Japanese mode and others’.

Examining various theories of the international order of the 1930s, Sakai Tetsuya also suggests there was very little
difference between the dominant theories in Japan and those in other powers. To be sure, he points out that because Japanese theories lost a 'liberal exit' in the 1930s, their focus was diverted away from the League-led social and economic international cooperation. As a result, they now shifted their attention to a more 'distorted' version of the international order, the 'regional order theory' \([kôiki chitsujoron]\), which was an imperial order, but based on the notion of 'informal empire'. Yet, as Sakai himself suggests, the difference between the powers’ visions for the international order and Japan's new regional order in the 1930s was not as significant as often understood. It was also not only Japan which turned away from League-led international economic and social cooperation in this period. For the British Commonwealth of the 1930s, its options were the 'liberal option' to impose an unequal deal to a lesser partner, or to form a block economy.

Although Manchukuo was not exactly an arrangement of 'informal empire', but more like a satellite state, it is important to remind ourselves that Japan could have made it a formal colony, but chose not to at least in a nominal sense. This could mean that the Japanese policy elite, even those in the Army, could not ignore the international condemnation of an imperial annexation in 1932. A 'public face' of the nation-state and 'informal imperial control' with the presence of
strong military force was, therefore, understood as a better option. Furthermore, in the years following Matsuoka’s
dramatic exit from the League in 1933, which has been com-
monly described as a period of Japan’s diplomatic isolation,
Japanese went into the most systematic and modern campaign
to improve its image overseas, and appease international
public opinion by deploying non-military power, culture and
information. Hirota Kōki, Foreign Minister, for example,
stressed the significance of ‘culture’ in foreign policy in 1934,
the use of non-military power in international politics.
Accordingly in the same year, *Nihon bunka shinkōkai*
(Japanese cultural promotion association) was established,
and in 1938, the Japan Institute was founded in New York.65

The Japanese state also utilized the power of information
more strategically in the 1930s. Reuters had dominated the
world of news communication in East Asia since the mid-
nineteenth century with unequal agreements with its lesser
partners in the region. The Japanese news agency, with the
American Associated Press, began to crack this dominance
around the mid-1930s. At the end of 1935, the Japanese
government established the national news agency, *Dōmei
tsūshin*. Although publicly its state support was repeatedly
denied, surviving official documents suggest a clear intention
by the state to use it strategically, especially for foreign policy
purposes. With the state support and the presence of military force, Dômei also intended to establish an ‘informal empire’ of information first in China, and then in Southeast Asia after 1941. This use of soft power was evident in the declaration of the New Order in East Asia in 1938, the publicity campaign of the Nanjing government in 1940, and that of the Greater East Asia Conference in 1943. Rather than a diplomatic isolation, these foreign policies that relied on non-military forces indicated Japan’s strong and active engagement with the world. Significantly, these policies were not unique to Japan: the British established the British Council and the Germans, the Goethe Institute in the mid-1930s. Similar uses of propaganda were also evident in policies of these other powers in the inter-war period as well as during the war. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs studied very closely what had been done in this area by other powers in 1927 and 1936, and incorporated policies and institutions which were suitable for Japan.

What distinguished the Japanese nation-state/empire from that of other powers was the geographical (and because of this, ethnic and cultural) closeness between metropole and colony (or informal colony); and its latecomer status as the nation-state/empire. Although the Japanese Empire had some commonality with what Arendt called a ‘maritime
empire’, it also shared other characteristics with the ‘continental empire’.

Japan was a powerful nation-state, which expanded into its own neighboring countries. In this neighboring empire, imperial actions immediately made an impact in the region in which the ‘metropolitan nation-state’ was located. Japan’s argument for a ‘special relationship’ with China can be understood to have stemmed from this nature as a neighboring nation-state/empire. While Japan could not use the same expansionist logic (integrating its own race) as Nazi Germany did, it nonetheless used the rhetoric of the similarity of race and culture (for Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, China) or that of the vague approximate-ness of race (Southeast Asia or the Pacific) to justify their greater legitimacy as a ‘leader’ than Europeans’. For the Japanese, this may have worked to argue for a greater entitlement. But for the Chinese, it meant a greater sense of humiliation. Furthermore, the geographic closeness meant greater economic and strategic stakes for Japan in China, and greater Japanese desperation to hang on to its right. The desperation was even greater because Japan was a latecomer nation-state/empire. Japanese leading foreign policy experts, such as Rōyama Masamichi, often made the point that Manchuria for Japan was like Egypt for Britain, or Panama for the U.S. The difference was that Japan tried to claim its control after
1919.

The dilemma and the problem of the order based on not only the nation-state, or the empire, but on the nation-state/empire were most evident in a neighboring nation-state/empire, Japan. In contrast, the double standard (metropole and colony) was more easily maintained for the maritime empires, in which metropolitan nation-states were largely located far away from colonial peripheries. Because of this, their imperial actions were more easily separated from their actions as the nation-states, while Japanese imperial actions were more immediately judged by the norm of the nation-state. While this condemnation was mainly limited to its action in an 'informal empire', it was later expanded to include its actions in its formal colonies. In hindsight, it was probably better for Japan for its imperial actions to be condemned straight away and strongly, and continued to be condemned, rather than have these actions hidden by a double standard. It lacked, however, political will or motivation to listen to this condemnation in the 1930s.

Conclusion and beyond 1945

I have argued that it is more useful to use the concept of the nation-state/empire for better understanding of the nature of international politics of the inter-war period, and the nature
of the League’s order and the Japanese actions in this period. It can effectively bring in the issue of power and ‘informal empire’ in an analysis. The concept questions the relationships among previously well-accepted terms, such as imperialism, internationalism, and nationalism (or ultra-nationalism). It could help re-evaluate key issues of international politics in the first half of the twentieth century, including the issue of international governance. It also helps us to re-consider key issues of Japanese foreign relations in the inter-war years.

I have briefly suggested how this concept, nation-state/empire, could be applied to the period after 1945, to the period of decolonization and even to the present post-Cold War period. I agree that the significance of decolonization should not be undermined, nor should the distinction between ‘formal empire’ and ‘informal empire’. Yet, military dominance continues to exert an influence, and the presence of force and its threat still remains critical factor in many unequal relations. The use of the term, nation-state/empire, makes the centre of the power more identifiable. It also demarcates more clearly the boundary of the territory where the influence is evident. In this sense, it is distinguished from the notion of ‘Empire’ by Negri and Hardt. On the other hand, as I elaborated briefly in the beginning, it is still important to leave room to interpret ‘empire’ not only as a ‘thing’ with a clear territory, but also as
a representation of relational power: relational power that is
derived from the structural dominance/subjugation. This is
because I regard ‘non-military power’ in ‘informal empire’ as
a critical factor. Non-military power, such as the power of
information, makes it hard to measure where the centre of the
power is, and blurs territorial boundaries of the spheres of
influence, as works on media studies well demonstrate. One
can, however, still use the two criteria which Robinson and
Feuerwerker suggested to distinguish ‘imperial’ relations from
‘unequal relations’.

We may live in the age of the nation-state, but a new and
historical aspect of empire still permeates the discourse of
international politics. It should be, therefore, properly incor-
porated in an analysis of international relations, which have
so far paid attention almost exclusively to the nation-state.

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1 I thank the opportunity to be able to put forward this framework,
especially for Dr Asahiko Hanzawa, and Dr Antony Best. I also thank
for useful comments by Ms Asamuma and Dr Tômatsu. Japanese
names appear surname first unless he/she is better known otherwise.
2 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’,
3 A good summary of the debate on ‘informal empire’ can be seen in
Akita Shigeru, ‘Igirisu teikoku to kokusai chitsujo [the British Empire
and international order],’ Rekishi gaku kenkyû, no. 794 (October, 2004),


9 Ibid., pp. 168–169.


11 For a good summary of the debates in recent years, see Hattori Ryūji, *Higashi Ajia kokusai kankyō no hendō to Nihon gaikō, 1918–1931* (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2001), pp. 4–12.


13 Hosoya, ‘Kokusai shakai’, p. 11.


15 Iriye, *After Imperialism*, p. 3.


17 Nish, *Japan’s Struggle*, pp. 175–179.
Hosoya, ‘Kokusai shakai’, p. 15.

Hirano Chikako argues that the norm of self-determination was yet to become a dominant one in the French metropolis and its colonies in the inter-war period. Hirano Chikako, ‘Senkanki France to shokuminchi: Teikoku shihai no shosô kara’, Rekishigaku kenkyû, no. 776 (June, 2003), p. 31.

Iriye, After Imperialism, pp. 14, 16.


Iriye, After Imperialism, p. 4.


Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, pp. 5–12.


Fujiwara Kiichi, Democracy no teikoku (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2005,


33 Ibid.


38 See John Kendle, *The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).
39 Ibid., pp. 18, 172, 182.
42 Sakai, ‘“Teikoku chitsujo”’, p. 299.
43 Ibid., p. 300.
44 Giddens, Kokumin kokka, pp. 299–301.
46 Giddens, Kokumin kokka, pp. 299–300.
47 In this sense, this notion of non-military power is very similar to what is now called as ‘soft power’. Joseph S. Nye, however, uses this term in a broad sense, including not only the type of resources of power of the state, but the means and effects of the power. Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 5–18.
51 Ibid., p. 8.
52 Ibid., p. 12.


54 Ibid., pp. xvii–xviii.


58 Ibid., pp. xxiv–xxvii.

59 Ibid., pp. xxvii–xxviii.


61 Takaoka, ‘ ‘Jūgonen sensō’’, pp. 41, 42–43.


Arita to zaigaikakukōtaishi, 3 June 1936 in the file, ‘Shogaikoku niokeru jōhō kankei kanchō chōsa ken 1’, Gaikō shiryō kan.

Arendt, Zentai shugi no kigen, part 2, pp. 161–164.

§ 3  Some Reflections on the League of Nations and International Order in East Asia: A Response to Dr. Best and Prof. Akami

Haruna Asonuma

The challenge that the international society faced after World War I was to devise means by which to restore peace and order in the post-war world. The several different ideas were discussed on the possible form international order might take and the newly created international organization. Although the two panelists speak from different standpoints - Dr. Best's is a historical study based on primary resources whereas Prof. Akami's is theory-oriented -, both of them focus on the form of the global governance in East Asia after the war. Their papers are based upon a premise that the League of Nations stayed in the background as far as the maintenance of the East Asia regional order was concerned. This implies that the collective security which the League envisaged had limited utility in the region. The difficulty the League experienced stems from the nature of the unique power structure of East Asia.

Dr. Best points out that, for the British, the Anglo-
American cooperation was the key to reconstructing the post-war order in East Asia. He argues that the British foreign policy makers and progressive elites outside the Whitehall regarded Anglo-American friendship as synonymous with internationalist cause when they discussed the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Alliance was, therefore, disapproved not only for strategic reasons but also on principles. This British understanding of internationalism is a very interesting point and reminds me of Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian)\textsuperscript{1}. As a member of \textit{the Round Table}, he was an ardent protector of the British Empire in his early years, but gradually recognized the vital importance of building a close relationship with the United States and became a strong advocate of Anglo-American solidarity. Kerr may have thought of the League operating under Anglo-American leadership based on a common language and values. But one can ask whether the League and Alliance were not sometimes considered incompatible in Great Britain? How did pro-Americans, like Kerr, perceived the Alliance? Was there any discussion in Britain of utilizing the League for shaping policy towards Japan? Was there any difference in their views towards the Alliance between pro-League and anti-League advocates?

Looking at the League in the context of Britain’s world
policies, it becomes evident that Anglo-American cooperation was one of the three functions Britain expected from the League. Britain, one of the main architects of the Covenant of League, skillfully planned it to serve British interests. The formation of three principal elements of the British external policies—trans-Atlantic friendship, European cooperation, and the empire—is traced back to the 1920s and all these goals were equally observed in the newly created League. The League served as a mechanism to restore order by settling territorial questions in Europe and provided legitimacy for British colonies through the mandate system. In other words, Britain attached several functions to the League according to geopolitical. As Dr. Best points out, it was the Anglo-American cooperation that became the basis of the British policy for international cooperation, in East Asia although the United States did not enter the League formally. But he concludes that while the League may have disputed the old order in the region, it did not come to define its future. It may be a natural consequence that the League failed to maintain the regional order in East Asia, as the coordination of Anglo-American interests did not work out well. Britain seemed to have more common with Japan than with the United States in economic terms in China, at least until the late 1920s. There was also the lack of American will to play
an active part to maintain order. Although ‘the Washington system’ was supposed to be a form of international cooperation after the end of the Alliance, yet this triumph of internationalism over ‘old diplomacy’ could be interpreted as an Anglo-American strategic retreat from East Asia, giving Japan a free hand. Another problem was that Britain did not give serious considerations to the policy coordination with other great powers, namely the Soviet Union. I believe these elements are the origin of the limitation of internationalism in East Asia.

Prof. Akami also points out the limitation of the League’s order, but in a different way. While Dr. Best treats countries more or less as sovereign states with equal status, Prof. Akami focuses on the hierarchical structure of the international system in East Asia. She argues that the international order during the interwar period is better explained by the framework of ‘nation-state/empire’ rather than that of ‘nation-state’ alone. Indeed, empires were still justified after the war, as the Allied-powers obtained new territories under the mandate system. While the logic of nation-state was well adapted to Europe where new independent nation states were born, the logic of empire still dominated East Asia. She emphasizes that the important element in the interwar period was not the transition from empires to nation states, but from
‘one kind of nation state/empire’ to ‘another kind of nation state/empire’, in other words, the transition from formal to ‘informal’ empires.

The problem with the League’s order, according to Prof. Akami, is that although it was formally founded on the nation-state principle, in reality it included empires. The dilemma inherent in the League emerged when the League’s order was adopted into East Asia in which a variety of actors including empires, nation states, dominions and colonies coexisted. European powers, while acting on the assumption of equal nation states in Europe, supported the logic of empire outside Europe. Criticism of imperialistic expansion into China sounded no more than the attempt to apply a double standard to the Japanese people. The ‘nation-state/empire’ framework is, I believe, very useful to build an integrated view on interwar period where the distinction is often made between the 1920s -the era of international cooperation- and 1930s -the era of fascism. Yet in order to successfully reconsider the inter-war period, it is imperative to respond to one question: if the dilemma of the League’s order was inherent in the League itself from the beginning, why it did not burst out until early the 1930s in East Asia? What made this dilemma suddenly problematical?

Prof. Akami is probably conscious of the relevancy of the
‘nation-state/empire’ concept to the contemporary issues, as I am. Currently empire as a subject of enquiry is very fashionable in IR and International History\textsuperscript{3}. In addition to the development of post-colonial research, intense debates over the current global order contribute to its popularity. Recognizing her idea’s applicability to wide-ranging historical events, I would like to ask a question regarding the terminology Prof. Akami used. She asserts that empires shifted from formal to informal ones, implying the informal empire is rather a ‘new’ phenomenon. Yet the same term ‘informal empire’ has been used to explain the hegemony of the British Empire in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century\textsuperscript{4}. Is the ‘informal empire’ in the interwar period different from that of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, and - if so - in what respect? The ‘informal empire’ of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century was also supported by doctrine of free trade or ‘soft power’, as with the US power in recent years. I would rather think the dynamics of formal and informal empire is more important than linear development from the former to the latter.

Both papers provide great insights to the analysis of the international relations during the interwar period. Dr. Best reveals the role which values played in the discussion of abrogating the Alliance. This provides a new perspective to research on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance where the emphasis has often been placed more on realpolitik and national inter-
ests rather than on ideas and values. I entirely agree with his suggestion that the constructivist approach contributes to the study of the international history in East Asia. On the other hand, Prof. Akami introduces the concept of ‘nation state/empire’ in the framework of the inter-war period. In addition to its contribution to the history of the interwar period, this will provide an integrated view of the history from the pre-World War I to the post-World War II. Our view of the 20th century history is largely defined by the ‘age of extremes’ and the Cold war. Yet the division of era by wars misses some important aspects of international affairs. This framework has potential to be used to produce a new understanding of the history of the 20th century as well as the comprehensive study of the League and the United Nations.

2 Regarding the Anglo-Japanese relations in China, see Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai 1925–31 (Macmillan, 1995).
§ 4  Sino-Japanese Relations  
at the League of Nations  

Shin Kawashima  

Introduction  

The main aim of this paper is to consider Sino-Japanese relations at the League of Nations. In recent years, historians of both Japanese and Chinese diplomacy have focused on the League of Nations for the following two reasons. One is the trend of re-evaluating the League of Nations itself. This is taking place because many think that the public policies conducted by the League of Nations in fields such as education, public health, and drugs in the international arena, may have played a significant role in terms of the formation of global governance in the first half of the 20th century. This contrasts considerably with hitherto criticisms of the League, which emphasized its shortcomings, such as the lack of coercive force in terms of security and that it could not ultimately prevent the outbreak of the WWII. Secondly, a consensus is now emerging that the League of Nations was not only significant in terms of providing an arena for power games among
the Great Powers, especially between the US and USSR, but also in terms of providing a unique diplomatic arena for small countries and newly independent states. In other words, the League's role in creating a new international order is now being reappraised. Examining the situation in Asia, despite the fact that in many cases small countries were dependent actors in international politics, it was quite important for Asian states, where nationalism intensified during the 1920-30s, to conduct international diplomacy and to be involved in the activities of the League of Nations as "nation-states". At the League, they had the possibility to develop relations different from bi-lateral or regional relations.

In an earlier international symposium organized by Prof. Asahiko Hanzawa at Hokkaido University in December 2003, I presented a paper titled, "Continuity and Discontinuity: From the League to the UN - The East Asian Context" in a session on "The Role of the Unite Nations in International Politics? An Historical Re-examination from the Member State's Perspective". This paper showed that there was continuity between the League of Nations and the United Nations in the sense that both provided an arena for improving the international status of nation-states, as well as for promptly developing public policies or works that supported the formation of the modern nation-state. This argument relates to the
two points mentioned above. However, the previous paper concentrated on the issue of the League of Nations and United Nations from the perspective of Chinese diplomacy. Building on the previous paper, the focus in this paper will be international relations in East Asia in the first half of the 20th century, especially Sino-Japanese relations in the League of Nations framework.

1. Japan and Chinese Membership of the League of Nations

At the 2nd Hague Peace Conference, Japan criticized China as a third-rate country for reasons such as its lacking a legal system\(^1\). Moreover, during the period between the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference, China’s major diplomatic objective was to participate in peace talks with the victor countries so as to become one of the original member states of the League of Nations. The other objective was to recover German and Austrian territorial rights in the Republic of China. Therefore, China opposed Japan’s acquisition of German rights in China. As a result, China did not sign the Treaty of Versailles between Germany, and the Treaty of Sevres between Turkey for reasons related to extraterritoriality. However, China did sign the Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria, and based on the first article of this treaty, China became one of the original member states at the League
of Nations.

During the Paris Peace conference in 1919, the inaugural meeting of the League of Nations in Paris saw the new organization become a significant actor in shaping international order after the First World War. It also had a significant role by doubling as the 3rd Hague Peace Conference. China, as one of the victors, was also a member of the meeting. In China, there was a strong influence of Wilsonianism. For China, which was dealing with diplomatic issues such as ethnic self-determination, Wilsonian principles such as reason and justice were highly respected. This resulted in heightened hopes toward the League of Nations as an entity that embodied reason and justice. There were also heightened hopes among the Chinese people that all problems would be resolved at the League of Nations under the name of “justice”.

At the time, Chinese diplomats also had high hopes toward the League of Nations\(^2\). Wellington Koo, who participated in the inaugural meeting of the League, stated that, “I may be the first person in the Chinese government who looked upon this issue [the formation of an international organization representing all states-S. K.] favourably.” He further argued that, “it will be in the best interest of China to participate in such an international organization,” because prior to the formation of the League, “China had experienced
hardship in her relations with Western countries because there was no international organization that regulated the use of force in international relations following a set of international rules.\(^3\) Wellington Koo requested President Xu Shichang to advertise and advocate within China Wilson's determination to form the League of Nations, as well as send a letter to President Wilson in which he wrote:

The President's Determination to organize a League of Nations, regardless of the size or strength of the countries, so as to maintain reason and eternal peace in the world, is truly admirable. Our people and I are deeply moved by your determination, and hope that the success of such League will transcend all over the world.\(^4\)

At the time, China regarded relations with the US as being of great importance in trying to prevent the expansion of Japanese rights in China. China attempted to develop its diplomacy by gaining U.S. support not only through bilateral relations, but also within the international organizations.

Between February and April, 1919, during the Paris Peace Conference, the Assembly of the League of Nations (comprised of 99 representatives excluding the Five Great Powers) met 15 times. Rep. Wellington Koo participated in these meetings, and made a speech as the ROC plenipotentiary when President Wilson presented the draft of the Covenant of the
League of Nations. Koo emphasized China’s vast population and wished that, “should the Covenant of the League be enforced, then unlawful state conduct can be prevented and world peace will be assured.” The Covenant’s tenth article stipulates the “territorial integrity and political independence” of member states. Should this be violated then the “Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.” China consistently demanded this provision at the Paris Peace Conference; it was also included in the treaty of the nine nations at the Washington Conference in 1921. The reason China emphasized territorial integrity and political independence was its intention to acquire a comprehensive principle that could, through negotiation with other nations, resolve diplomatic issues such as the Twenty-One Demands and the Shandong issue.

As one of the five Great Powers, Japan did not oppose these general demands by China. There did exist somewhat of an inconsistency between China, which wished to resolve the Shandong issue and the Twenty-One Demands issue through the inclusion of the principles of “territorial integrity and political independence” and Japan, which wished to keep rather vague the relation between such principles and specific issues. However, there was agreement that such principles should be included in the Covenant.
2. Sino-Japanese Relations with regard to the Article for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination

On the other hand, Japan also made claims for "just argument". That is, the argument for the elimination of racial discrimination. In recent years there has been number of studies on this issue, however, there is no study on the degree to which Japan coordinated with other countries, including Asian countries that were subject to discrimination.

At League, Britain opposed the Japanese proposal about the elimination of racial discrimination because some dominions in the British Commonwealth, especially Australia, had declared strong opposition to the Japanese proposal. Australia was worried about Chinese immigrants; Japanese immigrants were not the issue. However, there is no indication that Japan tried to persuade China to act in concert on this issue. According to the ROC Representative Wellington Koo, who participated in the preparatory meeting of the League of Nations, Japanese Representative Chinda, who raised the proposal for racial equality, had "eyed" Koo to request Chinese "amity" toward Japan. Koo replied that the ROC plenipotentiary was interested in this issue, that he sympathized with the Japanese proposal, and that he wished the opportunity to make an official statement. Wellington Koo's
statement is recorded in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Records of the “Negotiation Process of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (『人種差別撤廃交渉経過』)” as follows: “The Chinese Representative also has interest in this issue, and would like to express his sympathy with Japan, thus the Chinese Representative would like to state his opinion at a later date.”

Koo did make the above remark, and it is true that there was interest from China in the racial equality proposal; however, Koo was also aware that ROC should be cautious so as not to cause any problems with the U.S., which also opposed the racial discrimination article. Moreover, he recognized that the objective of the Japanese proposal was to create a cleavage between the U.S. and China, and that the ROC should not play into the hands of Japan⁶. In the end, the result of the vote to include the article for the elimination of racial discrimination was as follows:

In favour: French Representatives 2, Italian Representatives 2, Greek Representative 1, Chinese Representative 1, Serbian Representative 1, Portuguese Representative 1, Czechoslovakian Representative 1, Japanese Representatives 2.

Opposed: Britain, U.S., Poland, and Brazil.

China was in favour of including the article, but it demon-
strated a passive consent during the deliberative process and did not actively support Japan. On this point, it is also important to mention that this issue was not of general concern in Chinese public opinion. In March 1919, a Japanese interpreter stationed in Peking, Nakabatake, wrote a report titled, “Issue of the elimination of racial discrimination and the Chinese people” (March 8th). This report, sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted that: “In Paris, the proposal raised by our representatives regarding the elimination of racial discrimination was rejected at the Council of the League of Nations due to various problems. This was reported to Peking by news telegram on the night of February 19th, and later reported in the March 20th edition of the Junten Daily (順天時報) in an editorial designed to rouse Chinese public opinion titled “Racial Issues and Peace Conference”. However, not all Chinese-language newspapers reported the aforementioned telegram, so therefore, not many people are aware of the racial issue...”

Except for the Junten Daily, a Japanese-managed Chinese-language newspaper, no other newspaper reported on the results of the vote on the proposal.
3. Sino-Japanese Relations with regard to the Presentation of the Shandong Issue at the League of Nations

As mentioned earlier, China thought that various “irrationalities” would be resolved at the League of Nations. There was a notion in Chinese political circles that should the post WWI issues stemming from the Twenty-One Demands and Shandong issues not be resolved at the Paris Peace Conference, they could be resolved at the League of Nations. Moreover, the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry sought to raise the Shandong issue at the League of Nations.

On July 13th, 1919, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Liu Zhengxiang who was Paris at that time, sent the Foreign Affairs Ministry a proposal to present the Shandong issue at the League after the signing of the peace treaty with Austria and gaining League membership, which for the time being had become the remedial measure. The Chinese Representatives had sought to resolve the Shandong issue at the Paris Peace Conference; however, after facing some difficulties, they started to anticipate presenting a proposal on the issue at the League of Nations. On August 21st, Liu Zhengxiang proposed three methods for resolving the Shandong issue. First, if during deliberations on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles by the U.S. Congress, the Treaty should be
ratified with the suspension on the Shandong issue, then there is a possibility for the ROC to follow the line of the U. S. and sign the Treaty while suspending the Shandong issue. Second, should the U.S. Congress completely ratify the Treaty without the suspension of the Shandong issue, then China could consider direct negotiation with Germany (in which case, China would have to take into consideration the various statements made by Japan and the minutes of the tripartite meeting among Britain, France and U.S.). Lastly, should direct negotiation appear disadvantageous, then the ROC should consider submitting it to the League. However, Germany had recognized bi-lateral negotiation. While China, as a dependent actor in international relations, had to decide on its policies depending on the moves of other countries, it is significant to note that it did not consider direct negotiation with Japan as an option.

On September 10th, 1919, the ROC signed the Treaty of Saint-Germain. Once this Treaty was ratified, China would attain membership of the League of Nations. Moreover, on September 15th, the war was suspended on the orders of the Chinese President, meaning that the war was over for the ROC. Under these conditions, there were heightened demands from the local Chinese “military clique” that the Shandong issue be submitted to the League of Nations.
However, the ROC was not officially able to enter the League of Nations until 1920 because the Treaty of Saint-Germain had not been ratified by parliament. Wellington Koo and others participated at meetings of the League of Nations, but since their eligibility was ambiguous, they were unable to submit the Shandong issue. On February 17th, the Foreign Affairs Ministry sent a telegram to Wellington Koo mentioning that it would take time for the Treaty to be ratified because both the Upper and Lower Houses of the Parliament were not in session, and that because opinions concerning Shandong varied among different groups, measures were being taken to develop a common understanding on the issue. Then in March, the resolution of this issue was suddenly rushed through, because it was realized that once the Treaty of Versailles was ratified and enforced in each country, then the rights to Shandong could be negotiated and turned over from Germany to Japan.

However, the possibility for ROC to submit the Shandong issue to the League of Nations was declining. At the time when the U.S. Senate showed no intention of ratifying the Treaty of Versailles, former British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey went to Washington to request that the U.S. enter the League of Nations, even if ratification of the Treaty was suspended. Wellington Koo emphasized that China
should pay closer attention to such coordination between Britain and the U.S.\textsuperscript{14}.

On April 27\textsuperscript{th}, 1920, Koo for the third time requested the Foreign Affairs Ministry ratify the Treaty, following his first and second requests sent on January 27\textsuperscript{th} and February 9\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{15} The Foreign Affairs Ministry sent a memorandum regarding ratification procedures to the Secretariat of the State Council\textsuperscript{16}. Subsequently, the proposal to ratify was passed by Parliament on May 26\textsuperscript{th}. Shortly afterwards, the instrument of ratification was officially signed by President Xu Shichang and ratified on June 18\textsuperscript{th}. Notice of ratification finally arrived at the Representatives at the end of June, and on June 29\textsuperscript{th}, 1920, the ROC officially became a member state of the League of Nations.

However, ironically, on June 19\textsuperscript{th}, the day after Xu Shichang signed the papers, an incident occurred that hindered China’s submitting the Shandong issue to the League. That is, when Persia tried to propose to the League that Russia withdraw its occupation forces from its northern regions, the Council concluded that intervention would be difficult because direct negotiation was still possible.\textsuperscript{17} This Persian case was certainly not very encouraging for the ROC. However, on September 15\textsuperscript{th}, the Foreign Affairs Ministry demanded that its plenipotentiaries, including Wellington Koo, submit spe-
cific issues (Shandong, etc) to the League and then request the revision of all treaties that contradicted the principle of international equality 18.

The first Assembly meeting of the League of Nations was held from November to December, 1920. At this session, the Chinese Representatives realized that the League of Nations would not function as an arena where China could resolve its specific issues. Article 21 of the Covenant recognized the Monroe Doctrine as a Regional Understanding, which became the basis of justifying Japan’s hegemony in East Asia and the Ishii-Lansing Treaty. Moreover, China was unable to gain support from the permanent members of the Council regarding submission of the Shandong issue, and additionally, since the U.S. did not join the League, China could not secure a forum where it could submit the issue.

How did Japan perceive the situation? Jumping to the conclusion, Japan thought that it would be impossible for China to raise the Shandong issue at the League because Britain and France both recognized the direct hand-over of Germany’s Shandong rights to Japan, and also because the U.S. did not participate in the League. It would impossible to submit individual issues to the League even when one referred to the Covenant, and since an agreement had been formed among the Great Powers by the Treaty of Versailles, Japan
considered that it would be difficult for China to seek resolution for the Shandong issue at the League of Nations. At the end of April 1920, Foreign Minister Uchida argued as follows: China wishes to discuss the Shandong issue at the League of Nations. However, the Peace Treaty has already been ratified by Britain and France; therefore, it is difficult to think that they will listen to China’s proposal at this time. Moreover, at the League of Nations assembly meeting, when the Chinese Representatives raised the issue of Shandong, Assembly-President Dekan stated that the objective of the meeting was to discuss general issues and not specific issues such as Shandong. Therefore, the issue will not be adopted at the fourth Assembly meeting, and the issue is not something that can be adopted19.

This interpretation remained unchanged even when the Assembly meeting was approaching at the end of August, 1920. However, Foreign Minister Uchida indicated that both sides were getting prepared:

At the Assembly meeting to be held in Geneva next November, it is likely that China will propose the Shandong issue. Therefore, we should make our own preparations on such a basis20.

However, by this time, the Shandong issue was closely connected to the issue of the continuation of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance. Therefore, the Shandong issue was not submitted to the League.

4. Non Permanent Members of the Council and the Issue of Reforming the Council

As shown by a number of studies, the Chinese Representatives to the League of Nations, including Wellington Koo and Wang Chonghui, addressed and deliberated Article 4, which stipulated the procedure for selecting the members for the Council and committees. Of the six committees, the selection procedure was first discussed by the Legal Committee. The Chairman of this Committee was Lord Balfour, from Britain, while the Vice-Chairman was Wellington Koo. Koo emphasized the method of “regionalism” where out of the four non-permanent members of the Council, three countries would be selected from Europe and the U.S., and one would be from Asia, Africa, or Oceania\textsuperscript{21}. This proposal was approved by the Legal Committee, and at the Assembly. Thus, the original four non-permanent members of the Council (Greece, Belgium, Brazil, and Spain) were not chosen at this election. At the adoption of this regionalism, the ROC was selected as a non-permanent member of the Council. The ROC had support from Asian countries such as Persia and Siam as well as countries in Central and Southern America, the British
Commonwealth, and France\textsuperscript{22}. ROC non-permanent membership of the Council was not only praised by those associated with Chinese foreign affairs, but also by the Chinese public as reflecting “our country’s international glory”\textsuperscript{23}. This seat was held until the second Assembly meeting in September 1921, which was one month before the Washington Conference (the four permanent members remained). Thereafter, the ROC was placed in a difficult situation due to internal divisions, failure to ratify the proposal revising the Covenant, and the overdue League fees. However, China kept its seat by emphasizing “regionalism”.

Japan did not oppose the adoption of regionalism. However, when it became difficult for China to maintain its status as a non-permanent member, there was no movement to support China. Japan did not try hard to secure the seat representing Asia.

When Germany officially became the member of the League after the Locarno Agreement in 1925, there was a plan to make Germany a permanent member of the Council. Due to this, many countries demanded that the Council of the League of Nations be reorganized, leading to arguments about the seats of the permanent members and non-permanent members. Some countries even declared that they would withdraw from the League if there was no attempt to coordi-
nate the seats. The League subsequently held a special Assembly meeting on August 8th, instead of its scheduled September meeting. The ROC, which aimed to become the non permanent member of the Council, stated that should the number of seats of the permanent members of the Council increase due to Germany’s membership, then that ROC would also aim for a seat as a permanent member of the Council.24

Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Brazil also aimed to become the permanent members of the Council, however, only Germany was approved. It was decided that the issue of other countries would be discussed at the Assembly meeting in September, after coordination by the new “Committee on the Reform of the Council”.

During the deliberation process, Japan supported regionalism regarding the non-permanent members of the Council, and stated that it hoped the ROC would land a seat and that Japan would vote as such25. However, the conclusion reached by the committee was that the number of seats for non-permanent members would increase by three, but the seats of permanent members would not increase. Regionalism was confirmed. However, out of nine seats, only one was secured for Asia, and three were to be from Central and South America, despite the ROC claiming that Asia should occupy two seats. The Japanese Representative also agreed with the
Chinese Representative that Asia should occupy two seats. However, Spain, Brazil, and Poland opposed this, claiming that they would withdraw. Therefore, it was agreed that three out of the nine non-permanent members of the Council would become “semi-permanent members” where one country would be replaced.\textsuperscript{\textdegree 26}

After the conclusion, Chinese representative at League, Zhu Zhaoxin (朱兆莘), reported his views to Beijing as follows:\textsuperscript{\textdegree 27}

I think Asia as a region should have one of the non-permanent member’s seats at the Council of L. N., and Asian three nations, China, Persia and Siam, should have the seat by turns. If Asia as a region can get the seat, China would be non-permanent member at the Council of L. N for six years at first. After China occupies the seat, China should get the chance to become a permanent member should reform of the Council be advanced. Meanwhile, China should solve the domestic problems which negatively affect her prestige.

In fact, the 7\textsuperscript{th} Assembly meeting was held on September 1926 and China was selected as a non-permanent member of the Council for the period of two years. This selection was significant in that the seat was maintained at the 8\textsuperscript{th} Assembly meeting in 1927.

It can be said that in terms of the problems concerning the
organization Council of the League of Nations, Japan’s diplomacy generally agreed with China’s claims.

5. From Disappointment to the “Favourite Child of the League of Nations”

In 1928, the Nanking Government was established under the guidance of the Kuomintang (KMT). However, in that same year China unsuccessfully sought to become a non-permanent member of the Council at the League of Nations, and also had to take responsibility for paying the overdue League fees of the Peking Government. Many people started to question Chinese membership to the League of Nations, and there were even arguments supporting withdrawal from the League. However, China was gaining attention again as an experimental arena for “international cooperation” in terms of public health construction. Relations between China and the League improved, as is evident in the League’s decision to appropriate the debts left by the Peking Government to China as costs for international cooperation.

There was discussion regarding the visit to China between January and March, 1929, by Joseph Avenol, Vice-Secretary-General of the League, and Director of Public Health Reichman. Cooperation on public health projects was also discussed. In November 1930, the Chinese government
officially invited Reichman to China. He subsequently visited China as a public health advisor to the Chinese government. Reichman requested that Sir Arthur Salter, who was the League's Director of Economics and Finance, and Robert Hass, its Director of Communication and Transportation be invited to China. The Chinese government accepted this request, officially inviting them in January 1931. The League accepted the invitation, and the two Directors visited China, touring around and moderating with Director Reichman and the Chinese government.

In April 1931, the Chinese government established a National Economic Committee to advance its policy, and requested comprehensive cooperation from the League of Nations, including training and dispatching human resources, technical support and cultural cooperation. On May 19th, 1931, the Council of the League decided on dispatching committee members, and requested cooperation to concerned agencies (procedurally, it was necessary to obtain consent from the Council). Representative Yoshizawa of Japan also gave his consent. Within two years, the League dispatched committee members at Director level. After the withdrawal of Japan on February 4th, 1933, the Secretariat of the League released a communiqué supporting China on April 10th. On May 9th Reichman visited Nanking, and on June 30th, a special
committee was organized under the Council of the League which decided to execute a plan in cooperation with the National Economic Committee of China under which Dr. Reichman would become technical representative of the National Economic Committee. Reichman arrived in China on October 3rd 1933, and until the end of his term in July 31, 1934, he worked together with Wang Jingwei, Sun Ke and Song Ziwen, who were members of the National Economic Committee. After the resignation of Song Ziwen as Director of Finance on December 8th, Kong Xiangxi replaced him as Director of Finance, and Chiang Kai-shek came in as head of the Military Committee. Reichman gave details of his work during this period in his “Report of the Technical Agent of the Council of his Mission in China: From the Date of his appointment until April 1st, 1934” to the Committee of the Council for Collaboration between the League of Nations and China.

From the Japanese perspective, the collaboration between the League of Nations and China and the isolation of Japan at the League of Nations seem to have advanced simultaneously. Moreover, while Japan had considered becoming involved in this assistance to China, this was not welcomed by China. Juro Kishi, in his book, We Must Withdraw from the League of Nations (Asano Publishing, June 1932) [岸井寿郎『聯盟を脱退すべき』(浅野書店, 1932年6月)] stated that, “Relations
between the League of Nations and China have become close in recent years, such that it seems that the League now approaches and deals with China as if it were the mother of an infant.” He went on to argue that “China these days is not the China that has been traditionally been excluded, becoming instead a China that is nurtured and wrapped in the arms of the League of Nations”. This kind of description can be seen elsewhere too. For example, after the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations in 1933, the *Complete Translation: Reports on the Technical Support to China of the League of Nations* published by the Shanghai Mainichi Newspaper in 1934 described Reichman as “the champion of the realization of the technical assistance policy toward China after the withdrawal of Japan from the League” on account of his bringing together Song Ji Wen and Jean Monnet in order to realize a cotton and wheat loan. The same source also described this technical cooperation as being “essentially a political maneuver to compete with Japan.”33 Zhang Li also stated that “The League of Nations is an international organization that has no power in sanctioning aggressors, and only strengthens technical cooperation with China in order to save China from falling into a meager condition, and prevent China from becoming a nation looked down upon by other countries.34” However, the League was successful in a way in
instilling a feeling of isolation in Japan, which it painted as the aggressor.

Conclusion

After the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the League of Nations became an arena that symbolized the opposition between Japan and China. Japanese isolation became decisive from the dispatch of the Lytton investigating team to the withdrawal of Japan. Sino-Japanese relations per se became a focal point at the League. However, there was some disparity between Japanese and Chinese delegations when the Manchurian Incident was reported.

I have just received a simple telegram; however, detailed telegrams are being delivered to the Chinese delegation. The Chinese plenipotentiary, Dr. Shi Zhao Ji, is reporting information to the Secretariat of the League of Nations. From this information from the Chinese delegation and from other sources, the Secretariat is quite distressed. It even requested that the Council hold deliberations. However, I have explained to them that the telegram from the Japanese government states that the incident will settle down and that it is not necessary to take it up at the Council. For a moment the Secretariat believed me. However, after the continuous delivery of telegrams to
each delegation, in addition to the occupation of Fengtian (奉天) and Changchun (長春) by the Japanese Army, and the telegram that I received reporting that the Army is one its way to Jilin (吉林), the situation has become quite complex\textsuperscript{35}.

When considering Sino-Japanese relations at the League of Nations, a different picture emerges than if we just examine bilateral Sino-Japanese relations. From the Chinese perspective, the League of Nations was a place in which China could propose and resolve issues that could not be resolved between the two countries bilaterally. Japan was able to prevent this from happening regarding the Shandong issue, but it was unsuccessful during the Manchurian Incident. At this stage, the League of Nations became a space for conflict between Japan and China. With the summary of Sino-Japanese relations in the modern era by the Lytton investigating team, deliberations took place on issues such as textbooks and nationalism.

After the Manchuria Incident, Japan hoped to negotiate with China bilaterally, but China refused the Japanese proposal. Wellington Koo emphasized the role of Reichman in the Chinese decision-making process regarding this case. According to Koo, it is likely that Reichman advised Chiang Kai-shek to reject bilateral negotiations and resolve issues at
the League in order to maintain the integrity of the League. Koo thought that this was unrealistic since there was no tool that could prevent a Japanese military invasion; however, Reichman’s proposal was adopted by Chiang and ROC government.\(^{36}\)

However, we can find evidence of a co-operative relationship between Japan and China at the League of Nations. For example, during the re-organization of the League in the 1920’s, Japan supported Chinese activities, and with respect to the article on the elimination of racial discrimination, although China considered its relations with the U.S., it voted in favour of Japan. Moreover, in the 1930s, even though Japan criticized the collaboration between the League of Nations and China, at the same time many people in Japan advanced arguments in favour of cooperation with China. Similar things can be said about Sino-Japanese relations after Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations.

Translation:
Hyunjoo Naomi Chi,
Benjamin D. Middleton
I discussed this in my article, “International Position as Symbols of Chinese Diplomacy” (Kokusai Seiji, Special Edition on China after the Tiananmen Square Incident, No. 145, Summer 2006)【「中国外交における象徴としての国際的地位」（『国際政治』特集・天安門事件後の中国>145号，2006年夏，17－35页）】

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February 14th, 1919, “Wellington Koo’s Speech at the Paris Peace Conference” (Diplomatic papers, 03-37-12-2)【1919年2月14日，「巴黎和會全會全權演説詞」，（外交部檔案，03-37，12-2）】

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March 19th, 1919 (posted on March 10th), Telegram to Foreign Minister Uchida, from Minister plenipotentiary Yukichi Obata “Concerning the issue of the elimination of racial discrimination” in League of Nations Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Vol. 1, 2.4.2 2 1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan)【大正八年三月十九日本省接受 [三月十日発]，内田外務大臣宛，在支那特命全權公使 小幡酉吉「人種差別の撤廃問題ニ関スル件」）「国際連盟 人種差別撤廃」（第一卷）2.4.2 2 （外務省保存記

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8 August 24th, 1919 to ROC, *Telegram from Lu* (Diplomatic papers, 03–33, 151–2)【1919 年 8 月 24 日収，法京陸總長電（外交部檔案，03–33，151–2）】

9 September 13th, 1919 to ROC, *Telegram from France* (Diplomatic papers, 03–23, 46–1)【1919 年 9 月 13 日収，駐法使館電（外交部檔案，03–23，46–1）】

10 September 16th, 1919 from ROC, *Telegram to all Overseas Consulates* (Diplomatic papers, 03–23, 46–3)【1919 年 9 月 16 日発，駐外各使領館通電（外交部檔案，03–23，46–3）】

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21 *Report from the League of Nations* (Diplomatic papers, Foreign Affairs Ministry ROC, 03-38, 3-1)【「国際連合会第一屆大会第一股報告」(戊)（外交部檔案，〇三－三八，三－一）】

22 *Report from the League of Nations* (Diplomatic papers, Foreign Affairs Ministry ROC, 03-38, 3-1)【「国際連合会第一屆大会各股以外之報告」(戊)（外交部檔案，03－38，3－1）】。The reason why the Asian countries agreed to the Asian seat was because there was an agreement that all countries would take turns as representative.

23 Refer to December 18th, 1920 Telegram to Foreign Affairs Ministry ROC, “Telegram from Wang in Russia” (Diplomatic papers, Foreign Affairs Ministry ROC, 03-38, 14-1)【1920 年 12 月 18 日外交部収，「駐瑞士汪公使電」(外交部檔案，〇三－三八，一四－一）】and Luo, “Comments on the Closing of the League of Nations” (*Eastern Studies Journal*, Vol. 18 No. 1, January 10th, 1921)【羅羅「國際聯盟議会閉幕的感想」(「東方雜誌」一八卷一号，1921 年 1 月 10 日）】.

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§ 5  Sino-Japanese Relations
at the LN/UN (comments)

Wenlung Wang

Generally speaking, historians in Taiwan and China working on the field of relations between China and the League of Nations have primarily consulted English and Chinese archival materials only, while archives deposited in Japan relating to this topic are largely left unused by them. Indeed, scholars are in a better position to obtain needed information on the above topic from Chinese source materials, as Japan was China’s main potential enemy from the late 19th century through to the first half of the 20th century. I am aware that some Japanese scholars have done excellent researches on the relations between Japan and the League of Nations using both English and Japanese primary sources. Professor Shin Kawashima, for example, has used not only Japanese, but also Chinese archives to raise new perspectives on the Sino-Japanese interactions in the League of Nations.

First of all, I think the issue of the elimination of racial discrimination raised by the Japanese delegates at the League of Nations was substantially a strategy to puzzle China, the
United States, and the United Kingdom. Interestingly, such an idea was later adopted by Chinese diplomats, who drafted the same kind of resolution for the newly inaugurated United Nations in 1945. Although the Japanese proposal was rejected by the League of Nations, the Chinese version was accepted by the United Nations. I think it is an interesting case, and I would like to know if there is any other examples demonstrating this kind of analogy between China and Japan in the international arena.

Secondly, my opinion is that the civil war-ridden Chinese government in the post-Yuan Shikai era seriously lacked the capability to deal with China’s deteriorating relations with Japan. The provincial warlords were busy fighting with one another up to the early 1930s, when Chiang Kai-shek’s nascent and internally-unstable Kuomintang regime finally won the pyrrhic victory of the Central Plains War (中原大戰). We should also not ignore the very fact that, after the Northern Expedition in 1928, the Kuomintang regime had united the whole of China in name only. China in the 1930s was still badly in need of both time and resources for national development and reconstruction. To a weak Kuomintang regime in Nanking, in seeking foreign aid and national security, one of its best choices was the League of Nations. To turn to the League of Nations indicated Nanking’s pursuit of collective
security. However, for the Japanese, the best strategy was instead to cope with their relations and outstanding issues with China directly, without inviting international intervention. But as Japan was still a member of the League of Nations, it had to confront challenges and questions not only by China, but also by other nations in the League of Nations. In 1933, consequently, Japan decided to withdraw from the League of Nations so that henceforth it could deal with China directly as it wished. My observation is that, at this juncture, both China and Japan sought to achieve maximum benefits out of international and political maneuverings. In the end, the Chinese succeeded in getting technical and moral support from the League of Nations, thus keeping their stance toward Manchuria acknowledged internationally. The Japanese also reached their goal of dealing with the Chinese bilaterally and bringing Manchuria under their substantial control, thus fulfilling their ambitions in East Asia. Both China and Japan were not satisfied, but both had achieved what they desired.

I am interested in learning more from the Gaimusho (外務省) archives about perceptions of the Japanese diplomats posted to China at that time.

In our session Dr. Jin has talked about the relations between China and the United Nations from 1945 onward, as well as the relations between Japan and the People's Republic
of China (PRC) after 1956, the year when Japan became a member of the United Nations. As Dr. Jin suggests, the official opinion of the PRC government was optimistic about developing its relations with Japan. He not only retraces the past history of the two countries, but also tries to explore what is happening now, particularly the issue of peacekeeping.

By the end of 1949 there were two Chinese regimes claiming that they represented the seat of China in the United Nations. One was the PRC government in Peking, who was obviously on the winning side of the civil war. The other was the ROC government that had just been retreated to Taipei. After the outbreak of Korean War in June 1950, the ROC government continued to function in Taiwan, theoretically an island domain of China, under US auspices. Until 1971, the Chinese representatives in the United Nations were appointed by Taipei, not Peking.

My second point concerning the UN era is that China has become a growing power in East Asia, and it is eager to play a more active role in international affairs. I think the points Dr. Jin addresses in his talk are a sort of generalization. Indeed, we all know that China and Japan have to cooperate with each other for peacekeeping and other international matters. But apart from your generalization, is there any
other different or disputed international agenda in the United Nations between the two countries that we don't know?

I am from Taiwan, a small island located in the south of Japan and in the east of China. Since 1895 Taiwan has been a constant victim of conflicts between China and Japan. People in Taiwan were obliged to learn how to become Japanese after 1895, and then to learn how to become Chinese after 1945. My last point is: geographically Taiwan has no alternative but is destined to be a neighbor of both Japan and the PRC. Although the US military once described Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the Pacific, it nevertheless can’t sail away from the Pacific. Since the late 19th century China and Japan had both competed and sought to become the strongest nation in East Asia. The present situation between Japan and the PRC seems somewhat like what was happening in the early years of the 20th century, when nationalism within both nations was rife. Today we have learned two excellent papers discussing Sino-Japanese relations at the League of Nations and the United Nations. I hope we can learn more from Japanese and Chinese scholars about how the two nations manage to solve their problems, and what we can learn to avoid mistakes from historical experience.
§6 The United States, Japan and the United Nations during the Cold War: From the Occupation to the Nixon Shock

Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu

Introduction

In October 1943, the three principal members of the wartime Grand Alliance, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, gathered in Moscow and discussed, among other pressing questions of the war at hand, the creation of a new international organization designed to construct and maintain international peace and security. The proclaimed need for a new inter-state mechanism based on the principle of sovereignty and equality of all peace-loving nations was later endorsed by the Chinese nationalist government. Out of this wartime agreement came the United Nations, which would be launched into the turbulent history of post-World War II international relations in the summer of 1945.

In the waning years of World War II, the government of the United States made abundantly clear its commitment to the proposed new international organization that was expect-
ed to replace the now-defunct League Nations. It took charge of this international institution-building effort by presiding over the Danbarton Oaks conference where the wartime Big 4 worked out specifics of the new mechanism for global governance. From the moment of the UN’s creation, the US government looked at this enterprise as a sort of “second chance” at internationalism, or in the words of a key policymaker at the time, the “New Deal for the world” that the United States, now unquestionably the leading world power, promised to deliver.

Despite its initial sanguine idealism about the role of the UN in international affairs and the organization’s potential as an incubator of a multilateral and democratic world, the onset of the Cold War and the growing American antagonism towards one of its former wartime allies, the Soviet Union, quickly turned the nascent international organization into a site for global confrontation between the opposing ideological camps. The US began to use the UN as a forum for condemning Soviet intransigence, demonstrated through its frequent use of the veto power, and ostensibly hostile intent. The Truman administration also sought to use the UN as a media informational outlet through which to showcase the socialist state’s disruptive presence in the world. The 1946 Iranian crisis deliberated by the UN Security Council, and the consid-
eration of military disturbances in Greece and the newly created socialist states in the Balkans by both the Security Council and the UN General Assembly readily come to mind as early examples of such a US public information policy waged through the newly created world forum.

By the outbreak of the Korean War, the UN had, as far as US policy was concerned, morphed into a mechanism still multilateral in its structure, but unilateral in defining US national interests therein and carrying out what the US believed needed to be done to achieve international peace and security. In other words, through its troubled relations with the UN, the United States had to come to terms with a central conundrum of the 20th century world: how to devise and maintain a durable system of shared and more or less equitable global governance among nations with unquestionably unequal power resources?

A brief overview of the US engagement with this key question during a period which the renowned Cold War historian Walter LaFeber has identified as the first and second Cold Wars (1945 to the period of the so-called Détente engineered by Richard Nixon and Kissinger) offers an illuminating view into this challenge faced by the 20th century world. Further, focusing this inquiry into US-Japan relations set against the evolving backdrop of diplomacy at the UN allows
us to magnify this ever-present quandary of global governance. On the basis of the timeframe set by another leading historian of Cold War-era US foreign policy, Michael Schaller, I will divide my commentary into three chronological units: 1) the years between the end of the Allied occupation of Japan (1952) and Japan’s accession to the United Nations (1956); 2) 1956 through the early 1960s; 3) the remainder of the 1960s to the Nixon Shock in the summer of 1971.

1) 1952–1956

US policy regarding Japan’s accession to the UN should be considered as part of a larger American quandary over how to (re)integrate the defeated Japan into the new post-WW II international order and how far the US, now the global hegemon, and a senior partner in the consolidating US-Japan alliance, was willing to go in championing Japan’s efforts to stake out a niche in the post-war international system. It is thus useful to note and compare the timing of Japanese accession to GATT (September 1955) and Japan’s failed initial attempt at full UN accession in the summer and fall of 1955. In these two accession bids, impediments to US-Japan joint efforts were different. In the case of GATT, the road blocks were laid by nations within the Western camp: Great Britain and its commonwealth members, particularly Australia. In
terms of the UN, it was preeminently the Soviet Union. America’s communist rival vetoed Japan’s accession as part of a proposed mass admission of 18 nations from both sides of the Cold War dividing line.

Despite the different cast of opposing characters, these cases together showed that the US, in spite of its overwhelming power in the postwar world, could not fully control who could be admitted into these multilateral institutions they were instrumental in creating. The US was more forthright in its efforts to champion Japan’s accession to GATT and extended steadfast support for Tokyo’s campaigns to reintegrate itself into the community of trading nations. In the case of the UN membership bid, however, the US, at least in Japanese official perceptions, did not push hard enough. It allowed, without even a token resistance, the Republic of China to veto the en masse entry of 18 countries proposed by Canada because of Outer Mongolia’s inclusion in the list. The ROC’s veto in turn legitimated the Soviet Union’s veto of Japan’s accession. Japan’s membership in the UN did not materialize until Tokyo and Moscow normalized diplomatic relations in the fall of 1956, and key officials in the Japanese Foreign Ministry at point viewed the US as the principle impediment to the fulfillment of their UN dream.

The US-Japan controversy surrounding Japan’s UN
accession bid also exposed an enduring theme in the bilateral relations as they played out in the UN: the question of Chinese representation. In its behind-the-scenes lobbying with the Soviet Union, Japan even suggested the possibility of matching its own entry to the UN with accession by the People’s Republic of China. Needless to say, this tit-for-tat proposition was a kiss of death as far as US response was concerned, and Washington moved quickly to squelch the Japanese maneuvering. Some Japanese officials, including Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, felt then that the US was the key impediment to Japan’s accession to the UN. This bitter experience of American “betrayal” sowed seeds of Japan’s draft towards Jishu Gaiko and neutralist tendency in the mid-1950s, or at least so the US government viewed.

The 1952–56 period also showed that, in US-Japan policy coordination at the UN (and other aspects of the bilateral relationship as well), the China factor was a key, if not the key determinant. US policy over Chinese representation at the UN, until the late 1960s, was doggedly insistent on keeping the PRC ostracized from the world forum. As such, the US government was extremely reluctant to let the UN become an arbiter of some of the important questions affecting “international peace and security” at the time, most notably the war in Vietnam (because any direct engagement with the PRC on this
question would inevitably imply *de facto* recognition of the PRC or entail legitimating the PRC’s presence in UN-sponsored deliberative venues). Washington opted instead for ad-hoc deliberations outside the UN framework. As one case of such negotiations external to the UN, the United States began directly communicating with the PRC through the Johnson-Wang Geneva ambassadorial talks that began in the mid 1950s. Washington’s direct contact with the PRC at the non-UN-sponsored venue became a major irritant in US-Japanese relations while the Sino-US ambassadorial talks continued intermittently through the late 1950s. It was an insipid form of US unilateralism over the Chinese representation question. This unilateralism over China, of course, would most dramatically culminate in the Nixon Shock.

2) 1956 through the early 1960s:

After becoming a formal UN member in 1956, Japan declared its intent to become a “bridge” between the East and the West, as Foreign Minister Shigemitsu announced in his accession speech before the UN. It was during this time period when Japan’s self-assigned “bridging” mission played out against the backdrop of the emergent non-aligned movement as a third force in international relations. A success or failure of this mission depended on whether post-independence
Japan could give substance to the two pillars of its diplomatic vision, UN-centered foreign policy and partnership with Asia, relatively autonomous of the dictates of the US Cold War strategy. Japan, as a decidedly junior partner in the Cold War alliance, remained vulnerable to the vagaries of US unilateralist impulse, both within and outside the UN.

Although the US supported, as a matter of professed policy, Japan’s declared intent to bridge the East and the West and act faithfully as the West’s conduit to the Afro-Asian world, actual US actions suggested that it was deeply ambivalent about Japan’s quest for such a niche role in the UN. The sources of this US ambivalence were many: First and foremost, the Eisenhower administration was deeply hostile to neutralism in the Cold War in general, and it was particularly concerned about Japan’s drift towards neutralism and an emergent tendency to assert greater autonomy from the US in matters directly related to Asia. Washington was equally ambivalent about and disturbed by the growing militancy of the AA bloc, and the fact that the PRC played a prominent role in the AA world exacerbated the underlying US anxiety. The Eisenhower administration also viewed Japan’s close alignment with the AA bloc and Japan’s aspirations towards partnership with Asia as potentially providing impetus for Japan to move towards an atavistic form of Pan-Asiaism that
had driven the nation’s prewar militarist adventures.

There was also a deeply suggestive racial dimension to the American policy establishment’s sense of unease about Japan’s aspirations to partner with the AA world at the UN where post-colonial nations constituted by non-white peoples were becoming a numerical majority. The rise of the AA world in international relations coincided with the first wave of growing racial tension in US domestic politics in the late 1950s, first dramatized by the Eisenhower administration’s dispatch of federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas. As part of the anti-US Cold War propaganda, the Soviet Union effectively capitalized on this “original sin” of the United States as a racially segregated society claiming to be the champion of democracy and freedom. An increasing number of nations in the AA group became vocal critics of the glaring US double standards in preaching freedom and democracy for all peoples abroad while maintaining racial discrimination within its own borders.

Because of its obvious racial attribute, Japan’s goal to perform a “bridging” role between the Western industrial world and the post-colonial world in Asia and Africa harbored a danger of generating a force in global governance that the US could not quite control, unless it was willing to institute painful and disruptive reforms in its own domestic racial
practices. In this sense, American policy-making elites saw Japan’s UN-centered policy and partnering gestures towards the AA world a double-edge sword.

Yet, Japan’s own sense of superiority and self-identified cultural and economic distance from the AA world made the nation’s actual performance in embedding itself in the AA world an unfulfilled potential. Japan’s thinly masked self-distancing from the AA world manifested itself in such instances as the nation’s willing acceptance of honorary white status in South Africa. In the 1960s, Japan became an object of reproach by the AA world due to its unwillingness to forgo its lucrative trade relationship with South Africa and its failure to cooperate with the UN economic sanction against the white-minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. US officials concerned about their nation’s poor standing with the AA bloc furtively found solace in Japan, rather than the US saddled with its domestic racial baggage, acting like a poster child for insensitivity to the issue of racism still intact in the existing international order..

One area in which the US wholeheartedly welcomed Japan’s growing visibility in the UN and an intermediary role on behalf of the AA world was the redressing of the world developmental gaps. In the early years of the Kennedy administration, the United States became acutely aware of the
centrality of this economic question in global governance in general. The United States in the early 1960s also realized that development assistance was essential to winning the hearts and minds of the AA world in this new phase of the Cold War. The UN “Decade on Development” must be spurred by active Japanese participation in the form of financial contributions and technical assistance, especially in soft-currency areas in the AA world. In light of Japan’s improved economic position, the US sought Japan’s proactive involvement in UN-sponsored socio-economic programs and humanitarian enterprises.

In the meantime, Japan’s partnering with Asia continued to provide a complicating factor in US-Japan relations over the UN, as the US mandate to bar the PRC from the UN was quickly becoming a losing battle in the late 1960s. The war in Vietnam and America’s direct involvement in this Third World military conflict proved another point of mutual negotiation between the US and Japan. The two nations puzzled over how best to engage the UN in this growing problem of peace and security. The US government was determined to address this issue unilaterally, outside the UN framework. The Johnson administration was famously vigilant against any efforts and suggestions made by its Cold War “allies,” such as Canada and France, to bring the Vietnam question to
some types of UN-sponsored international deliberative venue. In the face of the surging anti-Americanism within Japan over this war in Vietnam, the government of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato deferred to the US wishes for the most part.

3) The late 1960s to the Nixon Shock of 1971

As the US became bogged down in the war in Vietnam, the Nixon administration began to explore possibilities of mending the fence with the PRC, a hated Cold War enemy and a firebrand in the AA world, as soon as it was inaugurated in 1969. It, however, opted to do so unilaterally, not as part of a collective decision to embrace the PRC into the world’s multilateral shared governance structure of which the UN was a key element. Nixon’s announcement to reach out directly to the PRC leadership outside the UN was an ultimate expression of such US unilateralism over the issue of Chinese representation. In the process, the bankruptcy of America’s PRC-ostracizing policy (and its refusal to engage the Chinese representation question as part of collective decision-making over UN membership) was masqueraded as a stunning demarche resulting from Nixon-Kissinger’s policy of détente.

In this denouement over the place of the PRC in the post-WW II global governance system, Japan again (to a certain extent on its own volition) found itself taking the fall
for a failing US policy over Chinese representation. In the 1960s, Japan continued, albeit reluctantly, to tow the line set by the US. In 1961, Japan even took an initiative in designating the ROC vs. PRC question as “an important problem” that required a concurrence of the two thirds of UN members present and voting, thus delaying the PRC’s UN admission for a decade. Even as Tokyo was slapped in the face by Nixon’s surprise announcement of his visit to the PRC, it sponsored two doomed UN resolutions regarding the ROC/PRC switchover and an expulsion of the ROC from the UN. Japan took a calculated risk over this key issue affecting its future relationship with the AA world. This decision was in part induced by an implied US promise of return of Okinawa to Japanese administrative rule. In the very least, Japanese officialdom was extremely reluctant to incur the wrath of pro-ROC conservatives in the US Congress. This agonized decision may have yielded the intended pay-off in bilateral diplomacy over Okinawa, but it nevertheless came at a heavy political cost to Eisaku Sato’s cabinet. It also came at a heavy diplomatic cost to Japan’s standing in the AA bloc in the UN.

Final Reflections

A brief look at US policy regarding the UN in the early
decades of the Cold War elucidates the nature of “internationalism” envisioned and practiced by the United States. The United States, since Woodrow Wilson’s failed attempt to be the founding father of the League of Nations, had remained deeply ambivalent about its role in global governance through a collective mechanism. Even in the 1920s and 1930s, the United States accepted the realities of the world interconnectedness and reluctantly involved itself in the international arena. Yet its breed of “internationalism” was always tinged with unilateralism. The United States was eminently untutored in the practice of internationalism as multilateral (although hierarchical) policy coordination and collective decision-making.

In the post-war period, the nation took upon itself to be the ultimate champion of a collective governance structure embodied in the UN, but its role in this multilateral enterprise always revealed the deep-seated contradictory impulses in US internationalism in the latter half of the 20th century. Does internationalism merit its name simply because the US became accustomed to pronouncing and executing its missions in international arenas? Or is the true test of American internationalism its willingness to restrain its unilateralist impulse and to achieve its diplomatic visions and interests as a part, if dominant, of collective decision-making institutions?
To what extent does “internationalism” as practiced by nations at the top of the international power “food chain” entail voluntary suppression of its unilateralist drive and participation in collective decision making and policy execution?

The way the US addressed Japan’s involvement and activity in the UN during the early decades of the Cold War provides a magnifying lens through which to view the American conundrum in the evolving system of global governance, because of the clear power differential between the two countries. It also tended to accentuate the contradictions in US policy because of the intertwining nature of Japan’s national trajectory with that of China. The PRC’s forced absence from the UN was one of the glaring anomalies in the system of global governance being formulated in the postwar period with the iron fist of US Cold War policy.

The two pillars of post-independence Japan’s diplomatic vision – UN-centered policy and partnering with Asia – were regarded by key US officials as a double-edged sword that might blunt the edges of US Cold War policy imperatives. Throughout much of the Cold war years, Japan had to practice a delicate balancing act between these two features of postwar Japanese foreign policy and its third feature (close cooperation with the Western industrialized world, mostly
with its alliance partner, the US). Yet, Japan was by no means alone in seeing the need for a balancing act. The US also waffled over how much autonomy to grant Japan at the UN; how far the US should go in tolerating Japan pushing the envelop of the US Cold War strategic mandates in the name of partnership with the AA world; how far the US should allow the UN to provide a type of “safe haven” for lesser countries such as Japan to pursue alternative visions and policies.

The UN, a brainchild of America’s “New Deal for the World,” was a viewing window to the United States’ contradictory approach to global governance after World War II. Is the United States willing to truly accept equality of all nations, big, small, or everything in between, as the guiding principle of the international order crafted at its initiative more than 60 years ago? Does the United States content itself with subscribing to the notion (and truism) that some nation-states are more equal than others? Who decides which countries are worthy of participation in that system of collective global governance operating on the principle of the rule of law? Is the United States capable of tolerating, as a legitimate *modus operandi* of global governance, the efforts by smaller and middling nations to form a countervailing bloc to restrain the excesses of US policy and make up for the limits and deficiencies of US visions and practices? Answers to
these questions that emerge in this brief discussion of US-Japan diplomacy at the UN suggest that the brand of “internationalism” practiced by the United States during the Cold War can be best characterized as a series of unilateralist behaviors displayed in an expanding global arena.
§ 7 Japan’s Participation in UN Peace-Keeping: 1950s–1990s

Tomoaki Murakami

Introduction

Over the past ten years, the Japanese government has taken an increasingly vigorous approach to its international security policy. Twenty years ago, the participation of Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF) in operations such as the peace-keeping operation (PKO) in the Golan Heights, to say nothing of the multinational mission in Iraq, would have been virtually unimaginable. This change began with the passage of a new bill allowing SDF participation in PKO in 1992. This paper will focus on the background of the passage of this important bill.

The initial concept of PKO was created in 1956, around the time Japan joined the UN. Although Japan did not participate in PKO for about 40 years, it changed policy and began participation in 1992. What caused this change? It is generally thought that Japan only began formulating plans for participation in PKO after the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990 and
that the trauma of that crisis its motivated subsequent PKO participation. However, it is worth noting that during the Gulf Crisis Japan was not asked to contribute forces to a PKO but rather to a multinational force. Nevertheless, afterward Japan chose to participate in PKO. Why? For about forty years Japan was unable to overcome domestic opposition to its participation in PKO but the government successfully pushed the peacekeeping legislation through the Diet only two years after the Gulf crisis. Why was Japan able to change policy so quickly?

In order to address these three questions, this paper is divided into two sections. The first will focus on the role of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), especially the plans it secretly formulated over in the period between 1958 and 1990. Although it is generally believed that Japan began making plans for participation in PKO only after the Persian Gulf Crisis in 1990, MOFA actually first began planning for PKO participation in the wake of the crisis in Lebanon in 1958. This paper will examine MOFA’s arguments about the dispatch of personnel on PKO missions from the Lebanon crisis through the end of the Cold War. It will divide this period into three phases: the origin phase from the 1950s to the 1960s, a planning phase from the 1970s to the late 1980s, and finally the phase of completion from 1988 to 1992.
The second section of this paper will compare Japanese plans with those developed by Canada during the same time. This will help to show which parts of Japanese planning were peculiar to the Japanese context, and which had analogs in a country in similar strategic circumstances.

**The origin of UN PKO and Canadian policy**

During the Cold War, one of the most important objectives of the UN was to prevent the Cold War developing into an open conflict that could result in nuclear war between the superpowers. In the 1950s and 1960s, there were a number of colonial wars as nations in Asia and Africa sought independence from their Western metropoles. It was feared that these conflicts could affect relations between the superpowers and trigger a nuclear war. Therefore, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld advocated preventive diplomacy as a means to fill power vacuums and prevent the escalation of conflicts. PKO were developed within this context of preventive diplomacy. The most important supporters of Hammarskjöld’s preventive diplomacy were so-called “Middle Powers”¹. Among these powers Canada was the strongest supporter of Hammarskjöld’s initiatives. Canada not only dispatched personnel on PKO missions but also assisted in the development of the model of PKO itself.
The idea of for such operations developed during the Suez Crisis of 1956. The crisis came about when the United Kingdom and France invaded Egypt after the latter’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. Although Canada was a part of the Commonwealth, it criticized the invasion because of the fear that escalation of the conflict could lead to nuclear war. Canada proposed the creation of a United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) to take over control of the Canal Zone from French and British forces. This made it possible for the UK and France to withdraw while avoiding the humiliation of passing control directly to their adversaries. Canada played an important role in the development of UNEF. A Canadian battalion supported its logistics and Canadian General E. L. M Burns took command of that force. Because of these contributions, Prime Minister Lester Pearson was awarded the Nobel Prize for peace.

After the Suez Crisis, Canada was deeply committed to PKO. In the 1960s, the UN had to deal with internal strife in the Congo and Cyprus. Canada participated in both the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC) and the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). What stimulated Canada to contribute so eagerly to PKO? Most Canadians supported the commitment to PKO from a perspective of traditional humanitarianism. But the Canadian government developed its PKO
policy in line with its perception of Canadian national interests. The Cold War was always on the minds of Canadian policy makers and they viewed PKO as a policy tool in that struggle. For example, in the view of the Canadian government the UNEF was useful in the prevention of nuclear war while ONUC and UNFICYP were seen as a means to prevent Soviet interference in NATO's sphere of influence.

The origin of Japanese PKO policy—the Lebanon Crisis of 1958

The United Nations first requested that Japan contribute personnel to one of its operations during the 1958 Lebanon Crisis. This crisis came about when the Hashemite Kingdom in Iraq was overthrown and the United States, fearing the spread of the revolution, quickly dispatched troops to Lebanon. The American action was strongly opposed by the United Arab Republic (the entity formed by the short-lived political union of Egypt and Syria) as well as by many Asian and African countries.

At that time, Japan took a seat as a non permanent member of the UN Security Council for the first time. The Kishi Nobusuke administration criticized the US action. The Kishi administration advocated a foreign policy centered around the UN and sought to act through the organization. Administration officials believed that Japan could increase its
stature and play an important role in world affairs by mediating disputes between Asian and African countries that had recently won their independence and their former Western colonial masters. Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichi even intended to abstain from voting for the UN resolution on Lebanon which the United States presented to the Security Council. Fujiyama had some sympathy for Arab nationalism and feared that the United States’ reaction would drive Arab nationalists to embrace communism. Fujiyama and other Foreign Ministry officials thought Japan could play the role of an honest broker and bridge the gap between the United States and Asian and African countries in the UN General Assembly.

But the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration could not tolerate such independence of action from one of its junior partners. The US ambassador to Japan, Douglas MacArthur II, cautioned Fujiyama to support the United States’ resolution. MacArthur warned the minister that “While only Japanese could decide what they must do, any action which gave [the] impression that they were in direct opposition to our efforts to preserve [the] independence of Lebanon could cause adverse effects on many things we are trying to do together.” MacArthur kept negotiations about the Japan-US Security Treaty in mind. At that time the Kishi adminis-
tration was eager to revise the treaty in order to get a firm engagement from the US to defend Japan\textsuperscript{13}. Therefore Kishi had no choice but to give favorable consideration to American policy in Lebanon. Regarding matters in light of this consideration, Asakai Koichiro, Japanese ambassador to US directly criticized Fujiyama’s policy\textsuperscript{14}.

How did the Kishi Administration handle the tension created by the contradictions between its policy of supporting emerging nations in Asia and Africa and its overall pro-American policy? It found the solution in PKO. It decided to approve the American resolution while simultaneously proposing a solution to the incident by submitting a draft resolution to the UN Security Council. The Japanese proposal provided for an enlargement of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) that would provide stability while making possible a withdrawal of American forces from Lebanon\textsuperscript{15}. Though the proposal was vetoed by the Soviets, Hammarskjöld supported the concept behind Japan’s proposal\textsuperscript{16}. Japan’s proactive diplomacy during the crisis was generally well received and praised by the UN at large\textsuperscript{17}. Thus Kishi’s autonomous diplomacy had the potential to evolve into that of a “Middle Power” such as Canada.

However, when Hammarskjöld requested that Japan send its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to PKO in Lebanon as a way to
implement Japan’s proposal, the Kishi administration balked\textsuperscript{18}. Behind this decision lay strong and vocal domestic political opposition to sending the SDF abroad\textsuperscript{19}. It was at this moment when Japan relinquished any possibility of becoming a “Middle Power” in the UN. After the Lebanon Crisis, MOFA’s UN Bureau drew up a “United Nations Cooperation Bill” in 1966 when it was elected to the UN Security Council again\textsuperscript{20}. Policymakers were afraid to reject any more UN requests and planned to use the bill to send SDF on PKO. But such plans came to naught as the climate of public opinion was strongly influenced by postwar pacifism and the government could not overcome the widespread and vehement opposition to the dispatch of military personnel abroad\textsuperscript{21}.

Thus, in marked contrast to Canada, Japan did not participate in PKO for quite some time. Nevertheless, MOFA had intermittently sought opportunities for such participation. At this time, Japanese PKO policy had two objectives. The first motive driving Japanese PKO policy was reinforcing security policy through cooperation with the US. This was similar to one of Canada’s essential motives. Sato’s most important diplomatic issue was winning the return of Okinawa from the US. As an essential step in this process, he had to show Japan’s willingness to help share the American burdens in Asia\textsuperscript{22}. In 1969, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku delivered
a speech supporting civilian participation in a kind of PKO in Indochina\textsuperscript{23}.

Second, Japan saw PKO participation as a means to reinforce its proactive diplomacy in the UN and Asia. Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi and MOFA’s UN Bureau under the Sato Eisaku administration began drafting plans to reform the UN Security Council in order to help Japan to once again gain a seat on the Council in 1969\textsuperscript{24}. The UN Bureau’s comprehensive plan for reforming the UN included suggestions for strengthening PKO\textsuperscript{25}. For example, the Sato administration suggested strengthening UNTSO in order to prevent Israeli attacks on Lebanon\textsuperscript{26}. The Security Council could briefly allay the dispute along the lines of such a Japanese proposal. However, Japan failed in its bid to become a permanent member of Security Council at that time. There were two reasons for this. First, reforms of the UN were opposed by both the communist bloc and the US as each saw elements of the proposed reform package as inconsistent with their interests. The Richard Nixon administration blocked Japan’s campaign for a comprehensive reform of the UN although it had no objections to and even supported the idea of Japan alone being admitted to the Council as a permanent member\textsuperscript{27}.

The second reason for the failure of Japan’s bid was that the Tanaka Kakuei administration balked at the UN request
for Japanese participation in UNTSO despite Japan’s proposal to reinforce the operation during the Sato administration\textsuperscript{28}. The refusal to participate in PKO was seen as a sign of the weakness of Japanese commitment to UN diplomacy.

Though Japan ultimately shied away from dispatching troops, support for PKO participation remained strong in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Not only MOFA’s UN Bureau but also MOFA’s Asia Bureau was interested in the dispatch of troops on PKO. In the view of Japanese diplomats the dispatch of Japanese personnel on PKO was a prerequisite to Japan’s playing a leading political role in Asia\textsuperscript{29}.

\textbf{Japan’s plan for participation in traditional PKO}

The number of new PKO decreased during 1970s and 1980s. During this time only three PKO were established even though nine such operations had been inaugurated in the period from the 1940s to the 1960s. However, despite the relative scarcity of such operations during the 1970s and 1980s, it was during this time that the traditional model of the PKO was firmly established\textsuperscript{30}. Four conditions needed to be met to satisfy this model. These were the agreement of a cease-fire, consent to the deployment of PKO by all parties concerned, the impartiality of the UN force and the prohibition on the UN force’s use of weapons except in self-defense. As a result of
the establishment of this model, PKO came to be seen throughout the world as peaceful and stabilizing operations.

What about Canadian Policy for PKO participation during this period? Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau skillfully used his country’s contribution to PKO as pillar of a new Canadian nationalism. That is because Canada’s new national self-image was consonant with the peaceful and stabilizing image of PKO. The Canadian nationalism that emerged at this time can be characterized as a quest for a distinction from the United States. Many Canadians wanted to set their own country apart from the colossus to the south. In addition, Canadian nationalism included a quest for multiculturalism, which would strengthen the unity of a society of immigrants. The image of Canadians as “Peacekeepers” in the world fit nicely with this new national image.

In short, the Trudeau administration used PKO as one way to satisfy the nationalist aspirations of Canadians. As a result, the traditional PKO model gained wide acceptance among policy makers and ordinary Canadians. Certainly the public supported PKO for reasons very different from those of the Department of External Affairs, which had seen PKO very realistically as a strategic policy tool in the Cold War. Nevertheless, PKO participation enjoyed both popular and official support in Canada.
On the other hand, in this period MOFA tried to establish an interpretation of Japan's war-renouncing Article 9 of the 1947 constitution that would accommodate SDF participation in classical PKO. In this period Japanese society, like Canadian society, was marked by the appearance of a new nationalism. Popular agitation to revise Article 9 (from the right) and to replace the US-Japan Security Treaty with unarmed neutrality (from the left) decreased during the latter part of the 1960s. Instead, a consensus began to form around moderate pacifism supported by high economic growth. These goals were no longer seen as inconsistent with Article 9 or the US-Japan Security Treaty.33

MOFA believed that the classical image of PKO as peaceful and stabilizing could fit the emerging national self-image. It tried to reconcile foreign and domestic pressures in two ways. First, ministry officials adopted an interpretation of Article 9’s restrictions that was more in accord with popular sentiment. Prior to 1972, some ministry bureaucrats had held to taken the line that Article 9 would permit the use of force by Japanese troops if they were under UN command. However, it was clear that such an interpretation was untenable in the climate of public opinion that prevailed at the time. Realizing that the peaceful character of the traditional PKO could still be accommodated under the more restrictive defini-
tion, MOFA opted to adopt a definition that would prohibit the use of force in the dispatch of SDF troops overseas\textsuperscript{34}.

Second, MOFA planned to circumvent restrictions on the use of SDF personnel by dispatching civilians on PKO when possible\textsuperscript{35}. While Article 9 could be interpreted as prohibiting the dispatch of military personnel abroad, it could furnish no possible grounds for the exclusion of Japanese civilians from participation in PKO. However, this tactic was unsuccessful for the simple reason that no opportunities arose for the use of Japanese civilian personnel.

**Japan's participation in PKO after the end of the Cold War**

The final stage of Japan's preparation to participate in PKO lasted from 1988 to 1993. In order to understand the development of Japanese PKO policy during this time one must first understand the significance of PKO in international politics at the end of the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War deeply influenced the classical PKO\textsuperscript{36}. First, the stalemates often caused by Cold War rivalries disappeared and as a result the significance of the UN Security Council in world politics increased substantially. The Council could resolve not only to establish many PKO but also to authorize Multinational forces to employ violence when necessary. Second, civil strife dramatically increased
because the function of crisis management was no longer performed by the super powers.

As a result, the number of PKO suddenly increased and most of the PKO were performed in areas of dangerous internal conflicts, areas which had not previously been the objects of classical PKO. Therefore, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed an “Agenda for Peace”, which adapted the conception of classical PKO to the present state of affairs. For example, PKO were henceforth to be established for the reconstruction of failed states and the enforcement of peace under Chapter 7 of the UN charter. In short, the characteristics of the classical PKO were no longer always applicable and thus had to be reconsidered.

After the Cold War ended the Canadian government could still, for a time, count on almost automatic popular support for participation in many PKO even if the operations were conducted in places with dangerous internal disputes. That was because Canadian participation in PKO had come to seem natural and proper to most Canadians. However, Canadian peace keepers began to encounter serious and unprecedented crises in these new missions. Canadian troops in those PKO found themselves helpless against many serious violations of human rights. In short, they were forced to witness the collapse of the classical PKO model.

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After the failure of many PKO, Canada has increasingly eschewed UN PKO and preferred to work in NATO-led or sometimes US-led operations for the suppression of civil wars. That is because Canada judged that the classical PKO alone was no longer adequate to deal with the challenges of the Post-Cold War world\textsuperscript{39}. In a sense one could view this as a measure of realism being restored to Canadian decisions about the dispatch of military personnel. Canadian idealism, which had long found expression in PKO policy, is now embodied in other venues such as Human Security policy\textsuperscript{40}.

While the changing world environment after the Cold War presented new challenges to Canadian policy makers, it also provided not only challenges but opportunities for Japanese advocates of PKO participation. In 1989, MOFA was able to dispatch a team of civilians to the PKO in Namibia for the first time. Under the Takeshita Noboru administration, MOFA also started to draw up a new bill before the Gulf Crisis of 1990\textsuperscript{41}. Under the terms of this bill, Japan could have contributed many more civilians to PKO than it did in Namibia. Japan then began to participate proactively in the Cambodian peace process. The extensive dispatches of personnel to PKO corresponding with proactive diplomacy were seen as a way to reinforce Japanese commitment to the process.
After the Gulf Crisis, Japan was not requested to send troops to PKO but to multinational forces. Properly, the new bill and the conventional definition of Article 9 could not be adapted to such a situation. But after the Gulf War, MOFA avoided participation in multinational forces. Instead it rushed to be included in the Cambodian PKO. In 1992, the PKO cooperation bill was passed at last because not only the conservative party but also centrist parties concluded that the peaceful character of the traditional PKO was consistent with the conventional definition of Article 9. As a result, Japan could dispatch not only civilian but also SDF personnel to the PKO in Cambodia in a timely fashion. This dispatch of personnel allowed Japan to reinforce its commitment to the Cambodian peace process, and to assume a leading political role in Asia and the UN. In addition, participation of the SDF in PKO created new possibilities in the Japan-US alliance in the 1990s. These were, after all the very purposes of Japanese PKO policy.

While MOFA’s preparation for participation in PKO allowed the PKO corporation bill to pass quickly, the preparation also became an obstacle to Japan’s international security activity. Even now, the SDF are restricted to fairly limited use of weaponry, and so Japan cannot adapt its policy to the transformation of PKO after the end of Cold War.
Conclusion

Most Japanese accepted contributions to PKO after the Gulf War in 1991 so quickly because MOFA had already laid the ground work for accommodating PKO in their interpretation of Article 9 during the 1970s and 1980s. MOFA thought PKO would match well with domestic pacifism as it had in Canada.

After the end of the Cold War, providing a new national identity which will simultaneously permit suitable activity in the international security sphere while being acceptable to domestic pacifist sentiment is a serious problem in not only Japan but also Canada. The governments of both nations have sought to handle this issue in ways that would be acceptable to their respective peoples.

Japanese PKO policy did not suddenly appear in the 1990s but rather was born of MOFA's historical quest for a greater international role for Japan through participation in PKO. As you know, Japan sought not only to participate in PKO but also to occasionally participate in the decision making process of PKO. Japan may find the solution to bridge the gap between international commitments and domestic expectations in such proactive diplomacy.


3 For a historical analysis of the arguments, see Hiroki Sairenji, “Nihon no kokuren heiwaijikatsudō sanka mondai: bunkan haken ni itaru made”, *Seiji keizai shigaku* (October, 2002) pp. 23–47.


7 Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping, pp. 223–41.
10 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
16 Urquhart, Hammarskjold, p. 269.
17 Tsuchida to Fujiyama, August 2, 1958, A’0383, Diplomatic Record Office of MOFA; Shimoda to Fujiyama, July 26, 1958, A’0384, Diplomatic Record Office of MOFA.
18 Matsudaira to Fujiyama, July 29, 1958; Fujiyama to Matudaira, July 30, 1958, both in documents declassified in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act.
26 Nakagawa to Fukuda, February 24, 1972, documents declassified in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act.
28 Political Division of the UN Bureau, “Jieitai shikan no UNTSO haken mondai”, October 19, 1972, documents declassified in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act.
29 Aoki to Shiina, March 24, 1965, documents declassified in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act.
32 See Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping*.
34 Political Division of the UN Bureau, “Jieitai UNTSO haken mondai”, October 26, 1972, documents declassified in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act.
35 Ibid.
41 Political Division of the U.N. Bureau, “Kokusai heiwa kyoryoku tai no haken ni kansuru houritsu (an)”, documents declassified in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act.
§ 8 Peace Support Operations: 
Contemporary Challenges and the Role of Japan

Chiyuki Aoi¹

The “peace support operations (PSO) doctrine” has developed as a way to manage the complex operations that encompass conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding, thereby enabling long-term solutions to armed conflict and regeneration of war-torn societies through a multi-actor engagement.² As a doctrine, it reflects the way Western nations (primarily NATO member states) have responded, mainly within the framework of UN-mandated missions, to threats to security deriving from the civil wars and other internal disturbances that are now the dominant source of conflict around the world. Understanding the doctrinal perspective of peace support operations today is critical for Japan, particularly given that the country is at a crossroads regarding its future involvement in international peace support and reconstruction operations.

Although the aim of this paper is not to advocate a particular policy position for Japan, the discussion here of recent doctrinal approaches is presented in the hope of better
informing current efforts by Japan to reassess its legal framework for peace cooperation and reconstruction operations, such as the drafting of a “general law” (ippanho) to guide these efforts. In light of PSO requirements, Japan should consider ways to more meaningfully engage in peace support operations, especially given the constraints imposed upon the activities of the Self-Defense Forces (namely the five principles of participation in PKOs and the current restrictive Rules of Engagement, or ROEs). The ongoing discussion about Constitutional revision should also take into account the requirements of peace support operations, although PSO involvement by the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) may not necessarily require revision of the Constitution itself. No matter how the issue of constitutional revision is resolved, issues related to collective self-defense, which relates to alliance relations – currently a preoccupation of many conservatives – should not be allowed to monopolize the debate on Constitutional revision. Peace cooperation or peace support operations do not fall within the realm of collective self-defense, as often mistakenly assumed, but are undertaken in support of international peace.

After clarifying the strategic rationale and evolution of the doctrine of peace support operations, this paper will identify the key dilemmas observed in such operations today. I
will then examine Japan’s options, in light of the doctrinal discussion and conclude with some practical recommendations for action on the part of Japan in developing peace support mechanisms.

**Strategic Rationale for Peace Support**

Although major conflicts—the classic forms of warfare between rival great powers—seem a more distant likelihood in the world today, war continues in much greater intensity in other forms: inter-communal violence, insurgency, and terror-based political violence, to name a few. Indeed, there seems no end in sight to war, defined as armed conflicts between political organizations.

During much of the modern era, threats to security were perceived as emanating mainly from external sources, but today threats emerge from *internal* sources. Internal political instability, social unrest, and humanitarian, economic, and environmental situations all have links to international security, directly or indirectly, because of social, economic, and technological changes that have occurred. The post-Cold War practice of the UN Security Council indeed supports such a view. The path-breaking declaration of the Security Council held at the level of Heads of Government in January 1992 (S/23500 (1992)) stated:
The absence of war and military conflict amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.\(^3\)

Since then, the UN Security Council has defined a number of internal situations as a “threat to” international peace and security. These included treatment of suspected terrorists (Libya); internal wars and arms transfer (former Yugoslavia, Somalia); humanitarian situations (Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and elsewhere); genocide (Rwanda); the nature of a domestic regime (Haiti); and international terrorism (Afghanistan).

*Stability*, in short, has become a matter of vital international interest. The international community has a common interest in keeping internal situations within certain boundaries so that political, social, economic, and environmental instabilities do not affect contiguous regions and beyond. Stability further serves as a basis of physical defense of the international community, particularly given the possibility that terrorism and other non-traditional threats may be generated by internal instabilities.

The challenge facing the international community is no
longer limited to avoiding major wars or securing borders after wars. The strong international stake in stability drives the need to \textit{(re)build} war-torn societies or unstable regions. The development of Peace Support Operations corresponds to this need, which cannot be met without long-term and multi-actor engagement by the international community.

\textbf{The Development of Peace Support Operations}

Peace support operations (PSO) are a practical invention responding to the security environment prevailing since the end of Cold War. UN and Western experience in dealing with Post-Cold War conflicts, especially in Bosnia, informed reevaluation of traditional approaches to peacekeeping, especially the “trinity” of traditional (or UN) peacekeeping principles, (consent, no use of force – except in self-defense – and neutrality/impartiality). Developed during the Cold War, these principles served the purpose of conflict containment in the Middle East, Kashmir, and elsewhere, where the predominant concern was to prevent the spread or spiraling of regional strife into broader conflicts. These principles proved to have limitations, however, when applied to situations involving strategic fluidity – unstable peace, partial peace agreements, or varied levels of consent – a factor present in most operations since the end of the Cold War.
During the Bosnian conflict (1992–1995), the nascent PSO doctrine, *Wider Peacekeeping*, prescribed a restrictive approach, where consent was taken as a “Rubicon” (or “Mogadishu Line”), a line that divided peacekeeping/wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Once that line was crossed, it was considered impossible to regain the consent of the local parties and to ensure the impartiality of the force. This restrictive approach, however, resulted in the loss of credibility of the UN force there and of the supporting NATO presence. Today’s PSO doctrine was developed much as a peace enforcement (PE) construct, designed to fill the “gray zone” that existed between peacekeeping and war. Consent is a long-term requirement to achieve a successful mission, but it can no longer be assumed to be a given; rather, consent is a variable that can affect the level of authority of the PSO. Consent is something to be managed and built by a PSO mission through the use of credible force and civilian support activities. The principle of *no use of force* (in Bosnia, this was minimum force) gave way to *minimum force necessary*, including coercive force vis-à-vis “spoilers” of peace, to defend and accomplish the mission. There is some variation in treatment of the principle of impartiality from one national doctrine to another, but in general, it no longer implies passive inaction in the face of “spoilers” of peace or atrocities against
civilians. Rather, it means *proactive impartiality*, implying readiness to take appropriate action in support of peace processes or international humanitarian and human rights law.

Further, corresponding to the need to rebuild, peace support operations now encompass peacebuilding activities. In practice, most PSOs – for example the NATO and EU-led operations in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo) or UN peace operations (such as in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Timor Leste) – are in fact peacebuilding operations. In PSOs, it is recognized that military forces alone cannot bring about the end-result of the mission, i.e., regeneration of the society. Hence emphasis is put on civilian peacebuilding capabilities and partnership with civilian agencies, and the need has arisen to manage ever-more complex multi-agency relations. In order to better handle the multi-agency aspects of PSOs, most nations that have the capacity to mount PSOs therefore emphasize inter-agency structure and processes that typically involve military, police, foreign affairs, and development affairs offices. Likewise, the UN has created the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office at UN Headquarters to manage the complexities that come with contemporary peacebuilding missions. To enhance coherence in the field between the UN’s humanitarian and develop-
ment activities and security-peacekeeping activities, the UN has also endorsed the Integrated Missions model.⁶

In PSOs today, a particular challenge lies in managing the transition from the initial stabilization phase to *self-sustained peace*. Successful transition to self-sustained peace builds upon successful implementation of civilian transition activities, involving the political, security, humanitarian, human rights, and development dimensions. Ultimately, a PSO's nation-building tasks will revive a nation/society's rule of law, education, commerce, humanitarian and health management, information (media) industry, military/defense, economy, and governance, based upon endogenous cultures and values.

For both the credibility of the PSO force and the long-term, multi-agency engagement that is sustained for the duration of nation-building, the mobilization and sustaining power of *political will* is critical to achieve success.

**Challenges of Peace Support Operations**

The transition from war to self-sustained peace, however, remains particularly difficult. This difficulty derives from the necessity to fill four “gaps” in the process of transition – the stability and reconstruction gap, the mandate/resources gap, the coherence gap, and the technology gap.
The Stability and Reconstruction Gap. First among the challenges is filling the so-called S & R gap ("stability and reconstruction gap") that lies between the initial combat/peace enforcement phase and the stabilization and reconstruction phase. In an immediate post-conflict situation, security is extremely poor, with few resources to protect civilians and vital infrastructure, as well as to maintain public law and order. In an environment where the maintenance of security is particularly shaky, introducing civilian nation-building capabilities, especially development agencies at an early stage, is not easy. For example, it is often argued that the S & R gap has widened in Afghanistan and Iraq, as effective maneuver warfare was followed by less effective, poorly planned stability and reconstruction operations. In many PSOs as well, there is a time lag between the initial security intervention that establishes the conditions for PSO deployment and the stability/reconstruction and peacebuilding activities that follow. As in the case of Kosovo after the initial NATO air campaign, local power contenders often seize the opportunity left by this gap to establish parallel security and administrative structures.

Ideally, plans for reconstruction and development should be included at the outset of security intervention planning, but this requires an effective inter-agency planning process as
well as inter-agency training and evaluation at all phases – pre-deployment, in-theatre, and post-deployment. If the situation is so precarious that civilian agencies cannot be deployed, the military should be mandated to do reconstruction during a limited period of time, but in such a manner that enables the realization of long-term goals.

Further, during and in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the rule of law (RoL) is one critical element of a functioning society that is missing, especially if these wars had resulted in the collapse of the government, as happened in Somalia, Liberia, and elsewhere. When societies emerge out of conflict, their rule of law institutions need to be rebuilt, but in many cases, they suffer from lack of adequate legal systems, absence of an impartial and functioning police force, adequate detention facilities, or experts in legal affairs. Thus, in post-conflict societies, the task of developing RoL institutions is urgent and requires external resources and experts. Especially needed is a functioning police, particularly formed units. Given the likelihood that local police are either non-existent or dysfunctional, the deployment of international police capabilities is often required. International police forces supervise and train the local police forces, and if necessary, take up executive functions, including arrest, search, and detention. Bringing in RoL experts, especially civilians, at an early
stage, however, may be risky and difficult if security is precarious.

*The Mandate/Resources Gap.* Another major challenge in peace support operations is filling the gap between the political mandate (the mission’s strategic objective) and the resources provided for its achievement. This gap remains particularly in UN PSOs, less, yet still seriously, in US-led, or NATO-led operations. The gaps tend to be pronounced in the following specific areas:

1. *Security.* There is continued need for a robust military capability in order to keep and enforce the precarious peace and implement peace agreements. Many post-conflict situations require a continued security presence by outside personnel, as in the cases of the Balkans, West Africa, and East Timor. In some situations, the hardest part is dealing with continuing atrocities, such as the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Darfur. Further, effective conflict prevention often requires a rapid reaction capability, which may be in short supply especially in UN missions. One of the recommendations of the Brahimi report was that the UN needs to be deployed within 30–90 days after a peace agreement to better support the peace process.\(^8\) As part of the effort to realize
this recommendation, the UN has established the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS), covering both military and police personnel, and is assisted by other rapid-reaction mechanisms such as the Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG), led initially by Denmark and currently chaired by Canada. SHIRBRIG, for instance, was instrumental in rendering headquarters support for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in its initial deployment phase. Rapid response, however, is a challenge, because the structure of UN mission planning makes it difficult to achieve the goal of deployment within 30–90 days. There is also a need for sophisticated mission support and intelligence capabilities in contemporary PSOs. SHIRBRIG also needs to be expanded to enable it to assist more missions.

2. Policing. Inability to meet demands for CIVPOL and formed police units (gendarmerie). In some cases, the police represent more than 10% of the overall force.9 It often falls on the UN to provide the police, as was the case in Bosnia where NATO forces were initially deployed, but the UN has a constant shortage of police to participate in its Peace Operations. The provision and training of impartial police continues to be especially challenging in the
US-led operation in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan, undermining the coalition effort to stabilize these countries.

3. *Sustained support.* Development assistance needs to be sustained over a long period of time. Nation-building requires an extended political and financial support over a long-term, well beyond the holding of first formal elections. Institutions, once built, still need to be supported to the point where self-sustained social and economic development is possible. A recent study indicated the UN’s weakness in this area, although the UN has done initial institution building fairly effectively.\(^{10}\) For instance, the UN successfully paved the way for a broadly representative government in Cambodia after organizing the election there. However, the UN’s limited mandate in terms of time, scope, and resources eventually resulted in the breakdown of democracy in that country.

4. *Regional institutions.*\(^{11}\) One obvious focus of the support needed for regional institutions is Africa. Africa remains the focus of the UN, hosting 8 of 18 UN Peace Operations (of which 6 are complex operations), or 75 percent of 88,000 military, police and civilian UN peacekeepers.\(^{12}\) Also it is here where the mandate/resources gap is chronic. The unfortunate situation in Darfur, for instance, where the UN has yet to establish a peacekeeping presence and the
African Union (AU) force, due in large part to lack of resources, is particularly weak, is not by any means an exception to the general trend. In addition, where peacebuilding efforts are called for, for instance, in West Africa, African institutions lack resources to engage in civilian peacebuilding activities. Therefore, it makes a great deal of sense to invest in strengthening local capacity in Africa, most importantly that of the AU, so that it can develop balanced peace support capabilities, consisting of both robust military and police capabilities as well as limited civilian capabilities so that it can, in coordination with the UN, work out optimal long-term solutions.13

To turn to Asia, this region is filled with situations that call for PSO involvement. In places such as Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Mindanao, and more recently Aceh, security intervention or international mediation was followed by PK/monitoring missions, coupled with peacebuilding/development assistance.14 Although there are limitations to the capability of ASEAN and ARF to address regional conflicts, the region would benefit from (a) a stronger capacity for coordinating security interventions and peacekeeping/observer missions, and (b) a capacity for long-term regional peacebuilding, centering on civilian capabilities, so that long-term assis-
tance to democratization, RoL, SSR, and economic liberalization could be facilitated in coordination with the UN.

Achieving Coherence. Despite much focus on civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), civil-military coordination (CMCoord), etc., there are still problems in achieving coherence within a particular mission. Different organizational cultures, preferences, and interests lead to the setting of different priorities. Different operational procedures and tools are often adopted side-by-side without coordination. Also daunting is that in PSOs, many policy objectives must be pursued simultaneously, resulting in considerable gaps in policy coordination. For instance, contradictions and trade-offs are said to exist between political and economic liberalization and stability; justice and peace; local ownership of political processes and multi-ethnic peace, to name a few. These difficulties notwithstanding, ensuring coherence among strategic, operational and tactical-level goals and means is critical to a mission’s effectiveness.

Technology. Finally, it must be pointed out that there is a significant gap in the technologies being made available for UN Peace Operations. There is a tendency for all PSOs to be short of necessary resources and equipment, but in the case of
UN missions, there is a significant gap between the severe security situations in which the UN must now operate and the quality of equipment the organization is able to procure. This technology gap can be observed in the range of weapons and other equipment (APCs, helicopters, etc.) made available by UN Member States to the peacekeeping missions. Surveillance may be another area where technological investment would make a difference in UN missions. The challenges of managing security today make imperative a fundamental review of technologies available to UN Peace Operations. The effectiveness of UN Peace Operations could be significantly improved if Member States were prepared to assist the UN better in this regard.

Options for Japan

Currently, Japan does not have the capability to provide support for the military-security arm of PSOs, in particular the peace enforcement element, due to the terms of its Constitution. It does, however, have the capability to engage in traditional peacekeeping missions. The choice Japan now faces is therefore whether to develop a full PSO capability, or to rely, as it has done so far, on other countries for the provision of security. If the choice is the former, Japan would engage most typically the maintenance of security in
the area of its operations, which would involve limited and selective use of force in self-defense in order to defend and implement the mission mandate. In this case, the preparation Japan needs to take would include: revision of the so-called Five Principles of participation in PKOs\textsuperscript{17}; preparation of a general law (ippanho) on participation in PSOs; and reconsideration of the Rules of Engagement for the Japan Ground SDF (JGSDF), to apply to PSO circumstances. It is not clear if this level of security participation would necessitate Constitutional revision.

Even without significant revisions in the laws, however, Japan should be able to contribute more to UN Peace Operations, especially by providing logistical support to UN POs and other PSOs. Japan’s option in this case would also include joining the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) and SHIRBRIG. Both mechanisms support UN operations and allow for member governments to acquire diet or congressional approval before deployment, presenting less of an obstacle for Japan than is typically understood to be the case. Another area where Japan could contribute significantly with some amendment of the laws is the provision of advanced technology, in the area of surveillance for instance, for use in UN Peace Operations. This, however, may require revision or modification in Japan’s three-point principles
banning arms export.

Regardless of its posture on exercise of military force, Japan could still increase its civilian participation in peace support operations. The recommendations contained in the 2002 Report of the Advisory Group on International Coopera-
tion for Peace remain highly relevant. Among the more feasible possibilities for Japan is to increase the number of civilians participating in election monitoring. In addition, humanitarian assistance and election monitoring should be made exempt from the application of the Five Principles of participation in PKOs. Another priority area would be partic-
ipation by Japan's civilian police in UN Peace Operations. Japan's development assistance in the area of peacebuilding would also need to move from the level of theory and guide-
lines to implementation. Japan's expertise in infrastructure building should be given more attention in peacebuilding, especially through rapid deployment in the stabilization/post-
conflict phase. A change in the institutional culture of civilian agencies has to occur, however, before nascent civil-
military cooperation for post-conflict phase assistance can be implemented.

Japan should, in collaboration with interested parties, identify realistic ways to support and strengthen regional capabilities to conduct PSOs in Asia. Region-level or region-
UN dialogues there could be facilitated to explore possibilities for regional cooperation in PSO. Further, possibilities for creating a regional PKO/peacebuilding training center have been suggested in some circles. In the context of Africa, Japan's financial and in-kind assistance should target the strengthening of regional PSO institutions, such as the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD).

**Priority Areas of Future Japanese Contribution to PSOs**

Strengthening global PSO capabilities should be a priority area for Japan.

Priority areas could include:

1. Organizing training of CIVPOL forces, also involving other Asian nations, with a view to strengthening UN Peace Operations;

2. Holding training programs for civilian personnel on PSO affairs (humanitarian relief, human rights, gender issues, legal and political affairs, DDR, mission planning and support, electoral affairs, civil affairs) to strengthen region-level PSO capability in Asia;

3. Identifying areas where Japan’s development assistance can more effectively support conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding. Priority should go, for instance, to support of recovery in Afghanistan;

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4. Working out ways to strengthen UN rapid reaction capabilities by strengthening existing mechanisms, such as UNSAS and SHIRBRIG.

5. Identifying which advanced technologies are helpful for use in UN Peace Operations that Japan can feasibly provide;

6. Working out ways to support African PSO capabilities, via political, financial and in-kind support—with special emphasis on immediate PSO needs of Africa (e.g., financial support for the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), and helping to develop the planning, logistics, and civilian arms of AU PSOs.)

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1 This article is modified from a paper presented at the Fifth Symposium on Canada-Japan Peace and Security Cooperation, 8–9 September 2006, Vancouver, Canada, which was published in the Policy Paper Series of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), Tokyo. The views expressed here are strictly those of the author and in no way represent those of the Japanese or Canadian governments.

2 A PSO is defined as “an operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations.” This is the NATO and UK definition. Allied Administrative Publication-6 (AAP-6) “NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions,”


5 The term was first defined academically in Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problem in Peace Process,” *International Security* 22:2 (Fall 1997), pp. 5–53. It is found also in various UN documents, such as the Brahimi report.


10 Dobbins 2005.


12 De Coning 2006.

August 1 September 2006, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, Ghana).

14 Although this region lacks an institutionalized PSO capability, there are signs of nascent collaboration taking place among participating states of ASEAN and ARF, involving external actors as well. For instance, in the INTERFET operation in East Timor (1999), some ASEAN nations (Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) took part, a participation made possible by Japan’s financial contribution of $100 million. A notable development has taken place in Aceh recently, where an EU Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), with the participation of ASEAN countries (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), as well as Norway and Switzerland, has been deployed since September 2005. The scope of the mission includes monitoring of DDR, SSR, human rights, legal reform, and political affairs. In Mindanao, an International Monitoring Team, with the participation of Malaysia, Brunei, and Libya, has been deployed, while Japan leads the facilitation of reconstruction and development in the region.

15 I would like to thank Professor Walter Dorn for making this point explicit. See also his contribution to the Fifth Symposium on Canada-Japan Peace and Security Cooperation, 8–9 September 2006, Vancouver, Canada. Interviews at Permanent Missions in New York conducted by this author in March 2005 also indicated a prevalent support among them for strengthening technological aspects of UN Peace Operations. Many also singled out technology as an area in which Japan’s contribution could make a difference.


17 These are: existence of a peace agreement; consent of the local parties; impartiality; the freedom of Japan to withdraw whenever it chooses; and minimum use of force for self-defense.
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has conducted reconstruction projects in the post-conflict phase in places such as Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan (Kandahar), where JICA arrived even before/without the JSDF.
§ 9 The Evolution of United Nations
Peacekeeping and Japan

Marrack Goulding

The sub-title of this very interesting conference is “Historical Perspectives”. I am not a historian but I have learnt a lot from the historians who have spoken today. I am especially grateful to Mr. Murakami for his account of Japan’s initiative on Lebanon in 1958, of which I am ashamed to say I was completely unaware. Nor am I an academic theoretician. I am a retired practitioner. My knowledge of peacekeeping is based almost entirely on my experience as the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping in the United Nations Secretariat in New York from 1986 to 1993.

There is some confusion in the terminology of peacekeeping. During the last 20 years I have made several attempts, in books and articles, in conferences and lectures or in the peace of my workroom, to design a taxonomy for peacekeeping. But during that period peacekeeping has evolved very rapidly. And as any biologist will tell you, rapid evolution inevitably creates a need for constant revision of the taxonomy.

With all due respect to Mr. Murakami, there are some
points in his paper which do not conform with the established
taxonomy – in so far as anything can be “established” in such
a fluid field. He says that peacekeeping was born in the Suez
crisis in 1956. It is true that that was the first armed PKO but
there had been earlier unarmed PKOs of which the first was in
1948 (Palestine) and the second in 1949 (Kashmir). I also have
to insist that peace enforcement, eg Korea (1950) and Kuwait
(1991), is in a quite different category from peacekeeping;
peacekeeping is based on the mutual consent of the two or
more hostile parties, whereas there is no consent when one of
the parties is to be attacked by multinational forces acting
under the authority of the Security Council.

The evolution of peacekeeping after the end of the Cold
War in 1989 was very rapid. PKOs were deployed to help end
several proxy wars which had erupted during the Cold War
with one super-power supporting one side and the other super-
power supporting the other, especially in Southern Africa,
Central America and South-East Asia. But when the Cold
War ended, and especially when the Soviet Empire fell apart,
a new set of wars broke out in Moldova, Armenia/Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Tajikistan, a phenomenon which invariably
occurs when an empire collapses. As a result, yet more PKOs
were deployed and by 1994 more than 78,000 uniformed person-
nel were deployed in 18 PKOs.
But the UN had bitten off more than it could chew. Over-reach led to disaster in the former Yugoslavia (especially Bosnia-Herzegovina), in Somalia and in Rwanda. By 1997 the number of uniformed personnel in the field had dropped from 78,000 to only 20,000.

These disasters accelerated the evolution of peacekeeping. The most important change was in the rules of engagement, ie the circumstances in which armed personnel in UN PKOs in even permitted to use their weapons. Originally weapons could be used only in self-defence. But this had terrible consequences. When extreme violations of human rights took place in Bosnia in the presence of armed UN peacekeepers, the peacekeepers were not permitted to intervene, because this was not one of the functions entrusted to them by the Security Council and because they had to be impartial and neutral between the parties to the conflict. This was agony for the soldiers and had a disastrous impact on the UN’s reputation. Similar horrors happened in Somalia and Rwanda.

After the collapse of peacekeeping in the mid-1990s, three Western powers (France, United Kingdom, United States) developed a new doctrine. This stated that peacekeepers continued to have authority to use their weapons in self-defence; but they would also have authority to use their
weapons for other purposes, provided that this was agreed by
all the parties to the conflict. Remember that every peace-
keeping operation has to be based on an agreement between
the hostile parties in which they jointly agree on the tasks to
be performed by the peacekeepers. It is only when such an
agreement has been made that the Security Council will
authorize the deployment of the PKO.

The first example of this innovation was the UN opera-
tion in Sierra Leone where the peacekeepers were authorized
to use force not only for self-defence but also to guard vital
installations, to keep communications open, to protect interna-
tional humanitarian operations and to prevent gross viola-
tions of human rights. This has now become standard prac-
tice in new PKOs, provided always that in each case both the
hostile parties agree to this element in the PKO’s mandate.

So, what does this evolution imply for Japan’s current and
future role in UN peacekeeping? Mr. Murakami’s paper has
given us an excellent source of information which we should
use to address that question. But before we do so, there is
one question which I would like to examine. It relates to
section 12 of Mr. Murakami’s report in which he states that
“PKOs were henceforth to include the reconstruction of failed
states and peace enforcement based on chapter 7 of the UN
charter”.

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I do not think that this is true of PKOs. There has always been a clear distinction in the Security Council between peace enforcement and peacekeeping. When the Security Council authorizes a peace enforcement operation it is authorizing the use of lethal force against a Member State by, usually, a group of other Member States. Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1990–91 are the classic examples of such operations – and both operations achieved their declared purpose.

This is very different indeed from peacekeeping in which the United Nations’ role is to be neutral and impartial between two Member States. And, I assume, Japanese participation in a peace enforcement operation – or, to put it more crudely, going to war – would arouse a great deal more opposition at home than participation in a neutral and impartial PKO.

This brings me back to the question I posed just now – what impact has the evolution of peacekeeping had on Japan’s past, current and future role in UN peacekeeping? There is, of course, a related question: what impact has Japan’s exceedingly cautious approach to peacekeeping had on the United Nations’ endeavours in this field?

These are delicate questions and I shall try to address them without appearing to criticize the policies which have determined Japan’s participation or non-participation in inter-
national peacekeeping operations during the last fifty years.

Let me begin with the first question – what impact has the evolution of peacekeeping had on Japan’s past, current and future role in UN peacekeeping? Mr. Murakami has given us a very clear account of the way in which Japan’s policy on its participation in UN PKOs has developed over the years. But note that there are two parallel evolutions here: first, the evolution of the Japanese Government’s policy – or perhaps I should say the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s wishful policy – on how far Japanese participation in PKOs can go without violating the Constitution; and secondly, the evolution of the UN’s doctrine and practice in peacekeeping.

If you had asked me fifteen years ago the question at the head of the previous paragraph, I would have said that the time had come when the UN’s peacekeeping successes were so numerous that Japan should join the other Member States in helping the Secretary-General to carry out the tasks entrusted to him by the Security Council. Indeed, I did say this to Japanese diplomats here and in New York at that time but they left me in no doubt that such a proposal would not win the necessary support in Tokyo. And a few years later, after the disasters of the mid-1990s, peacekeeping was in such disrepute that I would not have dreamt of urging Japan to change its policy.
Now the UN is in higher repute than it was 15 years ago and the number of uniformed personnel in the field is even greater. But – with further apologies for encroaching on your country’s sovereign rights – the recent evolution of peacekeeping doctrine on the use of weapons other than in self-defence would probably make it even more difficult for the Japanese Government to win at home the support it would require for Japan to play a larger and more conspicuous role in UN peacekeeping.

I come now to the second question: what impact has Japan’s cautious approach to peacekeeping had on the United Nations’ endeavours in this field? Again I have to be frank and to provide two replies to the question.

The first reply is Japan’s reluctance to put its troops into situations where they might have to use their weapons. This factor in Japan’s policy has caused resentment and complaints from soldiers of other contingents who do not like having to escort and protect Japanese troops who are unarmed, or under orders from their government not to use their weapons. This has been a problem in UNDOF on the Golan Heights in Syria where other contingents have been told to protect the Japanese logistics contingent in addition to their own regular duties.

The second reply to the question about the consequences
of Japan’s cautious approach to peacekeeping is that Japan is a rich country but for political reasons, not economic ones, it has so far been reluctant to make as large a contribution to UN peacekeeping as other wealthy developed countries.

This leads me to the final point that I wish to raise. It is not just about Japan; it is about most of the developed countries. The assessed (by which is meant compulsory) contributions to the UN budget by the member states of the OECD account for almost 80% of the UN’s expenditure on PKOs. As was the case in the first half of the 1990s, the wealthier Member States are becoming more and more concerned about the cost to them of UN peacekeeping, now that there are some 80,000 UN personnel (soldiers, police officers, civilian staff) deployed in 15 PKOs and costing the Member States $5 billion per annum.

And that is not the whole story. In addition to OECD governments’ assessed contributions, the few OECD countries which lend troops and police officers to UN PKOs have to bear most of the costs of having those personnel in the field. The UN pays to each government a flat rate per soldier, irrespective of the actual cost to the government concerned of having that soldier in the field.

Early in my days as Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping I did some research on how much of each govern-
ment's costs was covered by the UN’s flat rate. The operation chosen was UNIFIL in southern Lebanon. The flat rate was less than 25% of the actual costs to the government with the highest costs; and the actual costs to the contributor at the bottom of the scale were just under the flat rate.

I present this detail to demonstrate why it is that so few rich countries now contribute troops to PKOs. Is this perhaps an opportunity where Japan can take the lead not in deploying armed troops ready for combat (if necessary) but in devising incentives that would encourage developed countries to resume the major contributions to the costs of PKOs which they were making before things began to go wrong in the mid-1990s?

This proposal is not an expression of dissatisfaction with the peacekeeping performance of Third World countries; on the contrary, during my years in New York I was continuously impressed by their performance. But I was also glad then that each PKO included contingents from the developed world which brought with them advanced equipment, good training and professional skills. I believe that it would be good for Japan and the rest of the world to re-create that pattern.
Contributors

Antony Best, Senior Lecturer, London School of Economics, U.K.
Tomoko Akami, Senior Lecturer, Australian National University, Australia
Haruna Asonuma, Ph.D. Candidate, Kyoto University, Japan
Shin Kawashima, Associate Professor, University of Tokyo, Japan
Wenlung Wang, Ph.D. Candidate, National Chengchi University, Taiwan
Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, Associate Professor, Michigan State University, U.S.A.
Tomoaki Murakami, Researcher, Osaka University, Japan
Chiyuki Aoi, Associate Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan
Marrack Goulding, former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations

Editor

Asahiko Hanzawa, Associate Professor, Faculty of International Studies, Meiji Gakuin University, Japan
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